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The Swedish government originally asked me to write a paper on
reconceptualizing multilateralism and conflict prevention in
light of the international response to the genocide in Rwanda.
In order to be comprehensive and thorough in my reflections, I
ended up writing this book. Based on the book, a paper was
submitted to the Swedish government along with the draft
manuscript.
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5Part I: Preliminaries
   Chapter 1  
Puzzles
Originally, in the aftermath of my work on the
international response to the genocide in Rwanda, I started to
write a paper, at the request of the Swedish government, to
develop some practical proposals to enable relatively modest
middle powers with international concerns and commitments, such
as Sweden1, to contribute to the prevention and management of
complex emergencies. I found that I had to think about the issue
much more comprehensively and bring together much of the work
that I have done through my academic career. The result is this
book.
There is a great deal of discussion of theory in this
monograph. But this monograph is not a theoretical exercise
which is said to characterize the writings of the so-called
English school of international relations. Instead, theorizing
is embedded in both current events as well as a long historicist
overview. What is more, conclusions are drawn from an analysis
of events and what various actors do and do not do in history.
I have followed the dictum that "one must refuse to position
oneself outside of history." (Weber 1995, 9) Further, the
purpose of this analysis is to provide a framework for policy.
Though the core of the book is focused on case studies and
setting those cases in a historical context, a large part of the
the monograph is taken up with theory, and the relationship of
policy-making to theory. History and the current context of
international behaviour is seen to be a dialectic between a
limited number of epistemic communities2 - defined as knowledge
professionals focused on a common problem and broadly sharing a
general approach - and a set of parallel policy communities.
Each epistemic community has its twin in the policy field. The
theoreticians and the practitioners who operate in parallel
share a certain way of conceiving the world. Recommendations by
a specific epistemic community will generally satisfy one set of
practioners (the parallel set) while disappointing many other
practitioners. When an intellectual's membership in a specific
epistemic community is recognized, the policies recommended will
usually fall within a given set of parameters. Are intellectual
policy analyses and recommendations mere rationales for a
6certain policy-oriented community and could they, in the very
literal and traditional sense, be described as pontificating.
One of the themes explored in this paper is whether it is
possible to recommend or formulate policy outside of this self-
reinforcing circularity.
Critics of practitioners frequently point to the
incoherence and inconsistencies in policies geared toward
conflict prevention, mitigation and management. But the
theoriticians are equally inconsistent and at odds. This
monograph is concerned with exploring several possibilities. Can
most theoriticians dealing with intra-state conflicts and
international responses to them belong to a common epistemic
community?
Other scholars, especially recently, have focused on the
need for coherence among theoreticians. For example, "neo-
structuralism aims to bridge the gap between conservative and
liberal realism (regime theory) on one side and dependency and
world-systems theory on the other into a coherent 'agenda'."
(Gills & Palan 1994, 2) However, while they try to build a more
comprehensive encompassing theory, this study moves in the
opposite direction in two senses: first, building more coherence
by including professional decision makers into the program for
coherence, and, secondly, by building that coherence through
practice and praxis, as a process so that the coherence will
arise out of common practice.
Can theoreticians and practitioners belong to the same
epistemic community? The concern is not simply with bridging the
gap between academics and practitioners (George 1993) and the
various schools in each, but in integrating the two communities
and the schools in each. This is not simply a matter of
theoretical interest. It is critical for policy formulation. For
one of the main problems pointed out in the various studies of
the international response to Rwanda was the lack of coherence
in policy formulation and implementation. The fragmentary result
means that most efforts cancel one another out or else are
ineffectual.
That is the weak case for creating a comprehensive
epistemic community. This monograph makes a much stronger case,
arguing that the major problem behind the resort to violence in
complex emergencies and the inadequate international response to
dealing with such conflicts is the absence of an epistemic
community sharing a common body of knowledge and a set of
7minimal values. In other words, this monograph argues that we
need better knowledge and analysis of conflict situations, their
causes, and strategies for dealing with them not simply as
instruments upon which to base better policies, but because the
process of developing that knowledge and those analyses provides
an opportunity to create a cosmopolitan epistemic community
which is the essential missing substantive element in such
policies and actions.
Further, in making this stronger case, we will offer an
explication of why efforts to provide a more comprehensive
coherent framework in the direction of a more encompassing
theory (neo-structuralists) not only travels in the wrong
direction, but we attempt to explain how the direction taken is
but a repeat of the original divorce between theory and practice
which relegated the upholders of scientific knowledge and
universal values to a superego and critical role outside the
decision-making system.
This is clearly a constructivist effort in the tradition of
 a friend and mentor, Stephen Toulmin3 and the pragmatism of
Hilary Putman4 and Richard Rorty5. Just as Richard Dworkin has
done in moral theory on domestic and legal issues such as
abortion, I am concerned with the shared beliefs that are
already institutionalized. But unlike he and others doing such
work6, I am interested in those beliefs on which there is
agreement that they should inform practices and policies but
somehow do not, in particular, the general abhorrence at
genocide and the agreements that states have the right and even
the obligation to intervene to prevent such actions but do not
act on those shared beliefs and agreements. Ronald Dworkin and
others attempt to generalize from practices and bring our
attention to the formal rules implicit or semi-explicit in the
practices to provide an authentic source of authority for the
actual formal institutions, such as the Supreme Courts of
countries, vested with the responsibility for determining
general norms. I am concerned with explaining why the same
process does not happen in international relations. Asserting
that inter-state relations are characterized by anarchy simply
states the same proposition - international relations are amoral
- in a different form. It does not explain why this is the case
and, given the explanation, whether it should be and how it may
be remedied.
I am not concerned with asserting that it should or must be
8remedied. I am not on a superego trip divorced from the real
exigencies and dilemmas states face. I am open to the
possibility that it need not and/or it cannot be remedied. But
I am also open to the possibility that it can be remedied and
that explaining the source of the problem takes us halfway to
the remedy.
.......
In focusing on complex emergencies, instead of many
studies, this paper is based on the results of only one study -
the international response to the genocide in Rwanda - of which
the writer of this paper was a co-author. (Adelman and Suhrke
1996) Relying on one case study is admittedly dangerous and has
been used by practitioners to arrive at wrong conclusions.7 The
emphasis on Africa is understandable, both in the section on
Zaire and the one on Rwanda. After all, in the 1990s we have
witnessed the famine and aborted humanitarian relief effort in
Somalia, the genocide in Rwanda, the resumption of the civil war
in Angola, the civil war between the Christians in the south and
the Muslims in the north in the Sudan, the enormous bloodletting
in Liberia, the chronic massacres in Burundi, the collapse in
Sierre Leone. Given the earlier legacies of Uganda, Mozambique,
South Africa and Chad, and the immanent disasters to which large
African states such as Zaire, Kenya and Nigeria are now prone,
Africa is an obvious choice. Africa accounts for a very
disproportionate share of genocides, famines, coup d'états,
civil wars, and plagues.
But why focus on one state in Africa? And such a small one!
How can one draw any conclusions based on only one study? If
emergencies are indeed complex, and if there are a wide variety
of them, how can an analysis of just one case be any guide to
future action? After all, is not the foundation of intellectual
scholarship, particularly in international relations, the
discussion of wars and not just a war, the discussion of
genocides and not simply a single one?8
In addition to this methodological puzzle, the case itself
is puzzling. Why did the international community do virtually
nothing when the opportunity was present, the risks were
relatively minor, the foreknowledge was available, and one
raison d'etre of the international system was the prevention and
mitigation of genocide? After all, the international community
was not faced with a powerhouse like Germany committing genocide
during a war. Those committing the genocide of 800,000 people in
9less than three months - at a more efficient rate than the Nazis
ever accomplished - were a relatively small, poorly armed
clique, in a tiny country, Rwanda. There was an international
force present, initially invited by both sides in the civil war.
Part of the mandate of the force was the protection of
civilians. That force controlled the international airport. The
international community had both the capacity and the normative
grounds for effective intervention. Yet the world sat back and
did virtually nothing as 800,000 men, women and children were
slaughtered with machetes in their homes, on the streets, and in
the churches where they had sought sanctuary.
There were many places and factors on which to place blame.
Within the doctrine of international coercive intervention
alone, they would include:
a) the failure to deploy an adequate and effective international
deterrence and/or civilian protection force;
b) the failure to provide the force with an effective mandate;
c) UN mismanagement;9
d) the failure to collect and systematically analyze the
information they already had collected;
e) UN domination by a single superpower who was disinterested in
and disengaged from multilateralism;10
f) the failure to provide coordinated, rapid and effective
coercive intervention once the genocide began and was recognized
as such.
In addition, though there were exceptions, in general the
media also can be criticized for its initial disinterest and,
subsequently, for the fundamental disinformation spread about
the violence, reporting the situation as if Tutsis and Hutus
were killing one another in an orgy of ancient hatred, instead
of depicting the genocide as a centrally organized conspiracy by
a small group of Hutu extremists from the North-West to massacre
all the Hutu moderate leaders and kill the entire Tutsi civilian
population.
What was not at stake in this case was any accusations that
the situation involved undermining a basic tenet of the UN
itself -non-intervention in the affairs of others. This point is
critical, for it runs counter to the widespread doctrine that
the most critical factor preventing effective international
humanitarian intervention is the doctrine of the sovereign state
or that all international enforcement actions necessarily must
entail intervention and a breach of the principle of
sovereignty.11 In this case, sovereignty was not an issue;
10
intervention was. No moral and legal vacuum inhibited action.
International and African legal norms existed as well as
international ones. They were simply not enforced. (Adelman and
Suhrke 1996)
Some commentators believe that human suffering provokes a
demand for UN action even though that action constitutes
external interference in the internal affairs of a state.
(Makinda 1996, 157-8) Whether or not this is correct in general,
our report (Adelman and Suhrke, 1996) indicated that it was not
so in this case, even though the action was not a breach of
sovereignty because the UN had already been given the
reponsibility of protecting civilians by the legally constituted
government, and that permission had never been withdrawn. Human
suffering did provoke a widespread demand for action, but only
when the refugees crossed into Goma in large numbers when the
genocide was almost over.
In other words, the Rwanda case is not only a single case,
but a singular case entailing human suffering on a vast scale
which did not create a massive swell of international public
opinion for intervention even when a breach of sovereignty was
not involved and even when it would have been a relatively low
risk operation.
If one suggests that it was simply not in the self interest
of any state or cluster of states to do anything anyway, so the
analysis (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) demonstrated an ignorance of
how the international system operates, why then did France
launch Operation Turquoise at the very last minute of the
massacre? Why did the international community invest 1.4 billion
dollars in the first year in an enormous humanitarian relief
operation for the refugees, particularly when a significant
minority of those refugees were the genocidal killers
themselves? This was six times the top estimates of the
financial costs of a military intervention to stop the genocide
completely, and not just the first installment of an annual cost
of a huge relief effort. The Rwanda case seems to defy both our
normative expectations and our standard realist alternative
explanations.
This takes us into the issue of explaining international
action rather than assessing praise or blame for the failure of
that intervention. This is particularly relevant in ex-colonial
Africa where international factors played a significant role in
creating the conditions for such conflicts. I am not simply
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referring to the legacy of an inadequately educated population
required to run a modern state, or the absence of an adequately
developed democratic tradition, or the problem of running states
which are multi- multi-ethnic with single ethnic groups
occupying both sides of many borders, or many of the other
handicaps bequeathed to these ex-colonial African states. Many
of these problems were created when geographical sections of
Africa were carved up into colonies, ignoring the fact that many
different nations might be included in a single colony, and
areas occupied by one of those tribes or nations may have been
bisected by those articicially drawn borders Rwanda was
different. It was a state before it was colonized, a state
characterized by precolonial segmentation between Hutu and
Tutsi. Thus, although Rwanda was typical in that post-colonial
development aid attempted to make up for previous failures, this
was not a case where those previous failures were complicated
because of the way the colonial regime drew up the borders.
But Rwanda was typical in another way. Post-colonial
development aid did deform the local economies, creating
patrimonial regimes in which the primary source of employment
was the state, directly and indirectly. For even in the private
sector, the major contracts depended on state largesse, and
access to that depended on relationships with those in political
power. The subsequent victory of what is usually called liberal
realism and the domination of the idea of the market as the
prime determinant, meant that programs of restructuring were
introduced which undercut the power of the authoritarian or
patrimonial leaders.12 This was certainly the case in Rwanda.
The problem is that these explanations, which involve some
combination of catalytic economic crisis brought on by economic
restructuring, ethnic segmentation, a weak political authority
as a result of both, and an escalation and readiness to resort
to violence, does not explain why Namibia, South Africa,
Mozambique and possibly Zimbabwe have escaped the same fate.
Substantive causal explanations based on comparative case
studies and statistical studies are relevant, as are more
immediate analysis of the shortcomings of the instrumental
measures used to deal with the problems. This monograph does not
intend to travel down either route to focus on underlying causes
and intervening variables. Nor will I repeat the analysis on the
level of critical theory undertaken in the report I authored
with Astri Suhrke.
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That study used critical theory (CT) as its primary method
to explicate what was known to enable the genocide that took
place to be anticipated, and what initiatives were undertaken
(or not undertaken) to prevent its occurrence. Critical theory13
compares norms on which there is agreement to actual practice to
explore the contradictions between theory and practice. CT
stands in sharp contrast with a very different analytic
approach. For example, Ronald Dworkin, in his prolific writings
in the sphere of jurisprudence, also began with norms on which
there had been agreement, but he went the other way. He
constructed his theoretical framework to justify those settled
beliefs and then, using that theory, attempted to settle
disputes over contentious issues such as abortion.14
Critical theory differs from both conservative realism and
neoliberal realism or institutionalism in its approach to
international studies. Classical realism is an explanatory
theory of international relations which is then used to predict
the behaviour of the other main protagonist in the anarchic
inter-state rivalry to develop the strategy for one's own side.
In contrast, neoliberal realist internationalism "is a programme
for social reform through structured change." (Goldmann 1994,
198) The object is problem solving, not explanation and
prediction, in an effort to explore behavioural effects of
structural change. Critical theory, in contrast to both of
these, is not wedded to either a program of explanation which
directs action, or a program of action to resolve issues, but a
context based explanation to facilitate a fundamental critique
of the behaviour of all parties, whether their programmes were
based on classical realism or neoliberal internationalism.
Critical theory does not begin with any presumptions about how
the world does or ought to operate, or even that the basic unit
of operation is a sovereign state. The primary goal is neither
a general explanation nor a general program, but a particular
critique and deeper insight and understanding. Critial theory is
concerned with 'thick' description rather than the 'thin'
descriptions favored by comparative analysis and behavioural
explanatory theories. (Cf. Geertz 1973)
Since both classical realism and neoliberal
internationalism were theories of international relations
developed to deal with inter-state conflict, neither may have a
great deal to say about inhibiting intra-state violence. For
example, neoliberal "international institution building may have
limited relevance for the task of inhibiting intra-state
violence - a major function that 'a new world order' must be
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able to fulfil, as is obvious to everyone in the mid-1990's."
(Goldmann 1994, 204) Critical theory has the advantage of not
being restricted in this way.
Though CT links social theory and political practice to
explain social processes, it has two serious limitations - a
normative and an explanatory one.
Because the critical theoretical method adopted focused on
the disjunction between agreed norms and actual behaviour, the
analysis could not produce a normative direction. All the
analysis could purport to do is hold practices to account
according to the norms already agreed to between states in an
effort to reinforce existing international moral standards. In
concrete terms, the study could only conclude that if you have
signed a genocide convention, and if you want to prevent
genocide, then the practices followed did not achieve that goal.
But perhaps these norms prohibiting genocide were never intended
to be enforced? Perhaps they were simply empty rhetoric and
proof that states only act when their self interests are
involved? What justified the conclusion that if states sign
international covenants, they are obligated to keep them? But
then why act to help the refugees?
From an opposite perspective, others could argue and
criticize the study for assuming that those obligations are
simply the consequence of signing a genocide convention. They
would claim that they were the foundation for doing so.
Obligations do not arise from signing agreements but are the
reason those agreements are signed.
  Though CT certainly depicts, it does not explain the moral
failures in a situation in which there was more than sufficient
anticipatory knowledge and a preponderance of legal, financial
and military means available to stop a technologically low
level, ill-equipped and very accessible genocidal force. Nothing
within CT enables us either to explicate the absolute failure to
respond appropriately by those who at least purport to uphold
the principles of the inviolable rights of the individual and
the rights of a group not to be slaughtered simply because they
are members of that group. The conclusions can easily be used to
reinforce the position that universal moral norms are a chimera
and international organizations are the eunuchs of modern
civilization, except that the very same international community
launched a very effective and reasonably efficient emergency
operation to assist 2.6 million refugees resulting from the same
14
conflict.
In addition to its normative limitations, the critical
theoretical methodology adopted also suffered from explanatory
limitations. The Rwanda study explained the failures in the
particular case through reference to a number of factors such as
"noise' (a plethora of other world crises demanding attention)
and "shadows" (the inhibiting interpretation of the later phase
of the Somalia debacle15), but offered no general explanation for
the apparently accelerating number of such crises and the
features common to them all. This is an inherent limitation of
CT since critical theory starts with the presumption that all
social discourse is historically and contextually specific;
without that specificity, analysis is inaccurate. It is not
surprising that the case produced no analysis of root causes,
and, indeed by implication, seemed wary of suggesting there were
root causes.
This normative and explanatory limitation of the study is
captured in one central substantive inadequacy. Unlike other
varieties of more idealistic analysis, CT presumes that analysis
must originate in and, in the end, address specific social and
political interests. It suggests that the resolution of a
problem should attempt to rise above any one particular interest
by incorporating various interests. But if the interest of one
party -the Hutu extremists in this case - is exclusionary, how
can their interests be included? If the Hutu extremists were
ideologically committed not to rise above interests, but to
exclude the interests of a particular group - the Tutsis -
should the interest of that party be excluded? In the Arusha
Accords, should the extremists have been excluded, as they were,
or coopted as the Americans and French recommended?16 Restricted
to our chosen method of analysis in using critical theory, Astri
and I could not come to any agreement on whether, in retrospect,
it was appropriate to exclude those who ideologically refused to
recognize the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) because they could
never be committed even in principle to rising above the
interests of each party, or whether the American/French plan of
including the Hutu extremists in the planned Broad Based
Transitional Governemnt (BBTG) would have been the better course
of action. Do you exclude those who by belief exclude others, or
co-opt them? Critical theory has nothing in its bag of
methodological tricks to answer the question.17
If the methodology raises some questions, what about the
case itself? I have already indicated how unique the Rwanda case
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was compare to the explanatory and normative expectations
current in the literature. Further, Rwanda is a tiny,
historically and geo-politically marginal country, as distant
from the concerns of western developed nations as one can find.
We are talking about the outer limits of the developed world.
The case is extremely other in an opposite sense. The genocide
was enormous in both absolute terms and relative to the
population of the group slaughtered. What lessons can be learned
by taking a case as distant as one can find from both our self-
interest and our normative expectations?
One answer is that such a case, distant as it is from both
the interests of the great, declining and middle or small
powers, avoids any contamination of the primary focus of
analysis on which international theory has been based for the
last fifty years - the Cold War or East-West struggle. That
distance is not that obvious as we shall see. In any case, I
have much deeper reasons for using such a case quite aside from
my deep familiarity with it.
In chapter 2, I offer a theoretical explanation in terms of
bifurcation points and chaos theory. In chapter 3, I provide an
historical explanation in terms of the remoteness of the case
from the Cold War given the conventional wisdom that even post-
Cold War conflicts must be read in terms of the demise of the
Cold War. With these preliminaries out of the way, I then
explicate current international relations theory and apply that
theory to case analyses of both Zaire and Rwanda, and use those
cases to clarify the problems with current theory.
In the final section, I undertake an analysis of both
modernity and globalization to explain why an epistemic
community is the missing link in explicating violence, and
formulate the general parameters of a plan for using western
resources to build an international epistemic community focused
on the monitoring and analysis of intrastate conflicts.
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Chapter 2
Triggers and Bifurcations
One reason for focusing on crises in Africa is because
Africa is the place where we find the maximum disorder in the
world. Almost half of the civil wars being waged in the world
today (16 of 35) with battle deaths exceeding 1,000 per year,
and, therefore, half the complex emergencies, are to found in
Africa. In addition to Rwanda, the UN Security Council has on
its current agenda five other African states - Angola, Somalia,
Liberia, Western Sahara, and Rwanda's fraternal twin to the
south, Burundi.18
But the reality is that Africa, more particularly, sub-
Saharan Africa, is the continent most ignored. African countries
occupy the lowest spot in the totem pole of states competing for
the attention of the greatest power on the globe today, the
United States.19
On the other hand, in focusing on a small, marginal African
country, we can find continuity in African policy since it is
largely in the hands of the mandarins or professional
bureaucrats. When African issues come to the attention of the
head of state, it is generally only when there is a crisis. But
that too can be an advantage in terms of action just as the
normal bureacratic control can be in terms of analysis. At such
critical moments, that head of state is not trapped by current
policies, but is able to innovate. When bureaucratic influences
are briefly interupted, the "possibility for change in
interventionist practices is great." (Schraeder 1994, 50) The
more pronounced the crisis point, or what I will call a
bifurcation point, the greater the scope for innovation and real
change. In Africa, we find both long term continuities in policy
and sudden crises which offer opportunities for creative action.
Bifurcation points not only allow policy makers in the
developed world the greatest scope for change and innovation,
but such points of chaos are themselves subject to very
unpredictable patterns. In such situations, what often counts
most is not the underlying or root causes or even intervening
variables, but the triggers themselves. It takes very little to
shift a situation in one direction rather than another.
Brown (1996b, 573), for example, identifies four main
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cluster of factors which compare somewhat to and have a large
overlap with the four underlying causes I identify: an economic
crisis, weak institutions, social segmentation, and proneness to
violence. He identifies "structural factors such as weak states,
security concerns, and ethnic geography; political factors such
as discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national
ideologies, inter-group politics, and elite politics;
economic/scial factors such as widespread economic problems,
discriminatory economic systems, and economic development and
modernization; and cultural/oerceotual factors such as patterns
of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories."
Proximate causes are but the acceleration of the underlying
causes as can be seen in the comparative chart Brown (1996b, 577
Table 17.1) provides for which we offer the following
abbreviated version.
Underlying Causes Proximate Causes
Structural factors
- weak states - collapsing states
- intra-state security concerns - changing intra-state military
balance
- ethnic geography - changing demographic patterns
Political Factors
- discriminatory political inst. - political transitions
- exclusionary national ideologies - increasing same
- inter-group politics - growing inter-group compet.
- elite politics - leadership struggles intense
Economic/Social Factors
- economic problems - mounting
- discriminatiry economic systems - growing inequities
- economic development and - fast-paced development &
modernization modernization
Cultural/Perceptual Factors
- patterns of cultural - intensifying
discrimination
- problematic group histories - ethnic bashing and 
propagandizing
Brown generalizes from the very specific conclusion we drew
in our own report (Adelman and Suhrke 1996). "(S)tates are
especially prone to violence if state structures are collapsing
due to external developments (such as sharp reductions in
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international financial asistance or sharp declines in commodity
prices), internal problems (new, incompetent leaders or rampant
corruption)." (Brown 1996b, 576)
However, Brown, in contrast to most theorists concerned
with underlying and proximate causes, recognizes the importance
of identifying contingent factors. As he noted, there is not
enough data on the role of elites and leaders in instigating
violence or on the roles of neighbouring states as triggers.
This was perhaps the greatest strength of the Adelman and Suhrke
report on Rwanda; it identified and characterized the importance
of both those factors. Deep description is needed to identify
these contingent factors.
(C)onflict prevention efforts should focus very
aggressively on the decisions and actions of domestic
elites, who are usually responsible for sparking
internal conflicts...Those interested in conflict
prevention need to think systematically about ways of
neutralizing the ethnic bashing, ethnic skapegoating,
hate-mongering, and propagandizing that are often the
precursors to violence." (Brown 1996b, 599)
To neutraize the effects of specific leaders. knowledge is
needed which goes beyond general causes to identifying what
George (1993) calls the role of actor-centred and situational
analysis. This is because different nations and groups have
different propensities. The classical realism of Thucydides
recognized this. For example, it was important to recognize the
national character of Athens with its propensity to be bold,
innovative and relatively magnanimous while Sparta was
conservative, calculating and sometimes viscious. (Johnson 1993,
28) The idiosyncracies of individual leaders can be even more
important.
Further, an analysis of endogenous factors is insufficient.
Even if the primary causes of violence are internal, exogenous
factors are critical. At the very least, they play a permissive
role. They cannot be left out of any analysis. It is as
important to understand the conceptual and practical constraints
of outside actors and the conditions, capacities and motivations
which can propel them to act effectively as to understand the
internal dynamics within a state and within the region in which
that state exists. For, as the Rwanda study makes clear, the
role of neighbouring states is critical to understanding the
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conflict as well as grasping the best mechanisms for helping to
minimize that violence. Understanding the role of permissive
conditions and outside actions and their interaction with the
triggers which exacerbate the proximate causes of violence is
critical to any analysis.
This does not mean that the focus shifts from "discrete
(ontologically distinct) unities (that is states like Rwanda) to
the dynamics of social development within the international
system as a whole." (Gills & Palan 1994, 3) In contrast to the
neo-structuralist agenda in which the stress is on the primacy
of the totality of the international system, my perspective is
sceptical of any attempts to assume a god's eye view, to, as it
were, analyze a situation sub specie aeternitatis. I am wary of
creating any distance between theory and history. Theory must be
embedded in the details and nuances of history.
Further, as I shall attempt to explain in Part III, the
root cause of the divorce between theory and practice is to be
found in the mediaeval disposition of theorists in insisting
that they represented an absolute standpoint and that from their
vantage, those involved with power, but particularly with the
accumulation of wealth, were somehow inherently to be identified
with the devil's work. Because such theorists no longer use god
or devil talk and have totally secularized this perspective does
not mean they have escaped the propensities that were involved
in that position. While chastizing their theoretical opponents
for being concerned with what is universal and timeless in
contrast to their own historicist perspective, I argue that they
have not been sufficiently historicist for they do not recognize
the mediaeval origins of their own work. An important theme of
this work is not only to argue that such efforts take us in the
wrong direction, but to explain why and how the situation first
arose, as well as its critical impact on our current handicaps
in tackling the issue of large scale violence. That direction is
not only wrong in explanatory terms; it is wrong in moral terms.
The common theme of both the mediaeval moralists and our
contemporary anti-religious neo-Marxists of various stripes is
to equate the key source of the problem with capitalism. In
modernity, it is expropriating surplus value which naturally
belongs to those who invest their labour to produce it. In the
mediaeval period, it entailed putting a price on capital and
charging interest.
Rather than some general cause, such as the the inherent
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dialectic of capitalism for the revolutionary utopians, or the
absence of developed and effective global political regimes of
authority for most liberal internationalists, or, from the
opposite ideological perspective, the inherent conflict between
sovereign states, or, in more globalist terms, the clash of
civilizations or the clash between civilization itself and
nature and, hence the focus on environmental scarcity, this
monograph does not concentrate on reconciling the various models
of general causes that have been offered. Rather than such
powerful mechanisms, we note that relatively minor events can
start a chain reaction.20 In the centre of any system - and the
system of states in the international arena is a system - where
there is relative stability, one may find a degree of
predictability. However, at the outer edges of the system, a
small change cannot only have a large impact in that arena, but
can profoundly affect the system as a whole.21
In conventional international studies, large scale elements
- environmental scarcity and the consequences on satisfying
needs, population explosions, and illicit economic engagements,
for example, are isolated and studied as they are found in
various cases. The presumption in all these theories is that the
causes are proportional to the results. International theorists
presume that the mechanical model of Newtonian physics means
that any situation continues on an entropic trajectory unless
disturbed by an external force (realists) or balanced by
countervailing values and institutions (internationalists). But
the world cannot be reduced to a simple mechanical model. It is
a complex, inter-active system characterized by "chaos"22 at key
points of perturbation.23 Newtonian mechanical models may be
appropriate to the analysis of areas which are more-or-less in
a steady state of equilibrium. Mechanical laws may dominate in
apparently relatively stable periods between bifurcation points
of great instability even in areas of crises. Choosing Rwanda
entails taking up a case where the crises points are of greatest
concern.
The stress in the study is not on root causes or prevailing
intervening factors, though I do not dismiss any of the accounts
which attend to them. The stress is on triggers at criticial
bifurcation points, the very elements that mechanical modellers
of both the realist and idealist schools tend to dismiss as
minor contingent variables which are unpredictable and
uncontrollable. In contrast, the study we undertook was a
demonstration that a system can be characterized by a relatively
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stable regime dominated by forces (realists) or sufficiently
assisted by an adequate set of international agencies (liberal
institutionalists). But the key point at issue is the trigger,
a bifurcation point where a combination of elements come
together. At that critical juncture, choices could have been
made, actions could have been taken, without which the system
spun into disorder. Serendipity is as important as the "normal"
governing forces.
Conflict management is concerned with keeping 'chance' from
getting out of hand, and to be prepared, if a crisis occurs, to
take advantage of the situation to build a system which is even
larger and has a greater degree of order. It is in such crises
that we can see the missed opportunities and can set systems in
place that can in future effect large changes.
This monograph is built on the premise that it is not the
underlying root causes or the absence of adequate countervailing
values and institutions that are so critical, for those causes
will persist and institutions will continue to be inadequate,
however many reforms and improvements that are made. But those
institutions are best improved, not by an overall design, but by
zeroing in on a bifurcation point and taking advantage of an
opportunity or a crisis both to mitigate the immanent chaos at
that bifurcation point and increase the factors reinforcing
stability, not by reinforcing the status quo, but by creating a
new situation which reduces the pressure altogether. Bifurcation
points are like earthquakes. The tectonic plates covering the
surface of the earth are under great stress at the junctures
where they meet. The forces will only build up if temporary
measures merely postpone the inevitable eruption in the quest
for temporary stability.
Readiness and preparation are the key. Complex emergencies
are the products of composite systems that evolve to a critical
state in which a relatively minor event can start a chain
reaction. It is my contention that early warning should be
designed to anticipate the bifurcation point, take advantage of
that critical event, and introduce novel and more comprehensive
systems for increasing order and preventing chaos.
It is, of course, a truism that such crises are also
opportunities to reinforce the status quo, to insist on
stability in the face of chaos. Realists, in particular, dread
chaos and instability. Such policies governed American-Zairian
relations in the sixties and seventies. "A critical element of
this consensus (maintaining or enhancing US-Zairian ties) was
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the firm belief that 'chaos' - meaning territorial
disintegration, regional instability, and ultimately communist
expansion into Central Africa - was the only alternative to
Mobutu's continued hold over power." (Schraeder 1994, 80) As one
confidential source in the State Department put it so
succinctly, "Zaire without Mobutu could entail a Zaire engulfed
by chaos."24
Reinforcing the forces responsible for the chaos only
delays the explosion and multiplies the impact. The classical
pattern is to imitate the cosmic serpent, Naga, of Hindu
mythology, and try to reestablish stability and solidity out of
a very fluid situation.25 Marx said that "All that is solid melts
into air." But when hard core realists are in charge, "All that
is liquid turns into a solid sarcophagus," given common current
practices in foreign affairs, which, like Chernobyl, merely
hides and postpones the turbulence and danger beneath.
However, the reverse can also be the case. The sooner we
are able to intervene in a situation of impending chaos, the
greater control we will have over that situation.
Unpredictability increases with time. The more a situation is
allowed to get out of hand because we know so little about it,
the far greater chance that chaos will result in the greatest
disorder offering the least chance to produce a higher level of
order. Concrete contextualized analysis of particular sutuations
is required to enable us to understand what is happening and why
it is happening.
In addition to an immediate opportunity for creative
action, bifurcation points bring to the fore the contradictions
in international regimes, such as the refugee regime. Thus, in
addition to allowing us to grasp what is happening and providing
opportunities for innovative intervention, such innovations can
have the greatest impact on the system as a whole. Order emerges
out of disordered systems, not via a central control or via
governing laws, natural or man-made. In fact, a lack of central
control makes the system more adaptive because of the use of the
principle of self-organization. Bifurcation points allow a
system to reach a higher level of organization, not by
controlling the chaos, but, as part of the system, innovating at
the pint of chaos to increase the organization and, hence,
equilibrium of the system as a whole.26
Historical conjunctures of neo-structuralist accounts are
not bifurcation points, since historical conjunctures are merely
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the historical moment where different levels of the system
(security, finance, production (versus law), and knowledge meet.
They are not measured by their high ratio of chaos and low level
of equilibrium. They are not simply static rather than dynamic
points of contact; they are abstract points. My argument, in
fact, will be that modernity has been characterized by a denial
that knowledge can meet with the power, economic and legal
levels. In modernity, knowledge is simply instrumental for those
other levels or, alternatively, adopts a stance, as the neo-
structuralists do, in which knowledge insists on staying aloof
from those levels in order to retain both its explanatory and
moral purity.
There is another key problem with the neo-structuralist
approach. For, although they differentiate themselves from their
struturalist parents by denying any focus on governing world
processes, such as when Mason (1993) depicts capitalism as a
play of forces, a 'set of sets' "without an overarching system
of regulation to unify it" (98), in spite of such denials, neo-
structuralists generally continue to identify 'global governing
forces' and the transformative process instigated by these
forces at different levels, such as the responses at the level
of foreign policy and the efforts of individual states to
respond to the constraints and pressures of these global
economic forces. International relations is depicted as a vast
transmission mechanism (the words and italics of Gill & Palan)
for state and societal transformation, revealing thereby that
the controlling hand of a 'divine' entity is still in the model,
and, secondly, even though the model is dynamic rather than
static, it is still a mechanical model. Neo-structuralists may
be more broad minded in trying to encompass the conservative and
liberal realist agendas, but they seem unable to escape a
fascination with mechanical and global and governing forces.
As Ilya Prigogine put it so succinctly, "Matter at
equilibrium is blind. Far from equilibrium it begins to see."
(Prigogine 1993, 20) At equilibrium, we see, but we only see
what we have brought to the situation in the first place. Thus,
for example, Wallerstein, the brilliant creator of worlds system
theory, lays stress on an equilibrium model in which the basic
units of analysis are geographical: core, semi-peripheral and
peripheral zones in the world-economy.27 There is a dialectic
between the global transformative processes of capitalism and
the preservation propensities of states to maintain the status
quo while the globalization continually undermines that effort
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to produce a new equilibrium level by altering the character of
the sub-state units - classes, peoples, and households. Neo-
structuralists may amend the model by allowing us to see power
and self interest at work as dynamic and not just passive
elements. Idealist utopians may point to the absence of an
effective international authority. But the real issue may be to
allow the forces in play to see themselves. The key may not be
providing explanations for those who are victimized or engaged
in victimization, but to set up a process whereby they can
discover themselves what is wrong.
This is a larger point than the fact that any methodology,
including critical theory or behaviourist realism28, deforms what
it grasps simply in the grasping.29 "Electron's in atoms do not
have definite positions or velocities until these properties are
measured, and the measurement of an electron's velocity wipes
out all knowledge of its position." (Weinberg 1996, 12) This
does not mean that we cannot measure what is "out there"; it
only means that there is a cost for taking the measurement -
what is out there is no longer out there in the same way for us
as before we attempted the measurement. Heisenberg's principle
teaches us that all descriptions entail a choice of methodology
and the questions asked; the answer is profoundly affected by
the measure used. As expressed in quantum mechanics, there is an
irreducible multiplicity of representations for any system being
described, each connected with a determined set of operators.
Or, as Niels Bohr observed, in quantum mechanics, objects defy
unique and comprehensive descriptions; depicting an object
requires diverse points of view. In Hegel's more poetic
language, reality cannot be captured "like a bird caught by a
lime-twig." If we alter the method to grasp the object of study
with greater clarity, the object of study itself is changed.
According to Heisenberg's principle, there appears to be an
irreducible plurality of perspectives; no divine point of view
exists from which reality can be grasped.
Re Heisenberg's principle:
If we attempt to adopt the divine point of view, not by
utilizing one method and undertaking a single study, but
surveying the results of all studies of complex emergencies in
the effort to pick out the best suggestions, in the effort to
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find common elements, we miss the unique complexity and
opportunities that the study of a single crisis brings. More
importantly, we miss the opportunity of setting a system in
place which gives vision to the forces in play. Possibly, the
quest for identity may annihilate what it is intended to grasp.
This is the micro advantage of examining a particular
crisis. There is also a mega advantage. At a bifurcation point,
we may see through a glass darkly into a new world because we
come to understand the entry point of the modern world we now
occupy. It is as if close observation of a crisis in the heart
of Africa, in the country where the source of the Nile was
discovered by Europeans, we are watching an exploding star at
the fringes of the universe and thereby can see in the present
the origins of our modern cosmos.
As I pointed out in the first section, critical theorists
can be accused of reinforcing the relativism of all values while
protesting the separation of fact from value.30 But this is the
crisis of modernity itself. Modernity is characterized by
rational calculation. But it does not teach us the norms by
which we should live.31
"(M)odernity is characterized by an intensifying clash
between instrumental rationality and the realm of
substantive values. As instrumental rationality
advances, so the spheres of life in which meanings and
values are affirmed become both marginalized and given
a heightened significance. This tension introduces the
fundamental paradox of modernity: in a world
characterized by increasing rationalisation in all
aspects of human existence, there is no rational way
of deciding among an irreducible plurality of value
commitments...an account of modernity framed as a
universalizing history of (instrumental)
rationalisation is simultaneously an account of
modernity and a realm of non-rational and
criterionless choices about ultimate values." (Walker
1993, p. 56)
The central dilemma of our time, as Max Weber recognized,
is to explain the relativity of values, power politics and the
recourse to violence despite the advance of reason and
civilisation. "(L)ittle that is happening anywhere can be
understood without reference to the historical discontinuities
produced by the rise of the modern state and modern forms of
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power." (Gledhill 1994, 23) We are far more likely to find an
explanation at the fringes of our cosmos when a crisis is
underway than an analysis of far more central situations and
crises.
This is particularly true when the issue is whether or not
to intervene in the internal violence gripping a country. For
just as the state is the central creation of modernity in the
international arena, the issue of intervention is its
complementary other half. For an essential prinicple of a
sovereign state is, indeed, the principle of non-intervention in
the internal affairs of that state. When we have a case where
sovereignty was not an issue, but intervention was, we have a
rare chance to glimse the issue of intervention and non-
intervention without the issue of sovereignty obscuring our
view. It is akin to a chance of observing the sun when it is
being obstructed by the moon during a solar eclipse.
After all, "intervention is a moment of of modern political life
during which legal, formalized boundaries become politically
contested and communities as points of reference - be they
'domestic' foundations of state sovereignty or 'international
centers of judgement - are brought into doubt." (Weber 1995, 8)
Thus, the attitudes of both the sovereign publics which
determine the decisions of states and of the cosmopolitan
communities of evaluation are revealed.
This point is critical. For as I will shortly attempt to
demonstrate, the bifurcation point at which the Soviet Union
imploded was a much greater explosion with many, many more
observable effects. It was also far closer to home and easy to
observe once the convulsion was underway. But the bifurcation
point in Rwanda was much simpler and much more telling. Because
it was not a star exploding within our own galaxy, but at the
outer edge of the modern universe where the issues of
sovereignty and non-intervention were first forged as the basic
structural components of modernity.
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......................... Chapter 3 
The Cold War - Trigger or Bifurcation
The end of the Cold War was precisely such a bifurcation
point for Eastern Europe. Many have argued that the Cold War was
the most important bifurcation that has occurred since the
Second World War.
Since a change in one system always impacts on every other one,
a change in the system that dominated the globe for the last
fifty years would seemingly have the greatest impact. Hence,
global rather than local forces, so the argument goes, are the
ones that we need to study most, in particular, the impact of
the end of the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War certainly changed the world,
particularly Eastern Europe and that part of Asia adjacent to
it. The prime raison d'être of the western military alliance -
the containment of the Soviet military and ideological threat -
has self-destructed with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Though it has not disappeared, the twin threats of an invasion
of Western Europe or of a nuclear strike launched from Eastern
Europe have shrivelled enormously. The West also won on the
political front. Moscow's suppression of both its neighbours and
its own citizens, its ideological lead in exporting revolution,
its military expansionism, its ideological zealotry, have all
collapsed.32
It is also certainly true that the African policy of the
Western superpower, the United States, was a direct by-product
of the Cold War. The Cold War was also probably the main factor
that allowed hard realism to dominate international studies in
the United States and the American conduct of foreign policy.
(Cf. Goldmann 1994, 15) The real question became what would be
American policy towards Africa when communism no longer posed a
threat?
If the Cold War has ceased, what does this mean for
Africa? Will there be a peace dividend that will
enable Africa to recover from its debilitating
economic crisis? Or will Africa simply be relegated to
the dustbin of history? (Keller 1996, 1)
There are two views - a descriptive and a prescriptive one.
And they are at odds. Descriptively, the post-Cold war period
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has resulted in what Michael Clough designated "cynical
disengagement." Not just benign neglect, but effective
abandonment unless forced by domestic forces to become
superficially pro-active. "(T)he end of the Cold War has
reinforced the tendency within the US policymaking establishment
to ignore Africa in favour of other regions of greater concern,
such as Western and Eastern Europe and, more recently, the
Middle East."33 I. William Zartman claimed that this was a policy
adopted by America's allies as well.34
But the very individual who coined the phrase "cynical
disengagement" as a description of US policy, advocated a very
different role for the United States and her allies. Micahel
Clough insisted that the US could create a new relationship with
the African continent now that it was free of the conceptual and
ideological shackles of the Cold War. (Clough 1992b, 2) Such a
redirection of American efforts were supported by academic
scholars who had themselves described American Cold War policy
towards Africa in strictly realist terms. "(T)he end of the Cold
war offers tremendous opportunities - particularly the
possibility of replacing superpower confrontation with a greater
sensitivity to a host of development problems in Africa."
(Schraeder 1994, 30) America's ex-Cold War rival now gave even
stronger sentimental support to that view. Nikolai Krylov, a
senior research scholar with the Institute of State and Law of
the Academy of Sciences of what was then the USSR and is now
Russia, gave voice to the belief that the end of the Cold War
should produce a peace dividend. "Now favorable conditions exist
for the international organization (the UN) to perform its
historical purpose, namely 'to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind'." (Krylov 1991, 94)
The sense of opportunism for a new world order at the end
of the Cold War was certainly the predominant view of grotians,
idealists who believed that the end of the Cold War provided an
opening to invest the international system with a truly
governing set of international laws and the institutions to
enforce them.35 As the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated this position, "The end of the
Cold War was a major movement of tectonic plates and the after-
shocks continue to be felt. But even if the ground beneath our
feet has not yet settled, we still live in a new age that holds
great promise for both peace and development." (Boutros 1995,
para. 5, 6)
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This sense that the end of the Cold War offered new
opportunities extended especially to those non-realist theorists
from schools of international relations that had been
marginalized if not ostracized. For some, the end of the Cold
War meant an end to their own marginalization as theorists. This
was particularly true of those who wanted to examine issues
through a normative lens. Some hoped that the realists would
give up examining the world in terms of the survival of one
versus the survival of the other. "(T)he Cold War put a damper
on the salience of normative theory. Most political disputes in
the underdeveloped world were immediately subsumed into
international politics in Cold War terms...Now that the conflict
is over and it is no longer possible to understand world
politics in terms of a supposed conflict between good and evil,
the way seems to be open for a resurgence of normative theory.
" (Frost 1996, 6)
Unfortunately, for some, the rise of fundamentalist Islam
(and a resurgence of nationalism) seemed to scuttle this
possibility. Others agreed with the thesis of a forthcoming
conflict with Islam, but viewed Islam as a source of salvation
from American hegemony.
The global economy perspective sees the Third World as
a residual, marginal factor, a non-identity. The
historical experience and perspective of Europe
confronts Islam as a real identity, a different
civilisation. Islam returned to Europe's lost origins
in Greek philosophy, taught Europe science and
medicine, and showed Europe a cultivated style of
living, yet remained fundamentally alien and never,
unlike Europe, germinated its own capitalism.
The confrontation with Islam is not only external,
across borders and the Mediteranean sea. It is also
becoming internalised within European societies, in
migration and in the responses to migration by such
political phenomena such as the Front National in
France. The new Europe is challenged to free itself
from the residual, marginalised view of the Third
World and to confront directly the cultural as well as
economic and political issues in a recognised co-
existence of two different civilisations.
Europe, in sum, can be a proving ground for a new form
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of world order: post-hegemonic in its recognition of
co-existing universalistic civilisations; post-
Westphalian in its restructuring of political
authority into a multi-level system; and post-
globalisation in its acceptance of the legitimacy of
different paths towards the satisfaction of human
needs." (Cox 1993b, 286)
Gramscians placed their hopes for benefiting from the end
of the Cold War on the collapse of Stalinist and Leninist
versions of Marxism, which they termed pathological, mechanical
Marxism (Gill 1993, 3). The implosion provided an opening for an
authentic historical materialism. In John le Carré's terms, the
time was ripe for them to come out of the cold.
This sense of opportunism pervades idealist thinkers of all
stripes.36 But for some, it is more than an opportunity; it has
become a necessity. "Ethical problems were virtually ignored in
the bipolar international system, teetering continuously as it
did on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. For many people then it
sounded grotesque to speak of ethics as opposed to survival. But
today the drastic attenuation of international tension not only
allows but also forces us to turn attention to the moral
problems of international coexistence," (Bonante 1995, xiii-xiv)
Boutros-Ghali held the same position. "(A)n opportunity has been
regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a
United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and
security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting,
in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better
standards of life in larger freedom'. This opportunity must not
be squandered." (Boutos 1992; 1995, para. 3, 39)
These statements might bother some of us who worked in the
salt mines of international ethical theory during the Cold War
on issues not only of deterrence and humanitarian intervention,
but on refugees and membership theory. I am more concerned,
however, with the use of the end of the Cold War to see
opportunities and necessities for new beginnings and fresh
starts as merely the renewal of the age old hope for the dawning
of a new age.
This hope is contrasted with the description above of the
decline in American interests in Africa following the demise of
the Cold War. The perspectives of the conservative realists are
much less sanguine about the possibilities opened up by the end
of the Cold War. Or at least, the possibilities they envision
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are not positive; they anticipate new sources of trouble and
turmoil given their conceptual foundation rooted in power and
self-interest. Liberal realists, however, like the idealists,
advocate that a more forward looking internationalist policy be
adopted.
One of the strengths of any method that requires self-
criticism and self-consciousness to be built into the method is
that it tends to see our own fundamental conceptions to be as
much part of the problem as the solution. Its strength is
conceptual criticism rather than the exposure of root causes.
Thus, the central motif of many current realist and idealist
academic exercises is the conventional wisdom that the end of
the Cold War thrust upon us new problems and the potential for
new solutions.
Thus, in the idealistic Repression Thesis, the claim is
made that the end of the Cold War inaugerated a new era because
previous antagonisms repressed by the superpowers for fear of
escalation have now been released. In the words of Robert
Kaplan, "Although the threat of Soviet arms has receded, the
threat of global instability has taken its place." (Kaplan 1990,
113) Or, as Boutros Boutros-Ghali phrased it, "The end of the
cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the
former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As a result there has been a
rash of wars within newly independent States, often of religious
or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence or
cruelty. The end of the cold war seems also to have contributed
to an outbreak of such wars in Africa." (Boutros 1995, para 10,
7)
However, there is little evidence to suggest that the
problem of failed states and inter-ethic violence were all
problems waiting to surface pending the end of the Cold War, or
that such local and regional conflicts were moderated by the
superpowers lest they serve "as triggers of a superpower
collision," (Hoffman 1990, 116) let alone that the end of the
Cold War itself contributed to the outbreak of these wars. There
is as much evidence to suggest the reverse was true - the Cold
war rivalry exacerbated tensions already present and made them
far more dangerous.37
Overt antagonisms expressed by the resort to violence over
the governing ideology of the state and its ethnic make-up
preceded the end of Cold War in former Palestine, Lebanon,
Burundi, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Cyprus, Northern Ireland,
East Timor, Tibet, Burma, Iraq, Turkey, Ethiopia and Somalia, to
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take but a few of the many cases of inter-ethnic, religious, and
ideological rivalry that have riven states asunder or provided
a territorial basis for violence on the demarcations and
character of a state. One should be wary of the critical
emphasis placed by the END OF THE COLD WAR Argument (ECWA),
whether propagated by realists or idealists, for it may be self-
serving in fostering their respective tendencies to either
reinforce the security apparatus of the state or, alternatively,
international institutions geared to global resolutions of
problems.
My own conviction, based on my studies of conflict and
refugees, is that the end of Cold War was in good part a
consequence of much more fundamental underlying changes that are
behind the intra-state ethnic and ideological conflicts that
appear to be so pervasive now. This does not mean that I concur
with Gunther Frank's theory (1994) that the collapse of
communism is a consequence of the world economic crisis rather
than national ideology or policy because of ongoing and
accelerated economic integration and marketization. Those
underlying forces were critical. But deterrence, in spite of my
opposition to it, and the economic competition in significant
part propelled and exacerbated by it, played equally critical
roles.
More importantly for the purposes of our analysis, the Cold
War itself did not repress traditional antagonisms in the Third
World, but utilized them. Even more significantly, the Cold War
 shifted the awareness of these issues for those preoccupied
with the Cold War and provided a sense of exhilaration and
renewed optimism for those more idealistically inclined. The end
of the Cold War had more to do with a shift of awareness and led
to the discovery of the full recognition of the unwillingness to
respond to intra-state crises when the interests of developed
states are neither threatened nor involved. The unwillingness to
respond does not so much decline as become more apparent.
In speaking about becoming more apparent, in opposition to
the Repression Thesis about the consequences of the end of the
Cold War, there is a contending Revelation Thesis. The terminus
of the Cold War revealed a different world than the one with
which that war began - one in which national security had lost
any meaning. Globalization was the dominant motif. The globe had
shrunk along with the threats posed by the Soviet Union.
Interdependency was now too great to resort to the single state
as the prime actor in the new world order or disorder. The
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United States neither had the strength nor the diplomatic clout
to act on its own, but had to forge alliances to tackle such
problems as the international drug trade, currency regulation,
international terrorism, acid rain, etc. In this view, the
concept of national sovereignty had become as obsolete as the
Cold War.
These two twins - the Repression and the Revelation Theses
- have been the dominant motifs of post Cold War idealist
internationalist disourse. My position is akin to traditional
realists in arguing for continuity in the political
circumstances rather than any radical change brought about by
the end of the Cold War. But for very different reasons and with
very different implications.
Awareness of the fallibility of the End of the Cold War
Argument (ECWA) is not very significant since it was more a
rhetorical tool than an analytic one, but there are, at least,
two implications. ECWA tends both to misread the roots of the
problems entailed in complex emergencies and to overlook
experience from the pre-Cold War past. Further, ECWA creates a
myth of an era of high tension and high stability during the
Cold War and a period of low tension and low stability after its
termination. But the period prior to the end of the Cold War was
not one of high stability. The Korean war period, the building
of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile crisis, the Indochinese
War, the Yom Kippur War - not to mention Hungary in 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968 - were all highly destabilizing as well
as periods of high tension. Further, pockets of regional
instability were pervasive.
Prior to and accelerated by the end of the Cold War,
stability has increased as the number of democratic states have
mushroomed. Nor will hard-headed realists, nor should we, be
lulled into complacency in the mistaken belief that critical
causes and sources for high tension no longer continue to
pervade this globe. Thus, although this paper is concerned with
widespread and seemingly endless numbers of states caught up by
religious, ideological and inter-ethnic violent conflict, and
increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced produced
by such conflicts, it does not deny that the main concern of
developed countries will continue to be their own security in
the face of other potential threats. In fact, it argues that
these relatively peripheral sources of instability can produce
a small ripple that eventually can result in catastrophic
change. Instability in these regions are the main sources of
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threat, not the conflicts between civilizations, states or with
the environment, or the contemporary rivalry among China, Japan,
a revived Russia, the EEC and the Americas as the five major
economic centres of power.
Contrary to the realist Cold War theorists, there is no
need to seek a new threat to the West. For the deception is the
significance given to the End of the Cold War thesis itself, and
not whether it is put forth by idealists or realists. The
problems we face are ones we faced during the Cold War. What has
radically altered coincidentally with the end of the Cold War is
the mode for dealing with those problems. But it is not the end
of the Cold War that produced that alteration. For one of those
factors, it was the Cold War itself.
The right and contemporary realists defended the arms race
of the Cold War as the only means to deter the expansionist
totalitarian ideology of the Soviet Union. Using the superior
economic capability of the West, a two-track policy was
developed. On the military front, the West insisted that it
demonstrate a second strike capacity so that if the Soviet Union
decided to strike anywhere in the Western alliance, there would
always remain enough reserve capacity to destroy the Soviet
Union, or, at the very least, deliver an unacceptable level of
destruction.
The premises of deterrence rested on the ability and
evident willingness to inflict unacceptable levels of damage, in
part, as evidenced by the expenditure of significant proportions
of a country's GDP on deterrence. The practitioner of deterrence
must demonstrate a willingness to be able to withstand an
enemy's first strike and still retaliate with a devastating
second blow. Most importantly, the threat must be credible and
a willingness to carry it out must be clearly communicated.38
More significantly, there was no equilibrium point that
could be reached in this arms race. In fact, disarmament
agreements merely spurred the search for new technological
breakthroughs as occurred when the 1975 ING agreement banned
intermediate nuclear weapons and tactical air-surface missiles
were developed to fulfil and exceed the void left by the
previously banned weaponry.
What had developed was a mutual murder pact. If one party
initiated the murder of the other, the other could, and would,
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respond and murder the other.39 In fact, scientists predicted the
end of the whole world as we know it and not just the
destruction of the two sides.40 This doctrine of mutually assured
destruction, MAD, effectively worked, quite aside from the
criticisms we levelled at the doctrine. or, rather, MAD-plus
worked, for there was never enough of too much to assure the
destruction of the other.41 The expansion of the Soviet Union was
contained and the high risk of a nuclear military accident did
not take place, at least during the Cold War itself. Thus,
although the doctrine of nuclear deterrence rested on absurd
premises, on consequentialist grounds many would argue that it
was not an immoral posture. From that perspective, an abhorrent
logic may produce ethical behaviour if war is deterred.42
One of the ironies of post-war realist theories is that
they have supported a deterrence (nuclear based on MAD) that
cannot be used. This may partially explain George Kennan's
lifelong opposition to nuclear weapons, for George Kennan was a
traditional realist, who was both cautious and prudent; he
thought that the risks outweighed the benefits, especially since
there were real alternatives.43
Further, though I have a much harder time admitting this
result, the second track of that policy, led by the ideological
right as a moral rather than a realist mission to destroy the
Evil Empire, also worked. The Reagan foreign policy was based
not only on military supremacy, but on a belief in moral
superiority and a confidence in that moral superiority. Hence,
Reagan was a utopian realist of the capitalist school as opposed
to the utopian anti-capitalist realists (gramscians) that I will
sketch in the next chapter.44 Reagan was not a conservative
realist, but a utopian, setting his guns on Kissinger in favour
of "morality in foreign policy" and the defeat of the "evil
empire".45 For deterrence depends on conveying both capacity and
will to use the nuclear deterrent. And the willingness to spend
enormous sums on technological innovations is one of the signs
of that will. "American security depends on American power and
the will to use it." (op. cit. 23)
Thus, it may not have been the Star Wars strategy itself.
The prospect of creating an umbrella defence against nuclear
missiles available to all had always remained questionable at
the very least, if it was not a fantasy or even a quasi-
conspiracy organized by the military-industrial complex. The
dramatic economic escalation of the renewed arms race at a far
higher level of costs, and, more importantly, technology,
bankrupted the Soviet Union. The moral revolutionary utopians of
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the extreme right, who celebrated and fought for the victory of
the liberal and capitalist system against the evil empire, dealt
a deathly blow to its adversary, ironically not through
deterrence itself, but because of the costs of deterrence.
However, Risse-Kapan (1991) argues that it was not the
shattered Soviet economy and the need for perestroika, but
glasnost and the sharing of ideas between Western and Eastern
think tanks that led Eduard Shevardnadze and Aleksandr Yakovlev
to seek common cause with the liberal institutionalists and
create a new regime based on common security. (Cf. Goldmann
1994, 107) My own conviction is that it was deterrence and
economic competition that drove the USSR to the wall, and
glasnost that gave the Soviet Union the way out and the
foundation for a new foreign policy as well as internal
revolution.46
If the military realist strategy of deterrence and the
economic competition combined with the moral fervor of the
utopian Reganites together worked to create a synergy to defeat
the USSR47, the fact that the Soviet Union self-destructed in the
way it did can be attributed in a small part to a fourth factor
- the human rights provisions of the Basket II clauses of the
Helsinki Accords and the protections provided for the free
movement of peoples and ideas, a totally tangential element
included in the last minute against the better judgement of the
military and political strategists of the West in the 1975
disarmament agreement. The human rights provisions created the
democratic ground for the emerging pluralist system in Eastern
Europe.
The Chinese dissidents tried to imitate the Eastern
European human rights efforts, but even with economic
liberalization to assist them, they were squelched without the
assist of an international accord to which China was a signatory
and in terms of which China could be held to account. In
contrast, the military doctrine of MAD, the military-economic
competition of Star Wars fostered by the moral ideological
mission of the right, destroyed the Soviet Union. But the
positive ground for its rebirth was the human rights struggle
supported by the Helsinki Accords.48 This side issue was the tiny
ripple with the most telling and long term creative effects.
Victory, however, had come at considerable cost. Those of
us who fought for human rights generally pooh-poohed the
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extravagances and wastefulness of the military-defence strategy
and overwhelming danger of the high risk nuclear arms race. As
Lebow and Stein (1994) point out in their analysis of the Cuban
Missile crisis and the 1973 Middle East War, the results were
frequently pernicious, eliciting the behaviour deterrence
strategy was intended to prevent. More importantly for the
present, they left an enormous legacy of debt, decaying
infrastructure and a totally distorted research agenda, quite
aside from the build-up of underground pressures in the
kleptocracies fostered in the satellite states of the Cold War.
(The example of Zaire will be analyzed in chapter 5.)
However, I am concerned with the moral costs. Not the moral
costs to honour and reputation that is of such great and
legitimate concern to many analysts as the United States
squandered its idealized image as a liberator, upholder of
democracy and generous benefactor held at the end of World War
II.49 Rather, it is the cost to our own moral values. Not the
values of decency and respect and concern for others so
generally associated with humane values, but the importance of
the willingness to sacrifice life for a cause, a value too often
simply conjoined with military values.
The critics of the deterrence strategy were preoccupied
with the horrific danger and not just the costs of the arms race
and the strategy it supported. We were attuned to the absurd
presumptions of deterrence in a nuclear arms context. For the
arms, in contrast to normal deterrence strategy, were only
useful if they were never used. "What is perceived as an
impossible war has to be perceived as possible if it is to be
impossible. On the one hand, a nuclear war entails an
unacceptable holocaust for all parties. It is assumed to act as
a deterrent from aggression and to render impossible any and
every military use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand,
deterrence is not credible if these weapons cannot be used."50
Their value depended on the credibility projected to the
other party that your side was willing to use nuclear arms. The
reasoning assaulted our minds as the vision of their actual use
shrivelled our guts and the risk of an effectively destroyed
world assaulted all our ethical sensibilities.51 If the
deterrence theorists seemed to be participating in an absurdist
play based on the premise that nuclear weapons are only useful
if they are never used and useless if they have to be used, the
missionary ideology of the New Right intent on destroying the
Evil Empire itself, and not just containing it, drove us MAD.
For MAD-plus itself permitted the development of a capacity to
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overkill a thousand times, ten thousand times! (Cf. Art 1985)
But it is not even this immoral risk-taking that concerns
me and its costs to the underclass of America. It is the moral
cost itself. The combination of fear and insistence on
rationality had an unintended consequence. The calumny that we
taught people to believe, "Better Red than Dead," was clearly
false. But we did believe and teach that the nuclear arms race
posed too great a risk to be employed in deterring an enemy,
even totalitarian communism. Indirectly we taught a whole
generation that some risks were too great, whatever the danger.
When this is combined with the military belief that they (the
military) cannot be left at the mercy of vacillating politicians
as they were in Vietnam, and the their current conviction that
only low or no risk wars are worth fighting, the synergy
resulting from the combination of all these experiences left a
no-sacrifice or a low sacrifice moral legacy. Instead of some
risks being too great to risk the sacrifice of all of us, the
lesson came to be believed that virtually any risk entailing the
sacrifice of our own lives was too great. The sacrifice of even
a few was too large a cost. One might not be too many, but
hundreds would. The fundamental foundation for any universal
morality dealing with upholding principles had been sacrificed
with the pursuit of the Cold War. The idealism of both the left
and the right was left with no substantive ground.
The policy of not willing to engage in self-sacrifice for
a cause, even when the cause is close to home, seems as endemic
in Eastern as in Western Europe and North America according to
a former American Ambassador in Moscow: "while many Russians
retain a sentimental attachment to the vast empire their country
once ruled, most are not willing to spend a kopek or risk a
single life to resurrect it." Jack F. Matlock Jr., "The Struggle
for the Kremlin," New York Review of Books, XLIII:13, August 8,
28-34.
We really lost the Cold War because we have come to believe
that victory can come without risks. One of the most important
factors that has come about with the end of the Cold War is not
the revelation of globalization, a new world dramatically at
odds with the one with when we entered the Cold War52, but self-
revelation, the discovery of the values for which we stand and
the unwillingness to risk our lives for those values. What the
end of the Cold War has perhaps revealed most of all is that
there is less willingness to sacrifice the lives of the citizens
of a nation when there is no direct threat to that state than
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some idealists expected, but an enormous willingness to extend
our resources financially when the sentiments of a domestic
population are aroused, contrary to the beliefs of the realists.
The foundations for that moral destruction are to be found in
the very premises of both the realist and idealist modes of
analyzing international affairs.
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Part II:  Theory and Practice
4.  The Realist-Idealist Divide
There are many ways to approach the analysis of a crisis
like Rwanda. One can project a personal sense of realist
pessimism or idealistic optimism onto the analysis of our
current situation. In general, the tension between the Children
of Darkness and the Children of Light has been as much a part of
international analysis as the crises in the international arena
itself. "Pure idealists [children of light] underestimate the
perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties, operating
as a counter force against the achievement of a wider community.
But the realists [children of darkness] are usually so impressed
by the power of these perennial forces that they fail to
recognize the novel and unique elements in a revolutionary world
situation. The idealists erroneously imagine that a new
situation automatically generates the resources for the solution
of its problem. The realists erroneously discount the
destructive, as well as the creative, power of a revolutionary
situation." (Niebuhr 1944, 176)
In Rwanda, the pessimists saw age old atavistic ethnic
hatreds to explain Hutus and Tutsis killing one another.
Optimists saw inter-ethnic hatred as simply a product of
European colonialism and racism; the slaughters were only the
result of a small elite, which had been supported by France and
which had organized a systematic slaughter. Exogenous factors
were the prime explanation.
Is social science merely the projection of our subjective
attitudes onto a situation, simply a matter of whether we see a
glass half empty or half full? Ernst B. Haas (1983) interpreted
the difference between the Children of Darkness and the Children
of Light as resting on the mental paradigm as the foundation for
the differences in emotional mood observers brought to the
analysis. The difference was a product of the prime metaphor
brought to the understanding of an international crises, either
a mechanical or an organic one, the former viewing the world as
conflict-ridden and self-maintaining, the latter as harmonious
and self-organizing; one view is pessimistic while the other
sees hope.
The mechanical seeks to minimize disturbance in the
system and return it to equilibrium; it is focused on
self-maintenance. The organic seeks to profit from
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disequilibrium in order to assure continued adaptation
to a changing reality; it is focused on evolutionary
self-organization...
The mechanical metaphor is pessimistic. It sees the
world in steady state, closed, its future determined
by its constituent elements and the laws that govern
them. Processes of change occur homeostatically; the
return to equilibrium after a disturbance means that
the system is programmed toward self-maintenance. It
is stable, stationary, and static in the short run.
Eventually, however, the system must run down; it is
doomed to entropy... Self-maintenance will be hurt and
entropy will be ushered in sooner than fated if
international processes are permitted to follow the
positive feedback processes. Adaptation means learning
to live in a finite system...
The hope held out by adepts of the organic metaphor is
based on their conviction that the processes embedded
in their system are essentially harmonious. The system
is open, moving, and dynamic. It incorporates growth
and development...Disequilibrium, at any given point,
means that we have not understood the structure of the
system; we permitted the wrong processes to take over.
But homeorhetic principles stipulate openeness to
learn; we are biologically equipped to evolve into
better problem-solvers. (32-33)
Though there is some truth in both of these dichotomies and
that the attitude of pessimism or hope provides a quick litmus
test of which side of the divide one is to be found, the map of
the theory of international relations is, in fact, far more
complicated. For example, both idealism, in the form of grotian
liberal internationalism, and realism are dominated by a
mechanical metaphor. As I argued in chapter 2, my own conviction
is that we are not simply bringing to a situation two different
attitudes (pessimistic or optimistic) and looking at the system
through two different sets of emotional or metaphorical glasses.
The explanation, in part, is also found in what aspect of the
international system we are examining.
It is no coincidence that pessimists tend to place the
blame primarily on unchanging internal factors while optimists
have the opposite tendency and place the major blame on
exogenous factors and their proxies. For some are indeed looking
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at what is (the realists) versus what can or should be (the
idealists).53 For the conservative realists see every node of the
system as an effort to establish equilibrium between contending
forces while idealists tend to be more concerned with
bifurcation points and the potential dawning of a new era.54
There is a corresponding tendency of conservative realists to
vest responsibility on reestablishing the equilibrium of the
actors in the situation, whereas the optimists seem to want to
rely on exogenous factors, the imposition of international law,
the importation of universal human rights standards, or even
external coercive humanitarian intervention.
However, the picture becomes more complicated when the
liberal realists are put on the theoretical map. For, like the
conservative realists, they concur in looking at the effort to
reestablish equilibrium, but they focus on the system as a whole
rather than on the nodes that make up the system, on
international and primarily economic regimes rather than the
state nodes that make up the system seeking to preserve power.
It is my contention that we must look at both the processes
and dynamics that maintain the system in equilibrium and at the
bifurcation points of chaos that open the system up to new
levels of organization. Further, in the bifurcation points we
find efforts at self-maintenance and the use of disequilibrium
in order to assure continued adaptation to a changing reality in
a continuuing process of self-organization. The process is not
just a destructive one. But if that is the case, if the the
prospects for stability and equilibrium are to be found within
the nodes of chaos themselves, then we have to begin with a
solid foundation in understanding the realist analysis, not just
neorealist structuralism, or even more traditional contemporary
realism, but the entire historical tradition of realism. The
point, however, is not to remain embedded in that realism, but,
by understanding its perspective and historicist origins to free
ourselves from its imprisoning propensity to determinism or
fatalism.
This monograph is rooted in realism, but cannot be reduced
to realism. Further, it is rooted in classical, mediaeval,
modern and contemporary realism (rather than neo-realism) in the
following respects. First, it begins with human nature rather
than the structure of the relations between states in the
international arena. "The greatest division among realists today
seems to be between 'classical realists' and 'structural
realists,' or between realism and neorealism. Classical realism
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supposedly identify with the tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans
Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and Martin Wright. They explain
states' actions through a theory about human nature. As
Morgenthau puts it, man is characterized by egoism and animus
dominandi, lust for power. Human beings are driven by their
passions and assumed to be interested primarily in self-
preservation and enhancement of their power. Neorealists, in
contrast, insist that they differ from classical realists
inasmuch as they have a theory that excludes all factors except
the structure of the international system itself - how power is
distributed within the system. They concentrate on questions of
how differnt power distributions might effect or determine the
actions of states." (Johnson 1993, 203)
Secondly, like Hobbes, Machiavelli and Thucydides, I take
civil wars rather than inter-state wars to be most revelatory
about the behaviour of humans in what was traditionally called
the "state of nature", though, in contrast to Thucydides, I do
not regard civil wars as just the bloodthirsty byproducts of
inter-state wars. "For in peace and prosperity both states and
individuals have greater feelings, because men are not then
forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs
men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough
schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches
their condition." [Thucydides 3:82,2-3])
Hobbes views civil wars as events that take place whenever
there is no power strong enough to prevent them.55 I am akin to
Hobbes in seeing those passions acted out in everyday situations
and not just as a response to the extremes of war, but not
because of an absence of controls and the willingness of humans
to obey them - i.e. not because of disobedience - but because
humans who are not given recognition and respect seek it in
destructive ways. The fault is in the social institutions of
recognition, not the institutions of control, while recognizing
that some individuals, who have never been given any such
recognition as children, can develop into psychopaths who can
only be handled by controls and the use of coercive force.
Thirdly, for all traditional realists, the key is human
irrational  behaviour and not the self-interested instrumental
rationality which is considered primary by structural or neo-
realism. The key issues, therefore, are not explanation and
prediction of the behaviour of states in accordance with general
covering laws, but anticipation of the behaviour of leaders in
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specific contexts, and formulating an appropriate response.
But this is also based on rejecting various premises of
traditional realism. I reject that:
i) passions determine action, as Hobbes believed, unless
controlled by superior force - the only passion attributable to
all humans is the desire for power as the one means to obtain
any end and satisfy any passion;
ii) passions determine action unless manipulated by a more wily
intelligence as Machiavelli believed;
iii) passions determine action unless those same passions are
displaced by intelligence, rational analysis and improved
character as Thucydides believed;
or, more generally,
iv) that dispassionate intelligence detached from the passions
is the salvation from the irrationality of the passions.
Instead, I postulate a classical realism which presupposes
that detached intelligence can be as cruel as the unruly
passions, or, more pointedly, that the passions are unruly
because an intelligent mind takes itself to be divine in the use
and manipulation of the passions (versus Hobbes belief that
"promptness to hurt comes from distrust of one's own
intelligence, so that men who distrust their intelligence are
more likely to be victorious in a sedition than those who think
themselves wise." (Johnson 1993, 11)
On the other hand, informed passions can offset the effects
of ignorant passions and their destructiveness. Passions are
informed by knowing the personalities and characters of those
driven on a course of violence and destructiveness and the
context in which it is occurring, as well as effective patterns
of dealing with such destructiveness from past experience and
the general conditions which exacerbate such irrational
behaviour. For informed passions to outplay ignorant ones,
especially when confronting ignorant passions driven by
desperation, it is necessary to offset a weakness in
determination of passions that are informed. Information and
knowledge make us conscious of the fallibility of that
knowledge. We tend to err on the side of caution. Uninformed
passions can be very determined. Informed passions must
compensate for that lack of determination by institutionalized
training in the service of general norms and laws.
The most fundamental and common belief of all traditional
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western realists is that the danger is to be found, not in the
passions per se, as the Augustinian Christian tradition
believed, but in passions that are not boundaried by society. In
ancient classical realism, those passions are undirected (rather
than uncontrolled as Hobbes believed or lacking manipulation by
a superior intelligence as Machiavelli believed). However, in
contrast to the Greek tradition of Thucydides of believing in
displacement with superior sets of values and character,
prudence and effective communication, I am convinced that those
passions are given bounds by social institutions developed and
preserved through experience, and reinforced in their
effectiveness by superior intelligence. As an example, I note
the effectiveness of organized policing in dealing with hostage
takers through psychological intervenors rather than brute
coercive force or the capacity to develop psychological profiles
to capture serial killers.
This sketch of realists in history, and my debt to them in
spite of some fundamental differences, must be complemented by
a guide map of theories of international relations into which I
will fit some great thinkers of the past. First, I divide
realism into conservative realists, focused on the primacy of
power, and liberal realists focused on the primacy of self-
interest. Conservative realists are divided into four
categories: classical, pre-modern, modern and contemporary.
Thucydides is the archetypal classical realist56, but one who
believes in historical circular laws (versus covering laws)
unless humans with sufficient intelligence comprehend those laws
and are thereby enabled to overcome their fatal destiny. (cf.
Hunter 1973) Machiavelli is the archetypal pre-modern realist.57
Though not a modern, he was anti-mediaevalist. For Machiavelli
opposed the universalist categories of the mediaeval world.
Politics happened in history, but not simply to hold onto and
expand power. He was, after all, concerned with establishing a
political community that aspires to areté or virtue. Hobbes is,
of course, the archetypal modern realist.
Contemporary conservative realists are divided into
traditional realism and neo- or structural realism. "The school
of [contemporary] realism is essentially Hobbesian in that it
(1) counts on the predictability of actors' motivation and
behavior; (2) equates anarchy with constant fear, struggle, and
danger; (3) claims that the national interest, defined as self-
preservation and advancement against others, is a dictate of
nature - either a state obeys it or it is destroyed; (4) takes
all other motivations besides the national interest as
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irrational and dangerous and therefore to be counseled against
so that such motivations as national pride and ideological or
religious fervor cannot be accounted for except as fatal
anomalies or covers for power interests; (5) disregards the
character of individual leaders as irrelevant, considering the
overriding dictates of the international power structure; (6)
disregards political rhetoric because it is seen as
epiphenomenal; (7) counsels prudent adherence to the realist
view of the world put forth by the scientists of the realist
paradigm, thus claiming that science is a better source for
political wisdom than the cultivation of excellence in leaders
and their followers." (Johnson 1993, 70)58
The difference between Hobbes and his contemporaries is
that Hobbes paid a great deal more attention to the irrational
motives rather than rational self interest and the pursuit of
power as a significant factor in violent conflict.
Within the contemporary school of conservative realists,
the prime distinction is between traditional and structural or
neo-realists. "(S)tructural realism or sometimes neo-realism
deals only with basic structural features of the international
system: the 'anarchical nature of the system, the relative
distribution of power, and the importance of the balance of
power..and attempts to transform classical realism into a
scientific-deductive theory that focuses on the structure of the
international system...It avoids questionable assumptions,
ambiguities, and contradictions that Waltz and other scholars
discerned in Morgenthau's writings with respect to the central
concepts of power, national interest, and balance of power."
(George 1993, 108)59
Conservative realism can thus be broken down as follows:
Classical
Pre-modern
Modern
traditional
Contemporary
structural or neo-realists
Realism is used in a generic sense to refer to those who
uphold the belief that the international system is inherently
anarchic and lacks a central order-enforcing power. (Forde 1993,
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63) Further, realists believe in the primacy of self-interest
and power as explanatory motives (not necessarily the only ones)
in international relations; states have no duties other than to
advance their own interests and power.
One species type of realists in contrast to the
conservative realists are called liberal or institutional
realists who believe that states may agree, even through joint
decisions, to cooperate by adopting principles, norms, rules and
decion making procedures and even embedding them in
international governing structures, provided such institutions,
principles, norms, rules and procedures advance the interests of
states who agree to cooperate. over the long term. These liberal
internationalists of a realist persuasion will be referred to as
realist institutionalists or liberal realists.
Internationalism [realist] as defined here does not
obviate the realist diagnosis of the human
problematic. It sets out, on the contrary, to devise
a solution on realist premises. The difference
pertains to a relatively limited issue: whether, given
the fact of international anarchy, the structure of
the international system can be modified so as to
reduce significantly the conflictiveness of
international relations. To assert that this can be
done is not to adopt an 'idealist' antithesis of
'realism'." (Goldmann 1994, 56)
But the map gets even more complicated when some theories
attempt to combine conservative and liberal realism in a common
historical dialectic. In world system theory, much is made of
the difference and dialectical interaction between conservative
and liberal realism, between the conserving tendencies of states
and the dynamic changing forces of the increasingly globalized
economy as the essence of capitalism. In Wallerstein's three
volume account of world-system theory, "the separation of
politics (constrained within the individual polities of the
inter-state system) and economics (the encompassing global
division of labour) is constitutive of the capitalist world-
economy and is a functional requirement for its reproduction.
(1979: 6, 24, 32, 66; 1984: 7-12, 33-6, 50, 130; Rupert 1993,
nt. 21, 92)
"(T)he rise and expansion of the modern inter-state system
is held to have been both the main cause and an effect of the
endless accumulation of capital: 'Capitalism has been able to
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flourish precisely because the world-economy has had within its
bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems.'
(Wallerstein 1974, 348) At the same time, the tendency of
capitalist accumulators to mobilize their respective states so
as to enhance their competitive position in the world-economy
has continually reproduced the segmentatation of the political
realm into separate jurisdictions. (Wallerstein, 1974, 402)."
(Arrighi 1993, 153)
But there are idealists as well as realists, not only
realists who attempt to integrate and relate conservative and
liberal realism in the historicist dialectic of world systems
theory, or idealists who attempt to base their idealism on solid
realist premises as in the case of the gramscians and neo-
structuralists, but there are idealists who are not realists at
all.
The distinction between realist and idealist
internationalism made above is necessary because there are two
types of liberal internationalists. The realist
internationalists must be distinguished from the rationalists of
the grotian school60, a form of idealism which holds that
individuals possess and are the beneficiaries of a set of rights
which must be set off against the sovereignty of states.
Realists of all persuasions reject rights as having any equal
standing with the interests of states in the international
arena, though states may, for various reasons, contract with one
another to uphold such rights, particularly for realist
internationalists. Grotians and realists who support joint
cooperative decisions among states and the creation of
international institutions which embody principles, norms, rules
and decision making procedures embedded in structures and
organizations are both liberal institutionalists or
internationalists. The members of the two schools together are
often referred to as pluralists or simply liberals.
Idealist theories include both grotians61 and moral
utopians, and both schools are usually contrasted with realism.62
Basically, utopians believe that international society should be
reorganized to serve fundamental values and norms. A grotian or
idealist internationalist, for example, would assert, "If the
sanctity of human life is an overriding moral concern, and if
altruism is a feature of moral principle, then the case for
regarding internationalism as a moral principle has been
outlined. Internationalism is a programme for saving human life
on a grand scale by setting universal peace and security before
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short-term national interests." (Goldmann 1994, 162) A realist
internationalist might take moral norms into consideration as an
offshoot of national interests, but national interests would
always come first.
On the other hand, a utopian would make his fundamental
values categorical rather than hypothetical. Kant is the
archetypal utopian moralist.63 For Kant, the global society was
a voluntary association of states, united under non-coercive
laws, that is, laws of virtue alone. Because the duties of
virtue apply to all humanity, the concept of the ethical
commonwealth is extended to the whole of mankind. A grotian, on
the other hand, would begin with, "If we agree that value A is
fundamental, then...." The Nigerian General, Olesugun Obasanjo,
revealed himself to be a moral utopian when he asked, "why does
sovereignty seem to confer absolute immunity on any government
who commits genocide and monumental crimes of destruction and
elimination of a particular section of its population for
political, religious, cultural or social reasons? In an inter-
dependent world, is there no minimum standard of decent behavior
to be expected and demanded from every government in the
interest of common humanity?" (quoted in Gomes 1996, 41)
However, there are utopian thinkers (in my use of
terminology) who are also realists. In the last chapter, we
depicted the Reaganites as conservative but moral realists.
There are also radical moral realists. Radical moral idealists
reject the label idealism or utopianism because they found their
analysis on realist premises. Gramscians accept the realist
concern with a hegemonic power, but use the concept as a basis
for developing a radical critique of hegemony.64 "One meaning,
which is conventional in international relations literature, is
the dominance of one state over others, the ability of the
dominant state to determine the conditions in which interstate
relations are conducted and to determine the outcomes of these
relations. The other meaning, informed by the thought of Antonio
Gramsci, is a special case of dominance: it defines the
condition of a world society and state system in which the
dominant state and dominant social forces sustain their position
through adherence to universalised principles which are accepted
or aquiesced in by a sufficient proportion of subordinate states
and social forces (Cox 1983)." This second meaning of hegemony
implies intellectual and moral leadership. The strong make
certain concessions to obtain the consent of the weaker."
The claimed advantages of a neo-marxist gramscian approach
50
is that it avoids both a state centred or a global economic
approach, and integrates both in terms of the tensions within a
state, not only in terms of the ongoing class struggle, but also
in terms of the tension between the state and civil society,
both given impetus by technological innovations and transfers:
"we analytically distinguished three dimensions: the
transforming impact Atlantic Fordism has had on economic
structures; the articulation of changing class and state
structures in state-civil society configurations; and the impact
of changing world-order structures on national economic and
socio-political developments." (Holman 1993, 234)
Thus, unlike conservative realism or even the realism of
world system theory, or even the moral realism of the
Reaganites, the gramscian approach problematizes the state and
develops a relational theory of the state versus the view of the
state as a cohesive actor in which the state-bureaucracy is, at
one and the same time, idealized and its powers are exaggerated;
instead, the view, explicitly adopted from Braudel, is of the
state existing "to preserve inequality". "The state itself is no
longer seen as a set of institutions or a cohesive actor but as
a type of social relations, an articulaion of class interests
within a given territorial context." (Gill & Palan 1994, 6)
Instead, the state is viewed as "the heart of political power,"
the centre of hegemonic stability (Mason 1994, 16),
(T)he psychology of material interest is controlling
in the long term no matter what other elements may
deflect attention in the short term, Since these
interests are more accutely important to those who
benefit or lose most in the economic process, the
beneficiaries create social structures to reinforce
and preserve their interests while at the same time
assuring the repression or at least quiescence of
those likely to be motivated by their material loss."
(16)
Therefore, politics and the state are "ultimately an
artifact of social forces that mold it, not in concrete detail
but in underlying direction." That is, the state is an
expression of class power. Thus, the gramscian attempt at a neo-
structuralist integration produces, in the end, a control model
rather than a self-organizing system model. The state is
considered to be "a complex play of forces of classes, social
forces, institutions, individuals, genders, races, peoples,
regions, localities, etc." "To neostructuralists, the 'state'
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cannot be a volitional subject; it has no needs, it does not
pursue 'power and prestige,' it does not possess a unique
agenda. It is not an 'it'." (Gill & Palan 1994, 6) Thus, unlike
conservative realists, though power is considered primary, the
state is given a secondary role in relation to socio-economic
structures within the state and globally.65
The following chart may help to keep the terminology
straight as I employ the terms to clarify the four schools.66
SCHOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL THEORY
    Classical
/  (Thucydides)
                         Historical - Pre-modern
   / \ (Machiavelli)
 /    Modern
/    (Hobbes)
   } Conservative realism
World   }                               \
   }    /                      \         / Traditional
System  } REALISM                       Contemporary
        }    !    \                        \ Neo-realism
Theory  }Reaganite Liberal realism   
        }  moral                       \
   } realism \
   !      liberal internationalism
        neo-structuralists /
& gramscians                 /
   !
   ! Grotians or rationalists
   !    /
IDEALISM
   \ Utopians Moralists
   
Post-Cold War realists can also be divided on where there
see the next BIG THREAT coming from to succeed the Soviet Union.
Is it a renewed, xenophobic, nationalistic and authoritarian
Russia or some other state threat67, the clash of civilizations
and the threat of a renewed, militant Islam (Huntington)68, or
environmental degradation and the population explosion (Homer-
Dixon, Kaplan)69?
But realists, as I indicated above, are primarily divided
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on their methodological approach and can be divided into the
conservative and the liberal realists.70 The latter, as I
indicated, are also called pluralists or neoliberal
institutionalists. Neoliberal realists tend to be less
pessimistic than classical or conservative realists, but both
groups approach the study of international relations with a
mechanical, rational choice model.71 Both schools assume that
states behave like egoistic value maximizers. But the goals of
the calculation are different. Conservative realists are more
defensive and fearful, while liberal realists or liberal
institutionalists attempt to be more opportunistic and
internationally pro-active.
(R)ealists argue that anarchy means that states fear
not just being cheated but also being dominated or
even destroyed by others. As a result, while
neoliberals see states as 'rational egoists'
interested in their own utility, realists view states
as what I have called 'defensive positionalists'
interested in achieving and maintaing relative
capabilities sufficient to remain secure and
independent in the self-help context of international
anarchy. In turn, while neoliberals focus on the
problem of cheating for cooperation, realists argue
that an equally big problem is the fear on the part of
some states that others might achieve disproportionate
gains and therby become more domineering friends or
even potentially more powerful adversaries. Realists
therefore argue that states must solve both the
cheating and the relative gains problem in order to
achieve cooperation." (Grieco 1993b, 303)
Neoliberals or structural realists contend that
"International regimes exist when patterned state behavior
results from joint rather than independent decision making."
(Stein 1993, 31)
There are three other differences between the two types of
realists. Conservative realists are usually not just
methodological realists; they are metaphysical or substantive
realists. They believe that what they depict is reality, and
that reality shapes the international regimes which are mere
epiphenomena.72 Liberal realists take a more heuristic
perspective. A structure is a pattern or tendency, not a set of
laws describing reality, so that, "(I)f there is more law,
organization, exchange, and communication among states, this
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will reinforce peace and security." (Goldmann 1994, 2) Secondly,
liberal realists view human agents rather than the system as
dominant.73 These two taken together introduce a third
difference; the system is immutable for conservative realists,
but malleable for liberal realists.74
Now, as I said, some liberal internationalists are
idealists, not realists. They share many of the presumptions of
the liberal realists about an anarchic system of states and that
the international system is malleable and subject to change by
humans. However, for idealist liberal internationalists, the
principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures, and the
organizational structures in which they are embedded, are not
intended merely to be products of the self-interests of states,
but are intended to be a higher order of development which will
carry authority and the ability to enforce those standards on
wayward states. The grotian tradition does not presume that the
international system is composed simply of sovereign states in
an anarchical relation to one another and motivated by power and
self-interest. Sovereignty is relative, not absolute. It is
qualified by refugee movements and refugee regimes. Further,
states are compassionate as well as fearful and concerned with
their own security and survival. Force is not the ultimate or
even the primary factor in international relations. Nor, more
generally, is egoistical self-seeking. But both are dominant
factors, and coercion may be needed by a higher authority to
offset egoistical self-seeking if it is destructive to other
parts of the system.
Further, for Grotian idealist liberal internationalists,
the international system is constituted by cosmopolitan elites
who share many principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures which hold the system together.75 Grotians are less
focused on the state per se as a monolithic entity than the
individuals and bureaucratic units with their traditional
attitudes and practices who actually develop and implement the
working of international regimes.76 In fact, they welcome
globalization and the demise of the power of the state as an
opportunity to enhance and strengthen a grotian cosmopolitan
legal regime.
Nevertheless, grotians and the neoliberal institutional
realists generally share a liberal internationalist outlook.
Both view the international system as an evolving set of
traditions or regimes, the grotians focusing much more on the
ethical dimensions while the neoliberal realists depict the
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international system in normative but less moralistic
terminology. Though in both cases, norms are rooted in the past,
in the grotian perspective, they carry some degree of authority
in the present that has some connection with the continuity of
its transmission from the past rather than simply deriving their
authority from their utility in the present, particularly in a
world economy dominated by market forces. This does not mean
that they are rigid. In fact, the objective is to change our
principles to adapt to the problems we encounter. If the method
of change involves simply altering the governing norms, we have
evolutionary change. If the method of change involves an
overturning established norms, then we have revolutionary
change.
If realist liberal internationalists adopt accomodationist
strategies, idealist liberal internationalists believe the
higher organization should have the power to enforce the
priniciples, norms, and rules through decision procedures that
are the responsibility of a higher body than a state. Realist
liberal internationalists are much more content to rely on
improved communication and the inducements of participating in
exchanges which are mutually beneficial. Realist liberal
internationalists are content to leave states as completely
self-determining primary units; disputes are settled by
mediation, arbitration and the application of international law
through agreement and cooperation and not coercion. The
difference between idealist liberal internationalists and
realist liberal internationalists is the difference between Hugo
Grotius (De jure belli ac pacis, 1625) and Jermey Bentham (A
Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace, 1843).
If one is a post-Cold War idealistic internationalist, then
the end of the Cold War will present itself as a golden not-to-
be-missed opportunity to fix up the existing system and improve
the international legal and consensual framework in order to
address a legacy of deprivation, discrimination, and grievances
presumed to have been thrust upon the Third World by us.77 There
is a much more dominant moral telos to the idealist
internationalist program than the realist one. The missionary
message will be that we must not and cannot fail to bring to
these countries the benificence of equality and the liberty of
democratic government by attending to their social, economic and
political deficiencies. In contrast, realist internationalists
might conclude that democracy is a sine qua non for a liberal
internationalist program to work, but it would not be an a
priori determination.
55
For the post-Cold War realists, the problem is out there,
even if its centre of gravity has shifted by the dissolution of
the Soviet empire. For post-Cold war idealists, the problem is
within us, in our failure in morality and political will, and in
our inability to assume our collective responsibilities to
increase the resources available to the task of international
governance and greater distributive justice.78 For realist
internationalists, political will may be a necessary
prerequisite, but the lack of political will is not a moral
failing.
In the other direction, grotians share with utopians rooted
in the tradition of natural law and Kantian ethics a conviction
of universalism, either as a goal which we are striving to
achieve or as a preestablished a priori universalism rooted in
reason. Ought should govern what is. But for grotians, the
dominant ethical principles are directive, not constitutive of
the very fabric of a human being. They are convictions held by
humans which provide a ground for determining expectations and
determinations of legitimacy. For utopians, the ethical norms
are absolute, not just a matter of subjective conviction;
forbidden actions are wrong even if they yield positive
consequences. For intentions rather than consequences are the
critical factor. For grotians, valuable international norms -
such as the Hansen passports for refugees - may have been
adopted because states were interested in getting rid of
refugees rather than giving them rights; transformations in
normative practice may be a product of underlying changes in
power relations. Nevertheless, such an international practice is
valid and valuable. The practices need to be moral, not the
foundation on which they were put in place.
Grotians are similarly more tolerant of the fact that
internatioanl intitutionalized patterns and practices may
benefit the strong disporoportionately. There is no need to
introduce a standard of equity into international norms, though
a large "degree of bias may make a considerable difference in a
regime's durability, effectiveness, and mode of transformation."
(Puchala and Hopkins 1993, 67)
Moral utopians, on the other hand, are not content merely
to allow normative issues to play an important role in
international theory. They want to settle international issues
on the basis of such norms. If they are Hegelian or Marxist
dialecticians rather than Kantians, they will argue that such
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norms arise out of the contradictions which obsess critical
theorists or the forces that preoccupy realists of all stripes.
Realists (both classical and liberal) cannot escape having a
normative foundation. Thus, classical realism, liberal realism
and a grotian perspective generally line up respectively with
three different normative approaches: justifications which
settle normative issues by stressing the primacy of order (which
normatively deny the relevance of norms), utilitarian
justifications, and rights-based theories.79 Thus, all
international theories are rooted in fundamental normative
outlooks which constitute the basis for the principles, norms,
rules, and decision procedures as well as the structures and
organizations in which they are embedded.
Thus, for example, Luigi Bonanate (1995) tries to construct
a neo-Kantian theory which goes beyond the intentionalist
deontology of most Kantians to espouse an ethics of
international relations in which "each state has the duty to
concern itself equally with all the citizens of the world
(subject to practical constraints)...The most important
consequence of this formulation is that every state has a duty
to 'intervene' even outside its own borders to safeguard the
elementary 'rights of individuals, whatever the state of
origin." (vi-vii) This does not make the theory naive in
ignoring the huge distance which divides the ideal from the
real. It means that the ethical theory itself must not be naive,
but must deal with states that take themselves to be autnomous
and self-contained while they participate to different degrees
in a cosmopolitan society. It is in the stretch between these
poles of an existing system of states deemed to be anarchic and
an emerging cosmopolis that practical judgement must be applied
to the international sphere; this is where such a Kantian
position must make its impact.
Frost (1996), in contrast to a Kantian approach, tries to
construct an ostensibly utopian Hegelian foundation for
recognizing the independence of sovereign states while insisting
that the legitimacy of those states as authentic independent
states depends on a normative framework of an international
community which insists on certain minimum standards of
behaviour. In other words, there is an international community.
Rights are possessed, not as natural or human rights, but as
ones recognized to be the possessions of members of that
community whether taken on a global or a national scale. Frost
(1996) calls this a constitutive theory of international ethics.
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I call Frost's theory an ostensible Hegelian theory, for
though the final framework is one consistent with Hegel's
outlook, the method for reaching it does not. In contrast, Gill
(1993) offers a truly dialectical, but a neo-Marxist or
gramscian account of a utopian framework for international
theory, and, of course, an international political economy,
through a historical dialectical form of explanation rooted in
historical materialism. The method is Marxist, but the results
are claimed to be different because the development of
capitalism has reached a different stage. The results must be
consistent with the analysis of current conditions. In the
Marxist or gramscian approach, an already existing universal
culture and normative structure is not the foundation for its
analysis as much as a telos, a potential, the realization of
which is constrained and frustrated by a hegemonic, self-
sustaining, quasi-totalitarian capitalism, a regime of
competitive accumulation and division of labour which socializes
thought and institutions into subservience to this dominant
system and prevents the emergence of universal culture.
That normative telos is stated succinctly by Gill. "(T)he
normative goal of the Gramscian approach is to move toward the
solution of the fundamental problem of political philosophy: the
nature of the good society and thus, politically, the
construction of an 'ethical' state and a society in which
personal development, rational reflection, open debate,
democratic empowerment and economic and social liberation can
become more widely attainable." (1993, 25) It is the domination
of such normative goals that make gramscian analysis utopian in
my terms, even though they would dislike the terminology and
even though they take realism sriously.
One perspective that unites the liberal realists, grotians
and utopians, as well as the world system theorists and
gramscians, and in contrast to the conservative realists, is the
emphasis on a global perspective. There is thus an irony, which
we will explicate in the next chapter, between this
methodological globalism of the liberal realists and their
regionalist approach to policy, while the strictly state-centred
conservative realists take a globalist approach to interpreting
problems in African states.
For a utopian thinker, "nothing in the contemporary world
can be fully understood unless it is framed in a global,
international perspective." (Bonante 1995, 2) For utopians,
however, the global system is not something that arises as a
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construct of states. It is the foundation for states, classes,
civil society. Since realists accept a world system, but a world
system based on states existing within an anarchy, gramscian
utopians would argue that this reductionist position rooted in
positivism (they dub it objectivist materialism) and a
mechanical metaphor is not truly 'realist'. For it fails to take
into account the historical-material conditions which produced
realist theories in the first place and the hegemonic forces
such theories serve in the present. A theory is only truly
'realist' if it is a product of self-conscious critical thought
which can offer an explanation, in historical materialist terms,
for the origins of its own thinking.
In that sense, therefore, there can be no realist thought
per se, that is thought which corresponds to an external and
independent reality, since the social world is, in good part, a
product of that thought and, in turn, socializes its inhabitants
in dominant forms of thought. Cartesian dualism, at least its
widespread acceptance, hence, is a construct of that dominant
system. So is its corollary - an ahistoricist conception of an
unchanging reality which deforms science (Prigigone 1993) as
much as social science.
Further, such an approach argues that competing theories
are also dominated by normative structures, but normative
structures to which the society has been both socialized at the
same time as those norms are presented, not as norms, but as
scientific givens in reality. The object of a truly scientific
utopianism is to expose what Gramsci called the mythological
basis of the dominant forms.
For example, gramscians offer an analysis of what they term
the 'triple crisis' of capitalism. There is an economic crisis
in the terms and conditions for finance, exchange and production
while elites attempt to patch the system, but the effects of
restructuring continually create deeper fissures as attempts are
made to repair the old ones. There is a political crisis
undermining the legitimization of the state from within while
reducing its importance externally by the creation of servile
transnational institutions; yet the power of the state is needed
to preserve the political order. Lastly, there is a socio-
cultural crisis in which transnational ideas of commodification
and consumerism socialize all societies in a common ethic of
consumerism at the same time as reactions to this process of
universalization constrain and limit the hegemony of global
capitalism. The results are evident in the growth of refugees
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and illegal migration, the global reduction in the share
allocated to labour with the globalization of production and
finance, and the sacrifice of the public sector and the
environment for the sake of private accumulation. According to
gramscians, these provide solid grounds for the realization of
a humanist socialism to arise out of the contradictions of the
world capitalist system provided humanists raise their
consciousness, organize and take advantage of the openings
offered.
If the conditions depicted which weaken the power of
sovereign states offer a revolutionary potential for utopians,
they offer an evolutionary trajectory for grotian idealists, a
set of circumstances and conditions which provide an opportunity
for liberal human rights principles to be advanced on a much
higher and cosmopolitan level.
Three elements of regionalization and globalization
are essential to recognize: first, the way processes
of economic, political, legal, military and cultural
interconnectedness are changing the nature, scope and
capacity of the modern state, as its 'regulatory'
ability is challenged and reduced in some spheres;
secondly, the way regioanl and global
interconnectedness creates chains of interlocking
political decisions and outcomes among states and
their citizens, altering the nature and dynamics of
national political systems themselves; and, thirdly,
the way cultural and political identities are being
reshaped and rekindled by such processes, leading many
local and regional groups, movements and nationalisms
to question the nation-state as a representative and
accountable power system. Democracy has to come to
terms with all three of these developments. If it
fails to do so, it is likely to become ever less
effective in determining the shape and limits of
political activity. Accordingly, the international
form and structure of politics and civil society has
to be built into the foundation of democratic thought
and practice. (Held 1995, 136)
Basically, capitalism has thrown off the shackles of the
democratic state and there is now a vacuum. The underdeveloped
international political authority allows capitalism to dominate
with only the most limited fetters. At the same time, for
utopian gramscians or neo-marxists, the results of this absence
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of boundaries produces a crisis within capitalism itself. Half
way measures, such as controls instituted on state fiscal and
monetary policies, keep the system working but show its strains.
For grotians, the globalization of the capitalist system
produces a political crisis and challenge for democratic
societies. For both, the division of the world, primarily into
sovereign states, which facilitated the emergence and
development of capitalism and the Westphalian system of nation-
states, releases capitalism from any reasonable boundaries. For
gramscians, the crisis produced constraints on capitalist
development by preventing the emergence of an authoritative
global authority. For grotians, the vacuum offers an opportunity
for mechanisms of global governance to advance.
The biggest strain created is in the United States, which
continues to insist on acting like a hegemon which is above the
laws of the market, insisting that everyone but itself be
subject to those laws. Constraints are created through the
supranational institutions it controls - the IMF, the World Bank
- but the United States resists subjecting itself to those same
constraints. As a tiny example, when, in a decision-making
procedure of this system, an arbitration panel votes in favour
of Canada as part of the NAFTA agreement, the United States,
rather than accepting such a ruling, resorts to political
tactics - i.e. the tactics of a powerful bully to attempt to get
its way.
I have extensively outlined the differences between these
various schools of international theory because these are not
just academic differences. The theoretical schools can be
correlated with significant differences in foreign policy. It is
to the practice of these different theoretical perspectives that
we must now turn.
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Chapter 5 
Realists and Idealists in Foreign Policy: The Case of Zaire80
I have made these distinctions between utopians, grotians,
liberal and conservative realists, as well as the other complex
combinations, not because I am interested in adjudicating their
differences, but more to understand their connection with actual
policy and practice and the efforts to rationalize or criticize
those policies. For what we find is the opposite of what I
contend should be the case. In periods of crisis, when the
leading edge ought to be given to those interested in innovation
and propelled by hope, the idealists are in disarray. The hard
knuckled realists are dominant and intent on reestablishing the
previous equilibrium rather than achieving a new level of
stability. When international conflicts have been stabilized and
equilibrium prevails, realists ought to be the dominant actors
to ensure the maintanance of the equilibrium. Instead,
complacency grows and the idealists begin to use the opportunity
to plan radical changes.
Grotians grope to introduce human rights, democracy, but
primarily principles of neutrality and international law, at the
very same time that radical utopian idealists feed the realist
propensity to deal harshly with initiatives for radical change.
Realists then accuse the grotians of being both ungrounded and
inopportune.
I will initially illustrate this proposition by reference
to American policy in Zaire over the same period as the Rwanda
conflict. If Rwanda is a postage stamp-sized country, Zaire is
the size of Western Europe. If Rwanda is of virtually no
strategic or economic interest to the West, Zaire is rich in
mineral wealth, particularly copper and diamonds. If Rwanda is
one of the most densely populated countries in the world, at the
time of independence Zaire had a population of only 14 million.
I take the example of Zaire because the case material is
available, it is relevant background to the Rwanda study, and
one of Sweden's most illustrious international civil servants,
Dag Hammarskjöld, a preeminent grotian81, lost his life while
serving as secretary-general to the United Nations during the
initial Zairian conflict. Further, the period covers the Cold
War and the use of African countries as proxies in the global
struggle. "(T)he Third World served as a proxy Cold War
battlefield for U.S. Plocymakers who sought to avoid direct
military confrontation with the Soviet Union." (Schraeder 1992,
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385) Zaire was one of the foremost outposts of American Cold War
policy offering both an adjacent mega-mirror for Rwanda as well
as providing a missed opportunity. For instead of innovation and
developing new ways to handle and deal with such crises, a
sarcophagus was produced. Instead of Zaire serving as a model
and locus for establishing stability in the area, it is a source
of instability as we wait for Zaire to explode.
Zaire represented America's first major incursion into
Africa as part of its strategy of containing communism. Another
reason to choose Zaire is that it belies the widespread and
often quoted belief that between Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990,
the Cold War froze the possibility of utilizing peace
enforcement: "Until 1989, peace enforcement had been blocked by
the superpowers' opposed vetoes in the context of the Cold War."
(Augelli & Murphy 1995, 343) Zaire was also a trauma for sub-
Saharan Africans who learned from Zaire to be wary of UN
interventions. Until the success of UNTAG in Namibia in 1989,
this wariness remained. The UN, too, had been scarred in Zaire.
It was the UN's first coercive intervention in a civil war. "The
new breed of intra-State conflicts have certain characteristics
that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not
encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They
are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by
militias and armed civilians with little disipline and with ill-
defined chains of command. They are often guerilla wars without
clear front lines. Civilians are the main victims and often the
main targets." (Boutros 1995, para. 12, 8-9)
However, the UN, which avoided any involvement in Chad in
1981, and even after Namibia, refused to become involved in
Liberia in 1990, also never learned from the studies of the
Zaire involvement. "(I)n the aftermath of the Congo operation,
the Secretariat and more member states were more interested in
forgetting than in learning, more interested in avoiding future
ONUCs than in doing them." (Durch 1993b, 349)
The story I sketch is of US policy towards Zaire driven by
competition between hard headed realists (who also compete among
themselves), who dominated Zairian policy and are referred to as
globalists because Zaire was simply a proxy in the American
anti-communist war. Liberal realists, called regionalists in the
context of Zairian policy, tried to take into account the
indigenous forces and factors in play, and were more amenable to
seeking cooperative and compromise solutions rather than relying
solely on coercive force. When Jimmy Carter assumed the
presidency, a new, central political element was introduced into
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the debate within America (it had always been an important
element internationally, particularly in the UN and the non-
alligned bloc) - a grotian one in which human rights and
democratic conditionality were introduced as a dimension of
foreign policy in Zaire. The utopians are represented by the
revolutionary forces within Zaire led initially by Patrice
Lumumba, and in the United States by the radical critics of
American policy, none of whom managed to obtain political office
or positions in the American foreign policy establishment. (The
detailed chronology is provided in Appendix A.)
In the context of the Cold War, and the decolonization
efforts underway creating so many new independent nations in
Africa, the anti-communist crusader, Vice-President Richard
Nixon, following a twenty-two day tour of Africa, recommendended
that President Dwight D. Eisenhower create a separate Bureau of
African Affairs within the State Department.82 In the
realpolitik-inspired vision of the international system, power
politics, military preparedness, and a resolve to intervene to
contain communism remained the dominant motives for US policy in
Africa. Economic self-interest was not a determinant of US
policy for realists. Self-interest was defined in geo-strategic
terms.83 Further, economic outlays for the realist strategy, in
fact, sacrificed American economic interests both in Zaire and
in the priorities in budgeting within the United States to these
geo-strategic defined issues of power.84 The realists were also
opposed to multilateral initiatives that made America's geo-
strategic interests dependent on the UN.85 Further, they also had
few concerns with human rights or democracy, preferring to back
a strong leader as long as order was assured.
The conservative realists were in control of American
policy when Zaire achieved independence on 30 June 1960 after
widespread riots the year before. Patrice Lumumba, a socialist
and a nationalist utopian in our terms, became Prime Minister.
Kasavubu, an opportunistic realist, was elected President by the
Zairian parliament. Five days after independence, Zairian troops
mutinied against their Belgian officers and riots and looting
spread. Belgium, in a strct conservative realist response, sent
in military reinforcements to protect its citizens and economic
interests when it could not do so with its control of the civil
service. Having ceded independence in a realist doctrine of the
autonomy of sovereign states in an anarchic world system,
Belgium nevertheless continued to act as a colonial rather than
a conservative realist power because Belgium did not request
permission from Zaire. Belgium was, in effect, caught between
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its colonial heritage and its newly discovered realism which
only seemed to lead it to behaving as a colonial power.
The results were predictable. Belgium, a rapidly declining
hegemon in that region, was denounced by Zairian politicians and
globally by the Afro-Asian bloc for attemting to secure its
military and economic control over Zaire. The UN was invited to
intervene to defend the independence of a sovereign state
against the Belgian invasion. Under grotian principles, coercion
must be available to be used to back international law, in this
case, the sovereign independence of states. In spite of his
disinclination to rely on force to settle conflict issues, Dag
Hammarskjöld, the Swedish Secretary-General (SG) of the UN,
reported to the Security Council that a threat to peace and
security has emerged in Zaire.
In the meanwhile, Tshombe in what was then Katanga and is
now the copper rich province of Shaba, declared independence,
followed a month later by the diamond rich province of Kasai.
Self interest and power were impelling the collapse of a state.
Lumumba saw it as the machinations of the Belgians and dithered
between UN intervention and inviting the Soviets. When he
ascertained that the UN was bogged down in grotianism and the
rule of law, and he interpreted that to mean that the UN was
controlled by the imperial powers, when the UN would not provide
him with the muscle to repress the breakaway reactionary forces
in the country, he called for Soviet assistance (which was
immediately forthcoming), setting off alarm bells in Washington.
Washington overruled its French and British allies in the
Security Council (they abstained along with China) and
authorized creation of a UN peacekeeping force. However, the
peacekeeping force had no mandate to enforce peace or even act
to protect citizens. The authorization appeared to make it an
adjunct of the Zairian government. However, one objective was
the clear: the peacekeepers were to be deployed to replace the
Belgian troops in protecting civilians. But it was also equally
clear that they were not there in fact to help Lumumba solve his
secessionist problems.
This he tried to do himself in an attack against the
Buluba, the weaker of the secessionist forces. Thousands were
massacred. The CIA, in the meanwhile, had already been plotting
Lumumba's overthrow. The massacres provided the rationale.
Kasavubu was induced by the CIA to dismiss the Prime Minister.
The conservative realists and the revolutionary utopians were at
war. And the grotians were trapped helplessly and haplessly
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between. The CIA fostered a coup d'état by Mobutu. The Soviets
attacked Hammarskjöld as a front for the CIA when the UN denied
Lumumba access to Zairian radio. On the other hand, when Dayal,
Hammarskjöld's representative in Zaire, provided protection to
Lumumba from immanent arrest, he was viewed by the Americans as
a saboteur of their plans. The man who so believed in civility
and the importance of trust, and the role of the UN as a neutral
third party in disputes, became the object of venom and distrust
from all sides for his alleged partiality.
In January of 1991, Lumumba was murdered just three days
before Kennedy assumed the presidency of the United States. The
affairs of Zaire echoed with classical precedents. Those
familiar with Thucydides account immediately recall the
assassination of the populist leader, Peithias in the civil war
in Corcyra between the oligarchs who were linked with Sparta and
the democrats linked with Athens in the proxy war of classical
Greece. However, it was a proxy war only in the sense that the
bipolar powers of Ancient Greece fought out their mutual
hostility using Corcyra, as Zaire was used in the sixties, but
the true cause of war was the factions within Corcyra who used
the war between Sparta and Athens for their own purposes.
Peithias, a populist leader, like Lumumba, was initially
brought to trial and acquited. Then the populists set out on
revenge against those who had had Peithias arrested, but
initially through the courts. The oligarchs with their backs to
the wall about to lose all their wealth, staged a coup, "banded
together and suddenly rushing into the senate with daggers in
their hands killed Peithias and others, both senators and
private persons, to the number of sixty." (3.70.6) The situation
deteriorated into civil war as the slaves of the oligarchs
deserted to the party of the people and the oligarchs, like
Tshombe, hired 800 mercenaries. But the people's party won.
There was no equivalent to the UN in ancient Greece. Athens
tried to play the role of the UN even though the oligarchs
distrusted its democratic tendencies, engaged in preventive
diplomacy and secured a temporary truce whereby Athens would be
the guarantee of the peace. But the populists recruited the
crews of the Athenian ships to side with them, and the oligarchs
saw in this a plot of the UN in backing the populists, and
retreated to a sanctuary, a temple (3:75,5) In the meanwile, the
Athenian and Peloponessian cold war turned into a hot one as a
battle broke out at sea. When the Athenians routed the
Peloponessians, the populists took advantage of the situation to
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slaughter their oligarchic enemies. "The charge they brought was
of conspiring to overthrow the democracy, but some were in fact
put to death merely to satisfy private enmity, and others,
because money was owing to them, were slain by those who
borrowed it. Death in every form ensued, and whatever horrors
are wont to be perpetrated at such times all happened then -
aye, and even worse." (3:81, 4-5)
Accounts of the civil war in Zaire evoke the same horrors,
only the United States followed Sparta's lead and backed the
contemporary equivalent of the oligarchs while the USSR
supported the populists. When the Soviets backed the break-away
regime of Lumumba's remnant government under Gizenga, the centre
of gravity shifted in American foreign policy from conservative
to liberal realism and a willingness to engage in cooperative
actions.86 John F. Kennedy was explicit in seeing America's
interest in Africa as simply a way of influencing those nations
from alligning with the communist bloc.87 The prime lead, under
liberal realist leadership, was still assigned to US allies in
Europe under a spheres of influence policy. As George Ball,
Kennedy's Under Secretary of State phrased it, the US recognized
Africa as a "special European responsibility" just as European
nations recognized "our particular responsibility in Latin
America."88 Nevertheless, when America's European allies seemed
to lack the adequate capacity and/or will, as in the case of
Belgium's handling of Zaire, the US stepped in. On the other
hand, "when African plans clashed with policies considered
crucial to US security relationships with Europe, Presidents
ultimately decided in favor of the Atlantic Alliance."89
The United States supported a stronger mandate for the UN
peacekeepers. The UN was authorized to prevent the occurrence of
civil war and to halt all military operations. The US also
threatened war against any outside (i.e. Soviet) intervention.
But these two policies were at odds. The United States could
not give priority in realist terms to its Belgian allies who
were then governed by very conservative realist goals, and, in
terms of liberal realism, back a military coercive initiative by
the UN under grotian leadership. The Belgians, given their
perspective, were appalled. So was the new Adoula-Kasavubu
government at the directive to halt all military operations;
they wanted the secessionists suppressed. Thus, although Adoula-
Kasavubu and Belgium were at opposite sides, they were united in
opposing the American solution.
The American shift to liberal realism was made concrete by
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the replacement of Ambassador Timberlane, an Eisenhower
appointee, by Edmund A Gullion, a career FSO and a liberal
internationalist of the realist persuasion. He was a realist and
not just a liberal because he believed that if a power vacuum
remained in Zaire, not only would Zaire fall to the communists,
but so might all sub-Saharan Africa in the African version of
the domino theory.90 To forestall Soviet military involvement,
the US could not directly intervene militarily. The UN would be
required to carry out the US mission of resolving the Zairian
policy while keeping out the communists.
By the summer of 1961, the US was backing more robust
miltary
action by the UN against the secessionists in Operations
Rumpunch and Morthor.91 Those operations largely failed. The UN
was not given the clout to eliminate the mercenary menace in
Shaba. ONUC, beset by civilian-military divisions, the absence
of intelligence and a solid operational plan, with very divided
political backing, inadequate financing (France and the USSR
both refused to pay for the costs of the peacekeeping
operation), and totally inadequate administrative, logistic and
communications support, achieved more than anyone could believe
given that context. But it was still unable to crush the
secessionists. And the initiative cost Hammarskjöld his life
when he flew to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia to attempt to
negotiate a reconciliation with Tshombe who had taken refuge
under UK protection. His plane crashed on its landing approach.
Adoula, Zaire's Prime Minister, proceeded to try to
negotiate the implementation of a reconciliation accord reached
with Tshombe at the end of 1961. A US initiated plan proposed by
U Thant was accepted in the summer, but Tshome had no real
intention of implementing it. He was too much the machiavellian.
Adoula was forced to resort to military means and received very
strong backing by the US and the USSR for a final showdown. The
wily Tshombe forged an alliance with Gizenga's revolutionary
forces, in that marriage of convenience of strange bedfellows,
to deadlock parliament. With US substantial military and
financial backing, Operation Grandslam was a success. Contrary
to the hopes of the liberal realists and the grotians, force was
the only answer to Tshome's maneuvers.92 On 21 January 1963, the
wily Tshombe actually welcomed the arrival of the UN troops into
Kolwezi.
By then, the importance of force had proven its value. When
U Thant resisted the US plans to train and equip the Zairian
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military using the UN, the UN itself was abandoned as an
intermediary and the conservative realists were once again in
charge of Zairian policy. There was a corresponding shift away
from an African democratic solution to favour a military one and
CIA support for a strong military leader friendly to the West.
Mobutu visited Washington and had a private meting with Kennedy
on 31 May. When the remnants of the Lumumba faction launched a
new insurgency, the US initiated a bilateral military
arrangement with the government of Zaire and now backed Tshombe
for Prime Minister.93
But Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963. The
guerilla insurgency spread. In February of 1994, American
Ambassador Gullion was replaced by G. McMurtrie Godley, another
career FSO, but more sensitive to Belgian's interests and less
concerned with catering to African nationalists. In other words,
the process had gone into reverse; a conservative realist had
replaced a liberal one. When Tshombe and Adoula continued their
rivalry and were unable to get their act together to defeat the
insurgents, the US and the Belgians intervened directly to stop
the guerilla advance in Operations Red and Black Dragon. The CIA
finally won a complete victory and in a CIA backed effort,
Mobutu executed a coup d'état to faciltate the execution of Red
Dragon, but only after the American presidential elections were
out of the way.94
When there was a real crisis, the CIA won the competitive
struggle within the US bureaucracy to control African policy in
the crisis area, and resorted to covert action to eliminate
parties perceived to be dangerous to U.S. interests. The CIA
provided support to pro-American leaders. However, the United
States, though a hegemon, could not always control the
international institutions it itself dominated.95 Dayal placed
Lumumba under UN protective custody and refused to let Mobutu
arrest him, as well as refusing to recognize the legitimacy of
Mobutu's rule. The realists were sometimes thwarted by UN
grotians and their alliance with US liberal realists. However,
with the assistance of the radical utopians, the conservative
realists came into their own again and took command of the
situation, even though the internal American rivalry ran counter
to the conservative realist ideology that all policy results
from self interest and power on behalf of each government acting
as a monolithic unit. The trials and tribulations of the
conservative realists proved that their underlying conceptual
schema bore little resemblance to reality, other than the
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contention, that in the final analysis, if it comes to a finale,
superior force is what counts.
With the CIA victory, the regionalist liberal realists
populating the State Department began to resurface, particularly
when the policy seemed to invite continuing involvement of the
US in the internal affairs of Zaire and when Zaire, against all
liberal policy requirements, expropriated first the non-Zairian
small business people and then the large firms in the early
1970s.
But a new crisis, the immanent communist victory in Angola,
gave the CIA a new lease on policy in Zaire. Kissinger's
directive in 1975 granted Zaire "$60 million in Security
Supporting Assistance for 1976 (none had been allocated since
1969); a significant rise in military aid from $3.8 million in
1977; and a White House decision to equip Zaire with much more
sophisticated weaponry (including 150 armored cars and tanks) to
counter a possible Soviet threat from Angola. This increase in
military aid, making Zaire the largest recipient of US security
assistance in sub-Saharan Africa in 1976, was capped by two
visits by Kissinger in April and October 1976."96 "(O)nce
Kissinger perceived the unfolding of an East-West crisis in
Angola that threatened to lead to the establishment of a
communist, pro-Soviet regime in Central Africa and upset the
global balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union,
Zaire was suddenly recognized as a regional pillar of US Africa
policies."97
This policy continued right through the Carter era. In
spite of President Jimmy Carter's human rights tilt98 and a
radical shift of American policy to a grotian principled stance
opposed by both the liberal and the conservative realists, the
position was soon reversed. President Carter did refuse to
involve the US in the affairs of Zaire when, on 7 March 1977,
seven weeks after his inaugeration, 1,500 Zairian exiles invaded
Shaba from Angola as the Front for the National Liberation of
the Congo (FLNC). Mobutu was rescued by the French and
Moroccans. However, when a much more effective and successful
invasion was launched a year later, Carter reversed position,
became a conservative realist, and accused Castro, erroneously,
of backing the the invasion. US transport aircraft flew 2,500
Belgian and French paratroopers to "rescue" 2,500 Europeans and
88 US nationals. The FLNC forces were once again routed, but 100
Europeans were killed.
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Three months after Jimmy Carter had become a conservative
realist, he reverted to his grotian principles. On 20 June,
Cyrus Vance announced that future US-Zaire relationship would be
conditional on economic and political reforms. But then Reagan
was elected president. By 1985, the political forces were in
place to reverse Carter's conditionality requirements. In July
of that year,  the Clark amendment (re conditionality) on aid
was repealed. US aid was renewed to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA anti-
communist resurgents in Angola. And in November, Mobutu visited
Washington to request Pentagon involvement in Kamina. But a new
rivalry emerged between the covert conservative realists in the
CIA and the overt conservative realists in the Pentagon. The CIA
managed to scuttle the substance of the Pentagon proposal
(Mobutu was the CIA's man), and the Pentagon was left with a
token $1-2 million program for joint US-Zaire military maneuvers
and selected military construction projects in Kamina.
However, without an immanent communist threat on the
horizon, the centre of gravity once again slipped away from the
conservative realists to the liberal internationalists under
George Bush99 with their own priority for economic issues and
cooperative arrangements, though, "Zaire's critical role as a
regional ally in US foreign policy toward Angola resulted in
Mobutu being honored as the first African leader to be invited
by the Bush administration for an official White House visit."100
Though Mobutu had a geo-political interest for the United States
as a global power, Zaire was not central to American core
strategic or economic interests. Further, Mobutu's kleptocracy101
was an embarrasment to the United States. In addition, the
grotian idealists had grown in strength, particularly with
glasnost and perestroika. Pressure was used to get Mobutu to
recognize press freedom and institutionalize democracy. A
struggle for power ensued in Zaire, but Mobutu divided,
outwitted and outwaited the opposition and remained in power.
His position was reinforced by President Clinton's vacillation
between liberal realism and grotian idealism.102
In the development of America's Cold War policy in Zaire,
the four schools can generally be alligned with support for
various contending leaders in the history of post-colonial
Zairian development. The hard school of realism alligned with
Mobutu at a very early stage. The liberal realists were the
architects who created the unlikely coalition of Tshombe, who
led the breakaway province of Katanga (Shaba) and the the
original President, Joseph Kasavubu and Cyrille Adoula, Prime
Minister. They were pragmatists on the lookout for any
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combination that would provide stable, apparently democratic
and, hopefully, moderate government. The grotians backed
whatever was the legally constituted government of Zaire,
President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Adoula in the early days,
and then, when Mobutu became the dictator, they pushed for human
rights and democratic reforms. The utopians backed the
rebellious Patrice Lumumba who became the protegé of the Soviet
Union until his assassination. Their sympathies then shifted to
later rebellious elements, but subsequent radical utopians
lacked the legitimacy that Lumumba had gained through elections.
My purpose is not to criticize any of the particular
positions per se. Certainly, from a utopian angle, the Mobutu
regime is most foul. From a grotian perspective, the Mobutu
regime is immoral and fails to serve its own citizens in their
basic needs.103 From a liberal realist position, Mobutu subverts
rather than upholds the laws of the market; copper production
now is 20% of its conventional levels. And even from a
conservative realist position, Zaire has not been an example of
order, but of recurring disorder. Mobutu has never been able to
defend himself when challenged by relatively small forces, but
had to call on outside support. In terms of power, Mobutu is
just an empty shell.
The fact is, neither of the ideologies have dominated
American policy. The priority of one or the other has shifted,
though over the long term, the conservative realists have been
the most prevalent, in spite of the fact that the formation of
American foreign policy belies their prenise of the state as a
unitary actor in pursuit of its own national interests and the
preservation of its power, and in spite of the fact that large
questions can be raised about how Mobutu serves real American
interests and what he provides in added value to American power,
particularly in his latest phase when he is engaged in promoting
ethnic hatred in order to preserve power.104
The major tension in US policymaking circles has been
between the conservative realists and the liberal realists with
the occasional shift to grotian idealism under Jimmy Carter. In
contrast, the centre of gravity at the UN has been the grotian
idealists, but they could never reconcile their idealism with
their need to resort to real force and to take sides, quite
aside from their inability to get their act together
administratively, financially, or in any other significant way.
What we observe is a consistency between some theories and
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some policies, but parallel conflicts in both the theoretical
and the applied areas. From these grounds, a coherent policy
cannot be expected from the dominant superpower and from the
states governed more by a tension between liberal realism and
grotian idealism, when the centre of gravity of the dominant
superpower is thrust so much further to the right. Further, any
one of the theorists from the various schools will provide
different explanations, normative depictions and prescriptions
for what has been described. The theoriticins do not seem to be
in any position to sort out the contradictions and
inconsistencies in the policy field.
What is more, if our Rwanda study pointed out the immediate
shadows, such as Somalia, that hung over the policy in Rwanda,
the UN experience in Zaire cast a very long shadow. "All in all,
ONUC was an operation that a generation of UN officials wanted
to forget, or, if not forget, then never to repeat." (Durch
1993b, 316.) Further, "the problems that arose in ONUC remain
relevant thirty years later." (Durch 1993b, 342)
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Chapter 6 
The Case of Rwanda
I do not intend to review the examination of the Rwandan
crisis and the international response that is contained in the
study produced by Astri Suhrke and myself. Instead, I want to
summarize the crisis in terms of a series of puzzles - ones
already found in the case, ones that characterized the case and
defied the conventional wisdom and expectations, and ones
unanticipated by international theory.
Six years prior to the genocide, there were virtually no
hints of such an enormous tragedy let alone an immanent crisis.
Rwanda was one of the prizes for the international community,
demonstrating that Third World countries could have honest and
efficient governments combined with the lowest expenditures on
arms in Africa. Though discriminated against and subjected to
quotas under the guise of equality of opportunity for Hutus, the
Tutsis were not persecuted. Under Habyarimana's relatively
benevolent authoritarian rule, Rwanda had enjoyed outstanding
increases in rates of economic growth.
I do not want to pretend that the situation in Rwanda was
idyllic, but, comparatively speaking, it was a place of high
stability and relatively low tension. Three factors came
together to upset this myth of an approximation to a Garden of
Eden that so entranced development agencies. Coffee prices
crashed throwing this dependent economy into a tizzy. Secondly,
Tutsi refugees from the Rwanda revolution of 1959-62, who had
apparently become so integrated into the power structure of
Uganda, particularly the military power structure, decided that
they would never be integrated within Uganda on a basis of
equality; with their military experience as a result of their
participation in Museveni's overthrow of Obote in Uganda, they
determined to return to Rwanda, by force if necessary. Thirdly,
reinforced by the new ideology of spreading democracy and human
rights which affected the West's dealing with all development
societies at the time (see Zaire above) and the enormous success
of the Helsinki Accords, pressures grew from outside donor
governments and from within Rwanda for the protection of human
rights and permitting multi-party democracy.
A synergy of various factors proved to be incediary -
economic catastrophe, social ethnic segmentation with an
74
unintegrated exile community made up of one of the ethnic
groups, reinforced by open ethnic and regional politics in the
guise of multi-parties, and an authoritarian political system in
which a small elite from one region and the majority ethnic
group ruled as an oligarchy in a patrimonial system extremely
dependent on overseas aid. These circumstances fed the belief
that a military threat could be credible when there was an
unwillingness to defuse it by insisting that international norms
for repatriating refugees be observed. When this was combined
with political leadership within that had lost any broad-based
legitimacy it once had, the elements for a catastrophe were in
place.
Exogenous factors contributed to the passivity. Habyarimana
had a military assistance agreement with France and a friendship
with Mobutu of Zaire. However, he was also aware that Tutsis
were prominently positioned in Museveni's military in Uganda and
he understood the truism that neigboring states "are often
active contributors to military escalation and regional
instability." (Brown 1996b, 572) However, his own military
alliances made him underestimate the force and determination of
an externally well-trained militant opposition when compounded
by strife and dissension within. Further, as a military man
socialized on conservative realism as the foundation for rule
and state policy, there was no internal motivation to establish
a process of reconciliation. Habyarimana and his coterie lacked
a conceptual framework that would or could propel him to seek a
peaceful resolution of the refugee problem. Further, there was
no pressure from the aid agencies at the time partly because
they sympathized with the Hutus as the underdogs against those
they perceived as the old rulers who had historically been
responsible for exploiting the Hutu. Further, since Rwanda was
one of the densest countries in the world, in objective economic
terms there was a general belief that it would be better if the
Tutsis did not return, especially given the authoritarian rule
of the Tutsi minority in Burundi.
Thus, although the lethal combination of potential
destabilization was reasonably well known, little attention was
paid either on the inside or from outsiders. The outlook of this
monograph means paying attention to combinations of ripples
rather than waiting for a tidal wave. The assumption is that
combinations of small, little noticed changes can produce large
effects, including large patterns of behaviour that are
seemingly triggered by one action - in this case the invasion by
the RPF on 1 October 1990.
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Second, inattention to Rwanda meant that international
norms about both refugees and the obligations to them, and the
rejection of the resort of refugees to the use of violence to
return were all transgresssed. The plight and desires of a
refugee community were effectively ignored, so that, in
desperation, they determined to return by force, thereby
breaking other norms and rules. This resulted in a displacement
of a further 15% of the population in a civil war instigated by
refugee warriors. The failure to deal with one relatively
manageable refugee problem in a timely fashion meant many, many
more refugees were produced.
Three, although Rwanda was well behind in those forces of
globalization that redistribute rural populations into cities,
creating a foundation for industrialization, it was vulnerable
to the new forces of violence and communication (fear-mongering
on radio) that meant that rural populations fled en masse to
become internally displaced or refugees rather than remaining in
villages and close to land and the food they consumed to wait
out a period of political violence. In sum, the responses to
conflict were thoroughly modern even if the economic and social
circumstances behind the violence were not.
Four, defying the non-interventionist in civil wars
ideology of the nineties, the ideal conditions for peace were
created by early Western diplomatic intervention on behalf of
the government, positively by France and negatively by the
Americans against Uganda. Rwanda, which had never been a locus
for superpower rivalry, appeared to be a remnant of an older
neo-colonial order. The main hegemonic force was France, a
declining power with major power pretensions. France had
replaced Belgium as the protector for the Rwandese government.
But its interest in Rwanda was more cultural and lingusitic than
economic or strategic, although, when the civil war began, the
utility of military assistance became critical to the
maintenance of the Habyarimana regime. This meant that although
France backed the regime, it had insufficient motivation to
ensure its continued maintenance, particularly in the face of
its non-observance of democratic conventions. On the other hand,
superpower intervention (the United States) meant that
Museveni's support for the rebels was limited if not cut off as
the civil war proceeded. The limited power of a declining power
and its shifting emphasis to utilizing liberal realism rather
than conservative realism as a basis for its policies, and the
global reach of a superpower resulted in a military stalemate,
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creating both the conditions for serious peace negotiations as
well a the foundations for a dragged out situation where
everything began to deteriorate.
Five, instead of regional rivalries between Zaire and
Uganda creating the potential for escalation in accordance with
conventional wisdom, subsidiarity facilitated a peace agreement,
with Tanzania taking the lead as a helpful fixer. The peace
accord was signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993 with a very minor
diplomatic role played by major players, international
organizations or influential elites who are frequently presumed
to be crucial by many involved in mediation efforts, including
the Carter organization, the Carnegie Group and International
Alert.
Six, the substantive elements of the Arusha Accords would
be given almost an A+ in a course in international studies,
providing as it did for effective military integration and
demobilization, disarming of civilian militias, supervision by
an international peace force, an integrated broad-based
government, and return of displaced persons and refugees. Yet
this almost ideal peace accord would provide one of the blinkers
that blinded the world to a malevolent force left out of but not
disarmed by that accord. And the UN was not up to the task. When
the main intervening movers and shakers shifted from the Great
Lakes region to New York, this provided a recipe for disaster
rather than a synergy to complete the task. The reasons were
many: the lack of both detailed knowledge and interests; the
same administrative disorganization and civilian-military
tension that marked the Zaire operation a third of a century
earlier, this time with the absence of any major power high
level backing (in the Zaire operation, it emerged; in Rwanda, in
the long shadow of Zaire and the immediate dark shadow of
Somalia, it dissolved); the absence of assured funding for a
clear and strong mandate, backed by adequate transport,
equipment (in particular, the absence of armored personnel
carriers proved to be critical)-and troops.
Seven, instead of any fear of international intervention,
both sides in the conflict took the unprecedented step of coming
together to New York to lobby the UN to provide a peace keeping
force. Based on the experience in Somalia, the reverse lesson
was supposed to be true about the allignment of internal forces:
the weak line up with the UN while the strong oppose UN
deployment. (Augelli and Murphy 1995, 343-4) In Rwanda, the more
effective military force had initially opposed UN deployment,
77
but when the final stage of the battle, that had hopefully been
sidetracked, was engaged, the weaker extremist Hutus both
instigated genocide and sought to and succeeded in driving out
the UN for all intensive purposes.
Eight, the arrival in New York also reinforced the grotian
tendency to be blinded by the belief that a complete consensus
had been reached and that peacekeeping in this situation would
be "a piece of cake" as General Dallaire was told when he was
offered the position of Force Commander. On the other hand, the
Security Council, not the parties, a Security Council dominated
by realists, watered down the mandate and terms of engagement
that made the peacekeepers ineffective in disarming civilians.
Partly that was because of ignorance, even if it was the same
ignorance that allowed them to become involved in Rwanda and try
to forget Somalia in their short term memory and Zaire as part
of their long term memory. Whatever the synergy of differences
that allowed a common inept decision to be made, as has always
been the case, the peacekeeping force lacked any system of
intelligence, except one it improvised itself, but more
importantly, any system for systematically collecting and
analyzing the information they did have to translate that
intelligence into strategic and tactical options. What was said
about the Zaire operation a third of a century later could be
repeated about Rwanda: "Lacking formal intelligence on the
evolution of the political situation..., the UN relied on the
reports of UN staffers..., on member states' missions in New
York, and on the Congo political leadership...Moreover, both the
situation in the country and what the world learned about it
were subject to manipulation by those powers that had
intelligence assets and interests at stake." (Durch 1993, 332)
Nine, of four lessons that should have been learned from
the Zaire experience with peacekeeping (or Somalia), only one
and a half had been absorbed. In part, this is because the UN
lacks an adequate institutional memory and also because there
had been a desire to forget everything about the Congo trauma.
The first internal lesson was the immanent problem of escalation
and the need to prepare adequately for it. For peacekeeping
always can beget the requirement for peace enforcement in
countries where civil war has undermined the value of life, and
where each incident of violence invites reprisals. On the other
hand, the other side of the coin had been well learned from
Somalia: force, if it "is is not used within limits and with
caution, easily degenerates into violence." (Augelli and Murphy
1995, 343) The first half of the lesson had been forgotten while
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the other half had been learned all too well. There was a second
lesson from Somalia that, however, had not been learned, the
significance of the determination of local armed groups. There
were also two lessons about exogenous factors that should have
been learned from both Somalia and Zaire, but only one was: the
volatility of international public opinion. The second had not
been recognized, namely that, "No (my emphasis) contemporary
government is prepared to pay a high price in terms of human
losses unless the security or vital interests of the country are
at stake." (Augelli and Murphy 1995, 344) It was believed that
this was an American problem only, because of three factors in
US domestic politics: 1. "First, the conditions that made the
new world order theoretically possible - especially the absence
of a threat to US vital interests - also ensured that the
yearning to address long festering domestic ills...would become
greater."
2. "formidable opposition from within the U.S. military"
3. the support of the Un and multilateralism, especially
peacekeeping, was a major battle ground between the executive
and legislative branches. (Daalder 1996, 463)105 In fact, it is
a condition of modernity.
Ten, in addition to all the complex conundrums about
peacekeeping, in the process of implementing the Accords, there
were unexpected very positive elements; instead of the expected
antagonism between development agencies and security forces, the
UNDP, as one example, provided a critical role in planning the
demobilization in great detail. The UNDP went even further; it
provided the interim financing for the peacekeepers when it took
the UN until 4 April 1994 to approve the budget.
Eleven, instead of a widely held presumption that smaller
nations fear the exercise of too much power by the Security
Council, when the crisis broke out on 6 April 1994, it was the
smaller states that cried for a more activist Security Council
while the US demonstrated resistance. This was, of course,
exactly what happened one-third of a century earlier in Zaire.
Twelve, though the United States and the Secretariat were
mutually rhetorically critical and even antagonistic, and even
though they faced the onset of the crisis with very opposed
presumptions, they opted for the same solution - get out and
minimize risks and exposure, ignoring the plight of the civilian
population. At least in Zaire, in spite of similar ignorance,
chaos, and a radical disjunction between the military and the
political, between the political and the bureaucratic, it was
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the UN commitment to the civilian population that sustained them
and impelled the UN to stay the course. That motivation seemed
to be absent in Rwanda, and only emerged in the UN when the
genocide was clear and unequivocal and the UN peacekeepers had
mostly left the scene. And then it was too late given the tepid
response. In the obsession with not getting in the middle of
waring parties - perhaps partly as an unconscious legacy of
Zaire, they forgot the positive value of the Congo, the real
protection rendered to civilians.
Thirteen, instead of mediation, problem solving and the
search for consensus, which have become the primary tools that
the dominant ideology of international mediation espouses,
forceful intervention was required.106 But the ideology of
"neutrality"107 that plagued Hammarskjöld a third of a century
earlier continued. The pressure for continued mediation between
the two military forces misplaced the efforts of even the meagre
force of peacekeepers left in Rwanda during and after the
withdrawal.
It would have been clearly more effective both for saving lives
and the UN credibility if the UN had openly taken sides against
the genocidal regime.
Fourteen, without minimizing the role of the constructed
antagonisms between the Hutu and the Tutsi, the key problem
proved neither to be primarily a matter of North-South rivalry
let alone vested rivalries of two groups with different
cultures, languages and religions. On the one hand, "the
'ancient hatreds' explanation for the causes of internal
conflict cannot account for significant variation in the
incidence and intensity of such conflict." (Brown 1996b, 573) On
the other hand, "ethnicity emerges as a political resource
deliberately manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for the
specific purpose of facilitating their entry into the political
arena." (Lemarchand 1994, 5)
Fifteen, the problem was exacerbated by the role of
external aid. One unintended consequences of humanitarian
assistance is that it feeds both the desire and the means to
continue a struggle since it feeds a conflict with resources as
well as the motivation to fight to retain control over those
resources. Good intentions and good can be a root cause as well
as a means for prolonging a conflict and adding to the
casualties. The central problem was those willing to take the
house down with them to maintain their positions and power in
the name of an ideology. With Western aid and the vital
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importance of the state sector in financing change, the loss of
control of the levers of state power meant a dramatic loss in
economic as well as political power resulting in the politics of
desperation. "(M)ost major internal conflicts are triggered by
internal, elite-level actors - to put it bluntly, bad leaders -
contrary to what policymakers, popular commentators, and the
scholarly literature on the subjet suggest." (Brown 1996b, 571)
When this was combined with the absence of significant interest
from any external actor, the chaotic organization and management
of the UN, the power of radio both to reach the multitudes and
stir up their anxieties and fears, the availability of weapons,
and the weakness of the rule of law, civil society and political
democratic processes, it meant that there was no one to police
those in power, and, at the same time, no motive or instituional
mechanism to remove those in power.
Did any of the ideologies outlined in section 4
(conservative realism, liberal realism, grotian neutrality and
revolutionary utopianism) and their complementary policy makers
have any solutions that were relevant to stopping the emerging
crisis in Rwanda and its aftermath? In other words, could the
situation have been prevented if we had the proper organization
and the intelligence system? or are the problems much deeper
than the structural and organizational defects of the current
international system? Do they go to the heart of our beliefs?
Conservative realism is easiest to deal with. It would have
kept the UN away for Rwanda in the first place. Essentially, as
one US State department official, who was bold enough to
articulate that belief in clear and unequivocal terms, stated
it, 'If they want to kill each other, what business is it of
ours?' The United States and even France had no vital economic
or geo-political interests in Rwanda. Since Rwanda conflict was
both contained and of no economic or strategic interest,
therefore was a low probability of UN successful action
according to Oudraat's studies. (1996, 523)
One of the ironies is that policy would not have led the
civilian population to believe that they could rely on the UN
for their protection. They might have done more in advance to
protect themselves. But, in the end, other than relieving the UN
from blame for a promise undelivered, and blaming the UN for not
trying to do anything in the first place, my suspicion is that
the result would have been largely the same - a massive
genocide. Whatever the case, conservative realism would not have
helped at all.
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What is more significant, it is useless even in helping to
analyze what happened. For though what was at stake was economic
interest and power for the elites committing the atrocities,
there is no explanation in terms of economic interest and power
provided by neo-realists that accounts for diverting one's
efforts at violence to eliminating a whole population of another
group. Any minimal degree of intelligence would indicate that it
would destroy the long term chances of even recovering power and
economic clout once the genocide was over, even if here might be
some short term gains in eliminating a population base that
would support the opposition and stimulating the fears that
would facilitate political and military control over the exile
population in the camps. From Hitler, to Cambodia, to Bosnia to
Rwanda, genocide may have a strong self-interest component, at
least in the perceptions of the perpetrators. But for an
'objective' analysis, which neo-realism insists it will provide
even if it appears ruthless, there is little supporting evidence
that neo-realism can account for what happened let alone provide
any policy for mitigating or preventing such genocides.
What about a liberal realist outlook and policy foundation?
It is founded on a search for cooperative solutions while
recognizing the importance of self interest and power as prime
motivating factors? It is concerned with upholding and
implementing regime principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures, and strengthening the organizations given the
responsibility for upholding them.
As Adelman and Suhrke (1996) point out, there were
principles and norms covering the rights of refugees. They were
to be allowed to repatriate. Failing that, they should be
integrated in the country of first asylum. Or they should be
resettled abroad. But these were only preferred solutions in
order of priority. They were not governing norms or rules. And
they were certainly not enforceable. Caught between the
politicians of their home state rejecting repatriation, at least
in any significant numbers, and the sociology of their host
state which limited the degree to which they could be
integrated, and in the absence of any offers to settle them
abroad, there was neither the self interest nor power of any
state to cut through the conundrum. On this level, the neo-
realists are correct in arguing that the regime theories of
liberal internationalists lack any value added component in
explanatory or policy terms to the power and self interest
presumptions of the conservative realists. They simply do not
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tell how to get through a problem when it comes to the crunch.
And where there are no inherent problems problems, as in
international regimes for sharing air waves or determining
routes for air carriers, power and self interest are sufficient
for explanatory purposes. Thus, the refugee warriors resorted to
the use of violence, contrary to the norms which forbid refugees
from using violent means as a way to return totheir own country.
Let us take a second case. The French and the American
advisers to the Arusha peace process, represented by liberal
realists, advised that the extremists be included in the Broad
Based Government in recognition that they controlled too much
power and had too much at stake economically not to be a serious
source of trouble if they were left out of the solution. Since
there was unlikely to be any countervailing proposed power to
neutralize them as a contending force, they were better off
within with somewhat diluted authority than left without.
On the surface, this seems like a plausible thesis. Except
when you examine most other cases where it has been tried. For
example, allowing Mobutu to retain formal state power (the same
plan as that devised for Habyarimana) meant that Mobutu and,
subsequently, Habyarimana, was in a position to stall and
eventually sabotage the accords that had been agreed upon.
Including the extremists in the coalition would have made this
stall easier. Without supplementary steps to effectively defang
such a source of power, this is a high risk strategy.
What is most significant, it fails to take into
consideration a factor that most contemporary realists have
forgotten about which was an essential aspect of Hobbesian
classical realism. For power and economic self interest were not
the only factors deemed by the classical realists to motivate
humans. The issue of pride, and the recognition associated with
pride, was at least as, if not more, important than power and
self interest.
For example, Hobbes cited the following three factors as
the root causes of a quarrel: "in the nature of man, we find
three principall causes of quarrel. First, Competition;
Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first maketh the men
to invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for
Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Master of
ither mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to
defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue."
(Leviathan 13:para. 6-7)
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Economic interest may make us use violence to secure more,
and diffidence make us use that same power to provide security
and safety, but the ringer in the troika is glory and pride and
the search for recognition. It is the vain glory of pride that
causes madness, self-conceit and self-deceipt. (Leviathan,
8:para. 18) This overestimation of oneself and the group with
which one collectively identifies impedes reason and blinds men
to their true self interests. (Leviathan, 8:para. 18-19) In
other words, at least Hobbes as a classical realist recognized
that there was an irrational component that had to be factored
in which could, and was likely to, gum up any proposed solutions
based on mere rational, mechanistic assumptions and taking into
consideration only self interest and power.108
I am not concerned here with determining whether Hobbes'
psychological analysis was correct. I merely want to point out
that, in contrast with most contemporary realists, both
conservative and liberal109, but particularly liberal realists,
Hobbes at least recognized the existence of irrationality as a
powerful force which could subvert self interest. In the Arusha
Accords, liitle attention was being paid to the irrational. The
RPF would not include the extremists because the extremists
would not recognize them as a legitimate entity. The extremists
were driven to madness by their own irrationality which meant
that they were the most dangerous force that had to dealt with
one way or another. And the Arusha Accords failed to do so. The
liberal idealist proposals to coopt the extremists failed to
take into account this non-rational factor in the RPF and its
irrational dimensions in the extremists.
In strictly realist terms, "The laws of nature also suggest
that once men are in society, the greatest threat to order and
therefore to human well-being is not competition caused by self-
interest or diffidence caused by mutual fear but the struggle
for glory brought about by pride. The laws of nature demand that
pride be deflated and replaced by rational fear (my italics)."
(Johnson 1993, 13) the problem is that none of the realists were
realist enough. They failed to take into account the power of
irrationality and the importance of countering such
irrationality with an effective countervailing overwhelming
force that would allow rational fear to displace the domination
of the irrational forces.
There was a third failing in the realist position. At
84
Arusha, the United States and France played very postive roles
in assisting the parties to come to an agreement. But the
liberal realists were in charge here. The conservative realists
would have no part in such a show. That means the process of
mediation depended entirely on appealing to the self interests
and broader views of the respective parties. Quite aside for the
dilemma of a key party not being present, which was not the
fault of either France or the Americans, liberal realists are
disinclined to use deception to facilitate the respective
parties realizing what is in their best interests.110 The major
powers served as facilitators. They did not play the role of, in
effect, compelling any of the parties, particularly the RPF, to
bargain with them as the third party as well. In sum, there was
no Kissinger at the table using a combination of rewards and
potential threats combined with charm and deviousness to
indicate to each party that a simple compromise would be
sufficient to get a deal when that party knew that they would
have to use the same ruse to get the other party to compromise.111
If the liberal realists had problems, what about the
grotians? They come off as the most hapless of all. Like Boutros
Boutros-Ghali (sse Appendix 2), they flail in the wind, shifting
from erroneous analysis and panicky conclusions urging
withdrawal, to total reversals and demands for involvement in a
mea culpa at the undeniable genocide underway, and then a
subsequent cover-up for their own failures to live up to the
clear and unequivocal norms demanded as their most sacred duty
- that they act to prevent genocide. (See Appendix 2) As
believers in trust and good offices and well meaning, they are
the ones who are least useful to handle a crisis involving real
violence.
Is this fair? Was it not the international consortium of
human rights activists who first called the violence in Rwanda
'genocide' as early as January of 1993? Was it not they who had
induced their governments to pressure Rwanda to introduce
democracy and live up to the principles protecting human rights?
Were the grotians not the most prescient as well as most
insightful in policy terms in pointing to the need for
democratic reform as a precondition for correcting the situation
in Rwanda?
The human rights activists were the most prescient. But in
their bow to influencing their closest collaborators, that is,
in their pragmatic interest in influencing public and elite
opinion and not appearing hysterical to liberal realist ears,
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they removed the reference to genocide in their official March
1993 report. Further, they continued to address their appeals to
Habyarimana on the assumption (mistaken I would contend) that he
would be influenced by world public opinion; that was a
possibility only isofar as it undermined the support of his
patrons. Finally, one of the tragic ironies is that the
conservative realists were right - the push for democracy
increased the level of destabilization. As Zartman pointed out,
"conflict often occurs in the process or aftermath of
democratization; hence, the opening up of the system leads to
its tearing down. The mass killings in Burundi by both ethnic
groups - Tutsis and Hutus - in late 1993, after the army's
assassination of the democratically elected president, and the
genocide practiced by groups associated with the government in
Rwanda in April 1994, after the authoritarian ruler's plane was
shot down, are the most fearsome examples, but the similar if
lower-scale violence in Congo following similar elections is
another case." (Zartman 1996, 55)
Part of the problem is the fundamental reliance grotians
place on their foundational belief in trust and consensus. It is
not simply that they do not believe that actors are motivated by
self interest and power. Rather they believe those short term
interests can be (unfortunately this is too often translated to
mean that they will be) overruled by a higher rationality which
takes long term interests into account. In this case, the RPF,
if it had been rational, would not have resorted to violent
means and an invasion because the RPF would recognize that their
violation would set the precedent for other actors, particularly
the government, also to  violate international norms (direct
reciprocity). Similarly, the government would not have proceeded
with its own violations culminating in genocide because its
members would recognize that their violation would effect the
possible future violation by others, not necessarily against
themselves (indirect reciprocity).112
Secondly, grotians and even liberal realist
internationalists, place a great deal of reliance on the force
of world public opinion. There are three dimensions to this
belief. In reverse of the order in which they are presumed to
act, there is first of all the belief that such political
opinion will influence political leaders. There is a second
dimension to this assumption; they believe that such opinion
will be formed when needed. Thirdly, there is the belief,
because of their own enormous efforts at reporting human rights
abuses and disseminating those reports, that public opinion will
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largely reflect the reality they depict. (Cf. Goldmann 1994, 63)
None of these assumptions appeared to be correct as a
result of our analysis of the international response to Rwanda.
There was no evidence that Habyarimana, and certainly not the
extremist perpetrators of the genocide, were influenced in any
way by world public opinion. Secondly, large scale public
opinion was not aroused when the genocide was reported, but only
when the refugees poured across the border into Zaire at Goma.
Finally, much of the reaon for this is that the grotians were
unable to penetrate the dominant media in any significant way
and alter the prevailing (and eroneous view) that the violence
was a product of age-old hatreds between Hutu and Tutsi. The
fundamental presumptians of the grotians in the NGOs about the
role of the media and public opinion were belied by events. This
is true whether the reference is to official or popular opinion.
Further, because Rwanda was relatively remote from most
countries concerns, the irony was that the most accurate
reporting was found in the country which had been supporting the
government of Rwanda - France. Thus, while one might expect such
a situation to introduce a level of political and cultural bias
(Goldmann 1994, 75), the best and most detached, even when
couched in strident criticism and advocacy, was to be found in
France.
Even the penetration into the organized opinion of the NGO
sector was limited. As will be discussed in the section on
media, there is false presumption by grotians "that opinion
formation is a rational process." (Goldmann 1994, 69) This was
not so much because of bias in the media, but the bias of the
type of media (see appendix 3 and the media section) combined
with the almost total and fundamental flaws in gathering the
news in the first place. (Adelman and Suhrke 1996) What is more,
the evidence suggested that organized as well as public opinion
largely relied on the media rather than their own information
and analysis even when that had been done. The result was that
Boutros Boutros-Ghali himself reinforced these erroneous public
opinions when he rationalized the withdrawal of the UNAMIR
troops on 20 April 1994.
This does not mean that public opinion was powerless. When
television became involved in a massive way with the outflow of
refugees, the media had the power  to reverse the course of the
ship of state. This is the famous CNN effect. The White House
reversed the course determined by the security establishment
literally overnight in response to public pressure and what I
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term sentimental politics at the plight of the refugees pictured
on television. Thus, the role of the media undercut the
rationalist presumptions of the grotians and the self interest
assumptions of the realists at one and the same time as massive
aid flowed out to assist the refugees and indirectly the
genocidal killers who were also given an opportunity to
consolidate their power and create a constituency to fight
another day.
When it comes to the rationality of grotians who are in
positions of power and authority, instead of trying to influence
a situation from the outside, as the above sketch of what
happened indicates, they tend to panic at any challenge to their
most basic beliefs. In any case, they operate from a context and
within a structure that does not permit effective action unless
the irrationality happens to be minimal or absent. In such
situations, as in Namibia, they will emerge as the appropriate
heroes facilitating compromise and the upholding of internationl
ethics, principles and international law.
Finally, the grotians fail on the principle of neutrality.
But you cannot support the principle of justice and organize
resistance to genocide and be neutral between two sides in a
conflict when one side is planning and then executing genocide.
But this was precisely the role the UN assumed well after the
genocide commenced - trying to use their good offices to forge
a truce between irrational basic realists and utopians. The role
of the grotians was a tragic illustration of what Goldmann
called the "internationalists' dilemma". (194, 165-171) The UN
showed that when it came to making Buridan's choice between
upholding international covenants against genocide and promoting
accomodation, instead of ostracizing the genocidal killers and
declaring them the enemy of the world, they chose empathy and
neutrality in the understandable but futile desire to resurrect
the peace. They sold their own souls to the devil in the
process.
There are also utopians around. Some of the leaders of the
RPF we interviewed were clearly utopians. But we encountered
them in many positions in IOs in writing our report on Rwanda.
For these utopians, what was needed was simply a radical reform
of the UN in which American control was reduced, radical reforms
be made to the economic financing of the UN, etc. We are all too
familiar with the litany and the various combinations of radical
solutions proposed which simply fail to take into consideration
the existing powers and the economic forces which have very
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little interest in promoting any radical reforms. At best, there
is a possible interest in tinkering given current shifts in
interests and power among the member states. All of these
measures are intended to facilitate more drastic intervention
whenever there are massive violations of human rights, not
taking into account that no state, even one such as Sweden where
the foreign policy is primarily based on a tension between
grotian liberal internationalism and realist liberal
internationalism rather than a tension between conservative
realism and liberal realism as the prime determinants of foreign
policy as in the United States, France and Great Britain. This
is true even when liberal realism dominates foreign policy as
has possibly been the case recently in both the United States
and France.113
Without going into further detailed analysis, my conclusion
is that none of the dominant theories and their policy
correlates and structural reforms would have prevented the
genocide in Rwanda by themselves. The problem, as Gramsci so
clearly noted, is that realism and idealism see "a radical
separation between force and consensus, while, in the real
world, these two forms of rule are mutually supportive and often
combine in mysterious ways." (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 128)
On the other hand, the gramscians seem totally out of touch
with empirical reality when their overall framework leads to
generalizations such as the following: "some segments of the
Third World become integrated into the globalisation process;
other segments which remain outside must be handled by a
combination of global poor relief and riot control. Poor relief
is designed to avoid conditions of desperation arising from
impoverishment which could threaten to politically destabilise
the integrated segments. Riot control takes the form of
military-political support for regimes that will abide by and
enforce global economy practices, and, in the last instance, of
the rapid deployment force to discipline those that will not."
(Cox 1993b, 285-6)
Unfortunately, the riot police never arrived in Rwanda.
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Chapter 7
Using Practice to Undertand Theory
So where does that leave us? Theories seem to dictate how
we see the world and then lead to the implementation of a range
of policies within the parameters of that theory. Or is theory
simply a way of rationalizing what we are inclined to do anyway?
On the other hand, could each theory and its policy correlates
merely provide a partial grasp of the reality before us?
If we ignore the schools based on combinations, each of the
four basic ones correlate with two of the four underlying
factors of change: coercive power, economic factors, political
and legal regimes (sources of formal authority generally), and
morality and ideology. (cf. Mann 1988) The following chart makes
the correlations clear.
Coercive Power
+ } Conservative realism
Economics
  (Material Influence)  
+ } Liberal Realism
Formal Authority
+    } Grotians
Morality and Ideology   
  (Intellectual Influence} Utopians
If a comparison is made with classical factors in the
analysis of politics, two categpries are missing from this
chart. They are the passions and a higher source of authentic
authority: the Forms in Plato, the Final Cause in Aristotle, God
in the Hebraic tradition.
For a conservative realist, survival is fundamental, and
hence the priority given to power as the willingness to use
coercive force against another perceived as threatening one's
life or to forestall such a threat. In the anarchic
international world, states are artificial persons driven to use
coercive force to offset threats and maintain security. Desire
- in modernity, the quest for material acquisitions - is
important, but not in itself.  Material goods are accumulated to
ensure survival. If fear of destruction, and the willingness to
use force to prevent that destruction, is combined with self-
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interest, the motivation to ensure that survival, then, on the
individual level. one finds the motive for acquisitive self-
seeking and the use of force when the capacity exists to foster
that self-seeking. On the collective level, states then have a
rationale for imperial expansion. In this framework, the laws to
which individuals or states agree, whether domestic or
international, are tools of survival, not values in their own
right.
Thus, any moral system or ideology we espouse is but
sophistic rhetoric to gull the masses, unless, as Hobbes
contends, it is scientifically based. Words, unless they have
specific material referents, are meaningless. For Hobbes, words
used univocally with specific concrete references and
systematically organized into descriptive laws can be employed
to scentifically manage society. Science is the authentic source
of authority for determining truth. (Hobbes, Life of Thucydides,
para. 4) "The fundamental dilemma confronting Hobbes' political
theory can be reduced to the simple question: science or
rhetoric." (Johnston 1986, 61) In Thucydides, the master science
is not physics but history, and the laws are not the mechanical
physical laws of force, but the circular patterns of time which
are doomed to repeat and condemn collectivities to duplicate
their follies unless they learn from the past. Any other use of
words, such as the speeches of the Athenians, is sophistic
rhetoric motivated by self-promotion and an appeal to ignorance
and flattery.
For the motivation for using rhetoric and its appeal is
pride, the third non-rational motivation which, as I pointed out
earlier, most contemporary conservative realists ignore. "Pride
is the one passion that Hobbes considers lethal to civil
society, the one that can make man ungovernable." (Johnson 1993,
10) Humans are not just atomic creatures. They care what others
think about them. They want recognition. One's pride is hurt in
direct correlation with the distance between one's own self-
estimate and that of others. Further, the degree of discrepency
between one's own estimate of self worth and that of others can
be considered "vaine-Glory". The larger the discrepency, the
greater the madness or rage produced. In such cases, rather than
self-interest or material pursits, or even more fundamentally
survival and self-protection coming to the fore, an individual
governed by pride will not be determined by a rational
calculation but will risk all. Pride blinds men to the
conclusions of their own reason. (Leviathan, 8: para. 18-19)
91
The same is true of collectivities. When Bismark edited the
Ems telegram in 1879, he played on French 'vaine-Glory' and
Pride. The prick to the French sense of honour stumulated them
to mobilize against the Prussians and ignore any sense of
caution as a result of the knowledge of the superior status of
the Prussian military. This gave Bismark just the excuse he
needed to declare war on France in order to unite the German
states.
Similarly, according to Thucydides, what motivated the
Athenians to wage war was a quest for glory. Pericles appealed
to Athenian pride and greatness in his rhetoric, promising
historical renown even if they die and even if Athens actually
lost a war. "For the love of honour alone is untouched by age,
and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not
'gain' as some say, that gives the greater satisfaction, but
honour." (Thucydides, History of the Peloponesian War, 2:44.4;
cf. Johnson 1993, 31)
Life or survival is protected by coercive power and served
by self-interest, but the rationality of both of them can be
subverted by the passion of pride. Social institutions and the
inculcation of values can and should be designed to protect
individuals and collectivities from the sin of pride so that
their rational self-interest and the power serving self-
protection can be served and enhanced. According to this
rationale, many of the institutions created in the international
arena for peace and security - hot lines, for example - exist to
prevent the sin of pride (as well as accidents) from destroying
existing security arrangements.
This description seems very apt for the Hutu extremist
leadership in Rwanda who were willing to use their power to
destroy as many innocent civilians identified with the enemy
under their control, even if coercive power was being displaced
that could have been used to enhance their chances of victory or
at least a stalemate. Part of the answer for their actions was
their unwillingness to lose their positions and the access to
material benefits and power which political control entailed.114
But these 'rational' goals were subverted into a destructive
nightmare rather than any rational calculation of their
interests and coercive capabilities by their pride115, their
unwillingness to surrender the honor and recognition bestowed
upon them as political leaders. They would rather be leaders in
exile, in refugee camps, than thrown out of the spotlight as
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central actors in an historical drama.116 Rational calculation
based on fear or diffidence and the competitive quest for gain
are inadequate to account for the irrationality of massacres in
which women and infant children as well as competitors and
potential enemies are killed.
What is not so easily recognized is that the same
description could characterize the RPF. For it was their pride
as well that insisted at Arusha that they would not deal with
the extremists who would not recognize them. It was their pride
that blinded them to the risk to which their terms of peace, in
part, could be considered responsible for jeopardizing the lives
of the innocent Tutsis, in effect, held hostage by the Hutu
extremists within Rwanda. It was their pride that blinded them
to reading earlier slaughters as simply rational bargaining
chips and not as actions that indicated a willingness of
extremists to put aside rational calculation if the costs to
their pride were too great.
The sense of pride in the antagoistic violence of the
murderers is based on their low sense of self-esteem and an
effort to wipe out the existence of the other to retain and/or
recover their sense of self. The sense of pride in those who
fail to recognize the rage in the other is based on the high
sense of self esteem that denies the other any independent
existence as an individual or group. Thus, the Tutsis in Rwanda
denied that the Hutus were anything but other Rwandese, even
though the Tutsis, after the July 1994 victory, dominated the
political and military in the country. For the first, the ego of
the other is so overwhelming that it must be exterminated. For
the second, the ego of the other is so inconsequential that it
can be fully assimilated in an integrated national identity in
a state in which the Tutsi happen to dominate.
In the last resort, we can say that Tutsi and Hutu
have killed each other more to upbraid a certain
vision they have of themselves, of the others and of
their place in the world than because of material
interests. This is what makes the killing so
relentless. Material interests can always be
negotiated, ideas cannot and they often tend to be
pursued to their logical conclusion, however terrible.
(Prunier 1995, 40)
The dynamics of this interaction has been commented upon a
number of times by one of the most acute observers of Rwanda and
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Burundi who rages against the Scylla of most of the popular
press and some academics117 representing the struggle in both
Rwanda and Burundi as the expression of the age-old mutual
hatred of two tribes, the Hutu and the Tutsi, and the opposite
calumny, the simplistic assertion that ethnic hatred has nothing
whatsoever to do with the violence which is merely the product
of the machinations of a small elite bent on power and securing
their economic positions, merely using ethnic differences to
spread lies and stir up hatred.118
Finally, what is most significant is that there was no
source of authentic authority to adjudicate these two opposing
perspectives. On the one hand, science and/or history seemed to
play virtually no role in adjudicating the two diametrically
opposite viewpoints of the identity of the self, membership in
the state, and the relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis.
Rhetoric, not facts, drove the action. Further, there were
perceived sources of authority, but, in every case they proved
to be false gods rather than establishing their authenticity.
Let me illustrate. First, the source of the information of
the attitudes of the Hutus is taken from an excellent
anthropological study of Hutu refugees from Burundi which
accords with other studies of refugees elsewhere. The conveyance
of the world view of the Hutu refugees was projected by
rhetorical modes that conformed to standard guidelines for
training in sophistry.
One of the most immediate obvious characteristics of
the refugees' telling of their history was its
didacticism. Many of the accounts and conversations
recorded were characterized by the skilled use of such
formal devices as rhetorical questions, repetition,
repetition with variation, tonal emphasis...numbers
and statistics were used...lists appeared very
prominently in the narratives. There were lists
oftraits, lists of 'symptoms,' lists of faults, lists
of numbered points to be made, list that were like
inventories, lists of many kinds. Proverbs were
likewise deployed for persuasion and 'proof'. (Malkki
1992, 53)119
The stories told inform and explain, preescribe and
proscribe. (Malkki 1992, 54) Whatever the tale, they all had one
prime purpose - to explore, reiterate and emphasize the boundary
between the self and the other, between Hutu and Tutsi, a
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boundary identified as the one separating good and evil. The
Tutsis were not just constructed as enemies, but as the
embodiment of morally deficient characteristics such as
laziness, but also, and most importantly, as sources of
malevolence and evil. Even the positive qualities of the Tutsis
- the famed beauty of Tutsi women - was considered to be a
devilish device. The Hutu were defined 'reflexively' in
opposition to the characteristics said to be possessed by the
Tutsis.
The weltanschauung created out of categorical schemata and
thematic configurations heroicized the Hutus as a distinct
people radically in polar opposition to the Tutsis. Though the
construction of the precise bifurcation points in history vary
for Hutus from Burundi and Rwanda, both have definitive
historical markers or turning points. For the Hutu in Rwanda it
will be the revolution in Rwanda when the Hutus took the reigns
of power from the Tutsis and now the reversal, the 1994
recapture of that power from the Hutu and their forced exile in
the wilderness.120
The construction of the narrative has the following themes:
1) the Hutu are an ancient, aboriginal nation, which gave them
historical precedence in the land (whether Burindi or Rwanda);
prior to the arrival of the Tutsi, that nation as descendents of
the Bantu, identified as humans, lived in a state of nature
which was a paradise of harmony rather than a war of all against
all;
2) the Hutu tell stories of the birth of the nation from a
single founding father who married a local Twa as well as later
bringing his original family from what is now Zaire, hence being
father to both the Twa and the Hutu;
3) this story was contrasted with one told by the Tutsi -
foreigners', johnny-come-latelies who arrived only about 400
years ago - a story characterized as legend in contrast to Hutu
history; the three peoples, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, were descended
from each of three children born of a common father who in turn
was descended from or related to a sky god; the original son who
bred the Tutsi achieved his inherited right to rule (according
to the alleged opposing Tutsi legend in contrast to Hutu
history) by dint of superior character;
4) Hutu settlement is directly related to the introduction of
agriculture, in contrast to the Twa hunters and gatherers and
the Tutsi pastoralists;
5) the early discarded pseudo-scientific "hamitic" hypothesis of
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colonial "anthropologists" which accounted for the arrival of
the Tutsis from the north was woven into the history;
6) the Tutsis tricked the Hutus into indentured servitude121
through economic inducements - gifts of a cow - or the beauty of
the Tutsi women which seduced Hutu men into intermarriage and
perpetual servitude;
7) the identification of Tustis as Rwandese or Burundese (that
is, as citizens of a state rather than as members of a nation)
is designed to trick the Hutus and ensure the continuation of
Tutsi hegemonic rule;
8) ironically, the Belgians, who as colonizers evidently
institutionalized indentured labor into virtual slavery, and
introduced identity cards defining Hutu and Tutsi as racial
categories, were regarded as a benign source of impartial
adjudication and as protectors against the Tutsi;
9) knowledge (though interpreted as primarily an alchemocal mode
of discerning the lies of the rulers and as the key to Hutu
emancipation) was provided to the Hutu (which it was in the
later period of colonizing), but access was subverted by the
Tutsi rulers; when that failed, the Tutsis killed Hutu
intellectuals;
10) the body politic was reflected in the physical bodies of the
two 'races' in which the stocky builds of the Hutu were equated
with a willingness to undertake hard work in contrast to the
tall Tutis whose delicate constitutions made them dependent on
the work of others;
11) the identification of moral traits with a specific
physiognomy  to characterize the body politic and one nation -
patterns on hands, presence (Hutu) or absence (Tutsi) of calf
muscles and ankle bones, squat and fat noses (Hutu) verus
straight long noses (Tutsi), etc, - was also reflected in
necrographic maps of the bodies of those targetted for genocide
and the depicted means of genocide  through dismemberment,
disfigurement and sexual assault with bamboo sticks penetrating
the anus or vagina right through to the head;
12) the explanation of the powerlessness of the majority Hutu
population is the possession of superior weapons of violence and
organization for their use by the Tutsi and the 'natural'
docility of farmers.
Note, not only are the mytho-histories used to radically
contrast Hutu and Tutsi, but the stories play on the themes of
life and desire, on self interest and power, to explain Tutsi
rule - the monopoly of superior forms of violence combined with
contrasting economic forms of organization, and the use of one
to exploit the other economically. Further, there was a golden
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age of harmony before the arrival of the Tutsi and, presumably,
after their eradication. Finally, note that these tales were
closest to those told by Rousseau, rather than Hobbes or Locke,
for there was a general will; a collectivity and fraternité
rather than individualism was esteemed as a sublime state.
The Tutsi tales we heard in the interviews for our study
were not Hutu modified romantic Rousseauian myths of the past,
but utopian Rousseauian visions of the future of one people told
by RPF leaders, an ideal based on citizenship and equal
membership for all, thus, ironically, complementing the Hutu
myth of the Tutsis as intent on destroying the Hutu as a
distinct nation. Further, whereas outsiders - France, the UN -
were depicted as disrupters, spoilers and totally biased by the
Tutsi victors in Rwanda, for the Hutu (as well as for the Tutsi
within Rwanda prior to the genocide), outsiders were reliable,
impartial and neutral intervenors and protectors.
The problem was that these more "sophisticated" accounts of
history based on modern ideas and theories could not deal with
a) either the dependence of the new post-1994 Rwanda on
outsiders economically, and b) the resistance of Hutus to
repatriation in spite of all the efforts to guarantee equality
of treatment, except for the 1994 genocidal killers.
The result is that the modes of explanation proposed by
modern scientific derivatives of Hobbes and Locke, conservative
and liberal realism, seem to be mere modernistic variations of
mythologies of conflict and inducements to cooperation which
produce subservience rather than equality. The contradictions in
the theoretical underpinnings of the outsiders are mirrored in
their contradictory actions and formal rules which, for example,
do not allow refugees to use violence to return, but do not
solve the exile of the refugees but merely perpetuate their
status. And the ourside coercive power of UNAMIR propagated as
the protector of the Tutsis truly turned into a paper tiger
which dissolved when only ten Belgians were killed.
If power appears to be for show rather than real, if
economic inducements are taken but also perceived as a trap, if
formal rules appear to be both unenforced and contradictory, and
if the vision of a reconciled community living in harmony is
simply seen as being in the service of one side, what resolution
can outsiders bring. The realist story is a self-verifying
hypothesis and simply confirms that the west has no business
intervening where it has no self interest nor the willingness to
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use coercive force to back up its efforts.
Thus, although the categories and conceptions of the
conservative realists in the full classical version, which takes
into consideration irrational factors, the categories of passion
and pride, effectively explain the motives and actions of the
prime protagonists, inherently they fail to produce a solution.
Both physical science and historical science, as understood thus
far, offer no basis of higher authority to overcome the dominant
and apparently irreconcilable myths.
If power and self-interest are reversed in priority, if the
liberal realist formula for cooperation is introduced, does this
provide a basis for reconciliation between the parties as well
as a role for outsiders through the judicious inducements of
development aid.122 For though both the conservative and liberal
realists are both realists and characterize power and self-
interest as the basic motives in human nature, for the liberal
realists, self-interest, the desire to pursue acquisitions ad
infinitum, is primary. Humans are driven by acquisitiveness in
an even more fundamental way than even C.B. Macpherson (1964)
described. For even the motivation for acquisitiveness in John
Locke was not an after-product of the creation of money, but the
very motive to invent money in the first place. For without
money, there could be no acquisitiveness. Acquisitiveness led
humans to invent money which, in turn, led to human conflict and
the need to enter a social system which could regulate the
pursuit of greed. Coercive power was needed to protect the
expression of the acquistive instict, or, at least, self
preservation if one lacked any capital beyond the value of the
labour in one's own body. Using the classical categories, for
liberal realists, life is in the service of desire; desire does
not exist to foster life.
But mytho-history tells another story, a story of Cain and
Abel, of two irreconcilable ways of life, farmers and
pastoralists. In the Biblical tale, both economic ways of life
offer the best fruits of their labour to earn recognition from
God. God, the heavens, favor the pastoralists. The only way the
agriculturalists can throw off a pastoral superiority is by Cain
murdering his own brother, Abel.
But this is not the liberal realist tale. Instead of two
ways of life being irreconcilable, instead of the permanent
situation in which the farmers and the cowboys can never be
friends, the liberal realists paint a picture of reconciliation
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through market forces and a positive sum game of increasing
wealth, thus, undercutting the negative sum game of two forms of
life competing over the same turf. But this myth only works, as
we indicated above in the story of the refugees who avoided the
camps and tried to assimilate directly, if the former identity
is abandoned and the persona becomes a trickster to disguise his
former identity and to construct a new, ambitious, money
grubbing individual to conform to the expectations of the
market.
There is thus some foundation to the liberal realist
alternative even in the mythos of refugees who integrated and
stayed outside the camps. (Malkki 1992, chap. 4). For they
assimilated by rejecting the old mythos and adopting a self-
help, Horatio Alger, or, more accurately, a Duddy Kravitz
strategy of survival. "(R)elying on his wits, a young man
creates 'something from nothing' and makes a place for himself
in the world as he finds it. Other comparisons might be seen in
the late-nineteenth century robber barons of American lore, or
in the Canadian Duddy Kravits story [Mordechai Richler, The
Appreniceship of Duddy Kravitz]." Be calculating, (even
devious); look after your own economic self interest. Each day,
rather than the communal past, offers an opportunity for a new
start. The past was to be left behind. So were communal roots.
The problem was, as the Tutsis discovered in their exile in
Uganda, economic success did not correlate with political
security or equal social status. Rights did not come with
economic success. Further, the local population continued to
regard the incomers as usurpers of their rightful heritage.
Assimilation, whether by the Rwandese Tutsi in Uganda or the
Burundian Hutu in Tanzania (or the Jews in Europe who became
Zionists), seemed to prove to be an unattainable dream. Further,
it came at the cost of equivocating on their inherited moral
constraints dictating honesty and integrity. Success seemed to
be bought, if it came, at the cost of their souls. Thus, they
remained vulnerable to appeals to recover the faith and beliefs
of their forefathers and to rededicate their lives to service
and sacrifice for the collectivity. Like all refugee groups in
a dispora, they remained susceptible to ideological and
nationalist appeals, to combining the old myths with the new
ones of self help and resurrection in their preoccupation with
their ambivalent status, the adoption of workable but shallow
identities, and the focus on 'making it'. Ironically, liberal
realism and pragmatism simply seemed to create a much more
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efficacious base for a new round of warfare.
Or does it? Elizabeth Anderson (1995) tries to solve the
problem by a strictly rationalist economic inividualist who has
only positive attitudes to objects, different individuals having
different ways of valuing an object - aesthetics, utility,
appeal to nostalgia, etc. Rational actions is simply action
based on one's rational attitudes. For both the Tutsi and Hutu
Duddy Kravitzes, either they lacked or failed to implement a
positive attitude determining that one's action should fit into
a coherent neighborhood.If they lack that attitude, then they
simply sacrifice their historical soul. If they have it, then
they act to preserve it. The only difficulty is that the
political mode of preservation entails that the coherent tale
into which their story must fit is inherently irrational. In
sum, they seem to have two horrific choices, surrender your past
self and become an acquisitive individualist who denies his or
her history, or, recover that past and surrender your
rationality. One can argue that the Tutsi refugees in Uganda
tried to avoid making that choice when they decided to return to
Rwanda under the banner of a multi-ethnic new society which
protected everyone's rights. In the third choice, one becomes a
conservative rather than a liberal realist in order to provide
a ground for liberal realism.
Where do rights come in? For liberal realists, the
fundamentals are not just life and property, but liberty as
well. If the passion of pride was the fundamental original sin
in Hobbes, the desire to preserve and exercise liberty, to
preserve and enhance one's autonomy, is the saving grace
provided in liberal realist theory. For egoistic acquisitiveness
will not on its own yield a positive sum game. If driven only by
self-centred acquistiveness, the game of prisoner's dilemma
indicates how one can end up with the worst result by not
cooperating with others. "(A) frequent problem is that
unrestrained competition can harm all the actors. The obvious
model is the prisoners' dilemma, in which the rational pursuit
of self-interest leads to a solution that is not Pareto-optimal.
When this model applies, states will benefit by setting up rules
and institutions to control the competition amomg them." (Jervis
1982, 174) However, when freedom is fundamental, acquisitiveness
will always be tempered to ensure that the liberties of others
are respected in order to ensure one's own freedom. This
mutuality will yield cooperative moves which can yield positive
sum games and rules which will enhance the material goods for
all instead of simply fighting over the division of an already
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circumscribed pie.
Thus, unlike greed and the coercive power to defend that
greed, rights carry with them the obligation to recognize the
rights of others. By enhancing the rights of all, we increase
the opportunities available to oneself, at least the acquisitive
opportunities in general rather than those acquisitive
opportunities that depend solely on their advancement on the use
of coercive force. "liberals have always argued that 'the
liberty of the strong' must be restrained." (Held 1995, 203) The
problem is, of course, one must become the strong first in order
to restrain the strong.
In sum, the liberal realist answer is the creation of a
government that protects human rights of all the citizens under
a rule of law. As we suggested, this is easier said than done.
Simply put, there was no social contract in Rwanda upon which to
base a liberal polity. For the prior conditions for anyone
having any rights in the first place is that each individual be
a member of a polity. And the basic conflict was precisely on
this point - who could and should be included as members of a
community.
Thus, the very contradictions of the two realist positions
force us to look at a system of international law with a
coercive capability to adjudicate precisly these situations. But
the very polities that have ordered their systems on the
protection of rights are also the ones who guard entry into
membership in their polities so carefully. For within each
polis, there is an obligation of each to the collective whole.
Rights entail duties. But those duties are freely assumed. They
are not imposed. And they are assumed because of liberal realist
principles - the result is a positive sum game. No abstract
rational duty seems capable of overcoming the inherent self
interest and reluctance to take risks entailed in realist
foundations. Passionless duties are no competition for fear and
desire. If there is no self interest and there is no threat, why
risk the lives of "our boys".
And what about the current Hutu refugees, particularly in
Zaire? Unless they return, they will continue to be a source of
refugee warriors capable of destabilizing whatever degree of
stability is created. Why return when one's own stories see no
end to the conflict? As one refugee asked,"how do you expect to
put at ease these refugees if they are called upon to return to
the country? (Malkki 1995, 278) And one need only hear of one
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tragic story to paralise the propensity to go home of hundreds
of thousands.
"One of the saddest cases to emerge from this
repatriation movement must be the story of a man, a
1972 Hutu refugee, who had lived in Tanzania with his
family for many years, and who was employed by an
international agency in Dar-es-Salaam. He advised his
whole family to return to Burundi in July 1993. They
- there were eighteen of them - went back to Burundi
in early October, 1993. Only two survived." (Malkki
1995, 289)
The international community says it has a duty to protect
defenseless civilians. But the states with the power to offer
that protection are unwilling to take the risks entailed,
particularly after forty years of indoctrination during the Cold
War that risk strategies were associated with global
destruction. So scholars, faced with these irresoluble dilemmas
on both the very local and the global scales, faced with a
viscious cycle of violence and genocide that began well before
the end of the Cold War as these states were de-colonized, end
up with plea for compassion and the introduction of a system of
justice and mercy. Or else they advocate the radical
reconstruction of the global order which will not be based on
the nation state system at all.
Where do these theories go awry? Why did they noy seem to
get us out of each dilemma?
If the chart is recast to divide the motives in human
nature (such as power and greed) from the social institutional
factors designed to provide regulation, the real dispute in
international theory over the basic elements (not the priority
among them) can be seen to be twofold. First are the
'irrational' passions critical, and, if so, what is the
characterization of the irrational passion that disrupts human
order, all of them being variations of the motives behind a
search for recognition? What is also most noticeable among all
the moderns is that their theories are sui generis; they do not
appeal to an outside source of authority for their validity.
I will simply summarize my own resolution of this issue. I
begin with the two basic and universal motives in all realist
theory - self-interest and the desire for power. Self-interest
is a concern with survival. But there are two distinct survival
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concerns that may sometimes be at odds. One is synchronic
survival, the perpetuation of this body, this self. The second
is diachronic survival, the survival of myself beyond the death
of my body - through the bodies of my children and through the
body of my works. The latter may require self-sacrifice. The
former may require the sacrifice of others. In exceptional
circumstance, choices may have to be made beteen the two
versions of survival.
Desire also has two meanings. One desire is to be god, to
have absolute coercive power and creative power, but not to need
to use the coercive power; it entails a desire to be a self
without a body. A second desire entails the use of coercion to
make other bodies extensions of one's own. Again, the two senses
of desire may be at odds, for the desire to be god entails total
dedication to one's "soul" and the willingness, sometimes
eagerness, to sacrifice one's body for the sake of one's soul.
In contrast, externally directed desire preserves and
extends one's body and willingly sacrifices the bodies of
others. There is a great complementarity between externally
directed desire and synchronic survival - both entail the
sacrifice of others for the self. This egoism contrasts with the
self sacrifice connected with both diachronic survival and
inwardly directed desire.
Realists stress the primacy of egoism. The negative side of
that egoism is that one can no longer conceive oneself as
constituting all of life, as god. That is why the inevitable
accompaniment of the discovery of the ego is profound shame. One
does not have to do anything to feel shame. One merely has to
be, and be seen in one's naked embodiment. Further, there is a
willingness to sacrifice one's children, one's future progeny -
that is, engage in violent war against the other - for the
perpetuation of one's own identity.
There are two immediate (there are other mediated ones as
will be seen shortly) to that situation. One can cultivate a
belief in self-sacrifice rather than the sacrifice of others. In
Socrates version as taught in his lessons to Crito and by
example, self-survival is not the highest good and the coercion
of others to guarantee that survival is not the valued means to
achieve that good. There are higher ends which one can choose to
serve.
Or one can claim, as Augustine123 did, and teach that the
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desire underlying egoism - desire directed towards the other, is
inherently evil. Humans are born sinners. The source of violence
- in international affairs, the source of the competition among
nations and their willingness to resort to violence to defend
the well-being of their own - resides in this egoistic sense of
desire. The universal peacable kingdom entails the repression of
self-seeking, the suppression of the sin of pride, and the
expression of the self through charity and self-sacrifice for
the other. Ideally, not in a coercive sect, but in a sect of
voluntary self-surrender. The goal is to create a universal City
of God in opposition to the City of Man characteristic of the
competitive nations. If charity and care rule the first, cupid
rules the second for in the City of Man, humans are governed by
their passions "even to the contempt of God," and, hence, must
be governed by an authority that commands coercive force in
order to regulate and restrain the passions. Conflict can be
managed; it cannot be prevented. The only alternative is to love
God with all one's being and to bear contempt for the self.
Chaos does not necessarily entail subjecting that chaos to
repression and a violent ordering, but a search for that peace
and tranquility may be found in the eye of a hurricane.
The second direction is not towards repression but towards
expression, not towards the recovery of an imagined idyllic pre-
egoistic state of being governed by the passions, but the acting
out of the passions. With egoism, you are what you do. And you
want recognition for it. You put the best of yourself into your
works and you disdain survival as a higher sense of desire
expresses itself as the desire for recognition by displacing the
sense of self-sacrifice onto one's own work. The pastoralist
offers the sacrifice of the best of his cattle herd. The
agriculturalist settler offers the best of his/her crop. The two
sibling systems of economic life, one based on moveable property
and the other on fixed and boundaried territories, compete for
recognition. It is the age old story of Cain and Abel. In
realism, the Augustinian City of God is rejected for the cities
founded on Cain's murder of the other.
There is a double barrel to positing society built on
violent competitiveness for wealth and recognition. For one
barrel, as in the MAD doctrine of nuclear deterrence, can be
turned on the self. Not only is greed good, but Augustinian
confessions about the sin of wayward desire will be considered
the short cut to morality, the direct route to God, literally
using the back door. It will be conceived as a surreptitious
rather than open exercise of the same desire and will to power.
For in order to purge oneself of desire, one must make that
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desire transparent. Hidden in that transparency is the dictum
that this confessional narrative is the only way to truth, light
and happiness. It is not just a way to self-discovery; it is the
way. And with the way will come casting out of those who are
impure or infected with the capitalist spirit as the
Revolutionary Red Guards declared. Heretics will be ostracized
from the social group. In the name of service to the higher
good, repression and moral sadism124 will become the norm. The
great leap forward will be an attempt magically to pass through
the looking glass into a wonderland of harmony and peace. In
other words, what we find is merely perverted egoism. It can
have its mild forms in small peaceful sects of Amish and
Hutterites. Or it can be exprssed through the Cultural
Revolution, the persecution of millions because they dare to be
different and, more seriously, to think differently.
Modernity is the refusal to take this escape. Modernity is
the rejection of a universal coercive moral order for a
competitive order of desire and survival. And the transformation
of that level of competitiveness to a higher form of cooperation
through the pursuit of rational self-interest. But could not
this argument for a universal, for a global economic order be
but another method of ostracizing and excluding heretics from a
materialist order which claims to be amoral? After all, the
reason one gives consent to obey a political authority is to be
able to own property and pass that property to one's heirs. If
one rejects the vision of a nonviolent kingdom because property
is owned in common, does not the regime of private property
create and ostracize its own heretics?
No. It excludes by controlling admission and departure
rather than the exercise of expulsion or moral conformity. The
right to be a member requires overt allegiance to the principles
of property. The right to leave requires reimbursement to the
collectivity for its investment in yourself as property. That is
the nature of the contract in Locke and the basis of consent and
right. The right to leave, and, later, the right to asylum will
be later modications as the accumulation of wealth would be
sufficient incentive in itself not to require a coercive form of
retaining members, though a coercive form of excluding members
would have to be strengthened at the same time as the coercive
retention is weakened.
Thus, the issue of the right to return of the Tutsi
refugees becomes a central and telling moral test of modernity.
States have the sovereign right to determine their own
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memberships. There are no overriding international norms for
such determination. On the other hand, ecluded members have the
right to return. And no external state is willing to intervene
to adjudicate this choice. So civil wars are fought from Sri
Lanka to Bosnia and Rwanda. And the international system tries
to contain the conflict with as little risk and involvement as
possible.
The pradox is summed up in the essential weakness of the
grotians. "Their (post-colonial states) arrival reconfirms the
importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the
fundamental entity of the international community." (Boutros
1992; 1995, para. 10, 41) But, if on the one hand, "The
foundation-stone of this work [of the UN] is and must remain the
State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are
crucial to any international progress." On the other hand,
Boutros-Ghali then tries to square the circle. "The time of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its
theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders
of States today to understand this and to find a balance between
the needs of good international governance and the requirements
of an even more interdependent world."  (Boutros 1992; 1995,
para. 17, 44) In fact, the problem is that there is no such
balance. Recognizing this, states that have the power avoid
grotian positions, while states without the capacity to
intervene effectively and decisively, ten to support striving
for this invisible balance.
But the real question is not why we do not move to some
modest grotianism, but why modernity provides no moral standards
to take sides in such conflicts. Why does international law hide
under the camouflage of a false neutrality first in Zaire and
then in Rwanda? "In these situations of internal crisis the
United Nations will need to respect the sovereignty of the
State; to do otherwise would not be in accordance with the
understanding of Member states in accepting the principles of
the Charter." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 30, 50) And again. "The
United Nations is, for good reasons, reluctant to assume
responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose
a new political structure or new State institutions. It can only
help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live
together again." (Boutros 1995, para. 14, 9) But what if one of
the hostile factions is committing genocide on the innocent
civilians of the other. Why cannot the UN intervene to protect
innocent civilians and take sides at least on this issue.
This is not simply a matter of peacekeeping, which is based
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on trying to maintain a neutral role. "Three important
principles [of peacekeeping] are the consent of the parties,
impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence."
(Boutros 1995, para. 33, 14) Even in peace enforcement
situations, such as when the UN creates safe havens for
civilians, neutrality is the rule. "Even though the use of force
is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter, the United
Nations remains neutral and impartial beteen the warring
parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be
identified) or impose a cessation of hostilities."
We have to understand the root of this amoral neutrality in
the origins of modernity.
Part III: Knowledge and The World
Chapter 8
Modernity and Intervention
We now must go back to the roots of modernity itself to
seek the source of the problem. For in Rwanda and Burundi, the
most violent forms of the fundamental contradictions of
modernity itself are being acted out. Summarizing a section from
the first chapter puts the issue most succinctly. Modernity is
characterized by rational calculation. But it does not teach us
the norms by which we should live. An account of modernity is
both a history of universal instrumental reason and choices
about ultimate values without any foundation in an authentic
authority to make those choices. How do we explain the
relativity of values, power politics and the recourse to
violence despite the advance of reason and civilisation? To do
so, we have to develop a very critical understanding of the rise
of the modern state and modern forms of power.
What is a state and how did it emerge historically and
conceptually? Shaba, Quebec, Catalan, Scotland, Kashmir are not
states. Norway became a state at the turn of the century.
Slovakia and Eritrea, Slovenia and Croatia, became states more
recently. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia regained their
recognition as states. Costa Rica has been a recognized state
for a long time. The key is not size or linguistic and cultural
uniqueness, but a desire to be recognized as sovereign and that
recognition.
107
A concomitant of each and every state's claim to
uncontestable authority was the recognition that such
a claim gave other states an equal entitlement to
autonomy and respect within their own borders. The
development of state sovereignty was part of a process
of mutual recognition whereby states granted each
other rights of jurisdiction in their repective
territories and communities." (Held 1995, 36)
A state is based on "the concept of exclusive control
within a delimited geographic area and the untrammeled right to
self-help internationally." (Krasner 1983, 18) Herein lies the
crux. The modern state depends on others for being recognized as
a state. But it only exists as a state if there is effective
control and power exercised over the body politic and that
polity is capable of surviving on its own. As a body politic,
there has to be both centralized coercive control and an economy
in place that will ensure survival. As a cognized or mental
politic, as a polity acknowledged to be such, it must be
recognized by others. "(S)overeignty is taken to mean the
absolute authority a state holds over a territory and people as
well as independence internationally and recognition by other
sovereign states as a sovereign state." (Weber 1995, 1)
At the bifurcation point in the era when the nation-state
first began to appear, Jean Bodin saw the singularity of the
nation-state as the only answer, because the "mediaeval
confusion of un-coordinated independent authorities with
residual ties to a distant Pope or Emperor was a recipe for
chaos and bloodshed."125 Overlapping, multiple authorities had
disastrous consequences. There was no party that could be held
responsible. At the same time, there was confusion in the body
politic. A new system had to replace the old order of dual
jurisdictions. Responsibiliy had to be given a locus. As Bodin
wrote, "what was required in each state was a single and
ultimate source with 'the power to give the law to all
citizens'."(78)
Dual jurisdiction refers to the conflict between Rome and
more local authorities. When did that dualistic authority first
emerge? And over what? What was the source of that divided
authority? In the tension between town and gown. In the very
dual layered system that divided authority at the local level
can be found the seeds of divided authority that gave rise to
the unitary state characteristic of modernity.
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In 1185, the first university was founded at Boulogne.
Essentially, scholars coming together from many nations to study
had no legal protection for the leases signed for housing
because the 'foreigners' were not citizens of the town. Nor, on
the other hand, were they strangers en route, for those visitors
stayed in inns and were subject to the international protections
accorded such wayfarers. These were scholars intent on living in
a town and taking up quasi-permanent residence. They needed
legal protection for their leases. The Bull of Clement of 1185
gave a group of scholars an independent charter. The corporate
charter was not granted by the local municipal authorities. The
"university", representing the quest for universal truth and
values, could negotiate on equal terms with the corporate
municipality and have its legal arrangements upheld by
international law. The roots of the division in a singular
source of authority is not initially to be found in the
reduction in the authority of the Pope by nascent states, but in
the reduction in the absolute authority of municipalities over
the scholars in their midst. The municipalities suddenly had
semi-permanent residents in its midst over whom it had limited
legal jurisdiction.
The new universities, first in Boulogne, and then in Paris,
Oxford, etc, were  not subject to the authority of the local
magistrates. The seed of a fundamental dualism in the medieval
world were sewn in order to protect the material interests of
the scholars. The result, three to four hundred years later, was
that the town broke away from the gown as its source of moral
and spiritual authority. Societies went to sea and gave up the
need for permanent moral moorings.
Further, these scholars were collected together not as
individuals, but as nations, grouped according to their home
language and place of birth. Thus, the quest for universal
knowledge and the particularities of physical space and
diachronic origin were given a dialectical unity126, but only in
a context that divided town and gown. In conceptual terms, the
division was between the city-state conjoined with particular
interests versus the conjunction of nations and universality,
the very reverse of our current connotations. Nation now
suggests a dedication to particular interests. Nations as part
of the nascent universities were identified with universal
concerns - truth and cosmopolitan values.
The university was dedicated to the preservation of
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knowledge and its transmission. The new universities were not
committed to the discovery of new knowledge. It was the city-
states in the Italiian peninsula, such as Venice, that would
foster exploration and discovery in the search to acquire
wealth.
The state arose in Western Europe when the dynamic
creativity of the society was directed at change, not stability,
at discovery and not simply preservation of order. A combination
of factors brought modernity into being, all associated with
movement rather than stability. And it was thrust forward by the
inability of any one nation to establish hegemony over western
Europe. In fact, the variety and competition of cultures
fostered the dynamic development of western civilization. "The
dynamism of a civilization derives from mutual influence,
intermixture, and the friendly rivalry of different peoples."
(Masakazu 1996, 110)
It is unlikely that the new institution of the middle ages,
the university, would have produced anything new in itself,
however, except the preservation and elaboration of existing
"knowledge". Nor were the scholars connected with those who
controlled coercive force and political power. The universities
consisted of scholars and scribes in an era when a man's man
would not be seen with a pen in hand, for writing was the stuff
of sissies. Real men were warriors dedicated to the preservation
of the realm and Christian values. And scholars were dedicated
to the preservation of knowledge and the perpetuation and
continuation of values who, unlike the monks, imitated the
warrior aristocratic class in their disdain for earning a
living.
At the same time, it was the merchant class, not the
guardians, that needed writing. It was the merchant class that
had this commonality with the scribes and scholars in the new
universities. Further, the merchants were in touch with distant
places with their own traditions for preserving knowledge and
transmitting traditions through time. Marco Polo had opened the
routes to the Orient.127 The  possibility of new knowledge was
created by a number of factors, but most significantly, the
invention of moving type and the printing press.
China had invented moveable type centuries earlier.
However, unlike China, Western Europe had the advantage of a set
of symbols which could represent many different languages.
Western Europe was already in possession of the alphabet. An
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alphabet allowed the use of a set of common symbols to be used
to spell words in different languages, facilitating translation
and mutual understanding. Even more importantly, unlike the
idiograms of Chinese, the alphabet was perfectly adaptable for
use by the printing derivative of the wine press. Who would have
anticipated that this synergistic combination of an ancient
alphabet from the Middle East and moveable type from the Far
East would lead to the conception of knowledge being based on an
openness to discovery rather than simply the handing down of
received truths. (McLuhan 19  )
Other symbiotic factors facilitated this possibility.
Western Europe, after all, was just a peninsula with a very long
coast line, one of the longest parts being a huge sea which
connected three continental land masses - Asia, Africa and
Europe. The sea, unlike land communication, opened the traveller
to long distances and the unfamiliar versus the relatively short
runs and the need for familiar markings to guide one's way in
land travel. At the same time, Western Europe was also very
remote from the horsemen of the steppes and the periodic raids
of these nomads on the agricultural settlements of Europe. Thus,
the location of Western Europe provided relative saftey at the
same time as the sea provided both access to distant places and
a very different conceptiual model of openness.
Other factors helped as well. Though travel introduced to
Europe hitherto unknown diseases, including the infamous Black
Death of the fourteenth century which wiped out one-third of the
population of Western Europe, the result, in the long run, was
the homogenization and domestication of infections within
expanding communities that followed that death-pervasive period
and saved Western Europe from the microparasitic catastophe that
subsequently devastated the sendentary empires of the Azteccs
and Incas. (McNeill 1976) The Western European exposure, though
susceptible to the new disease, was more gradual for they did
not face mortal enemies when they were most devastated by
diseases in the fourteenth century. They did not suffer
catastrophic and sudden collapse as did the sedentary empires.
Enhanced survival and communication skills were
complemented by the importation and development of new forms of
utilizing coercive force more effectively. Gunpowder benefitted
the infantry versus the cavalry of the horse-mounted nomads from
the east. Shooting arrows from horseback had held the military
advantage for two and a half millenia, an advantage greatly
enhanced by the invention of the stirrup. Suddenly the advantage
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shifted to the cities of agriculturally settled areas with the
development of the ability to concentrate superior force at a
specific locality rapidly. "(W)estern Europe's political
diversity survived the gunpowder revolution as happened nowhere
else in the civilized world." (McNeill 1992, 117)
This development further benefitted sea-oriented societies
because they no longer had to divert resources to land defences
against marauding nomads from the steppes. More significantly,
the cannon destroyed the effectiveness of the walled and moated
castles as refuges. The foundations for a stable and secure
world order in walled-off feudal castles was no longer possible.
The advantage had shifted to the city. The gunpowder empires -
the Ming and Ching dynasties, the Mughal empire in India, the
Ottoman empire, Portugese and Spanish empires - were developed
in this period. In other words, the new developments in coercive
force, and communications, fostered by the search for wealth,
resulted in the development of new forms of political authority
to ensure stability over large land masses and a wide variety of
people. In the rest of the world, gunpowder empires were the
result. The backwater peninsula of Europe travelled a unique and
very different route.
Only in Europe, with all the diversity of a fragmented and
very diverse geology combined with very rich resources, was
there to be found an absence of a monopoly on mining and metal
production for the casting of guns. A diverse, dynamic, but
relatively secure pluralist system of political entities arose
in the vaccum of the absence of an effective central formal
authority that commanded and controlled the means of exercising
coercive force. They had never been financially dependent of
Rome. The polities of Europe merely needed to be free of the
legal and moral authority of Rome and the presence of that
source of authority in their midst in the institutions of the
independent universities who trained the clergy.
Thus, ironically, the creation of knowledge communities
called universities sewed the seeds of disunity within municipal
legal authorities, which were, after all, the final arbiters of
what concerned most humans in Western Europe, security and
economic survival. It was ironic, for this very division would
susequently turn the tables and allow the local political and
economic classes to ally with the rurally-based military classes
to throw off the yoke of Rome.128 For it was the universities that
held back the dynamic European societies from breaking their
moral and spiritual boundaries. Divided in two from within by
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the split between preserving knowledge versus the quest for
security and survival, and weakened from without by the
invention of the cannon and the use of gunpowder, the cities, of
Europe, nevertheless recovered the initiative and the lead.
On the security front, they developed earth fortifications
and the use of crossfire from their own gunned bastions. Europe
experienced a renaissance in the development of rival centres
for excellence in warfare. With the relative strength of a
prosporous agricultural society facilitated by opening up new
lands, first to the east, and later in North America, to
cultivation, and the reciprocal introduction of new crops - like
maize, the potatoe and the tomatoe - to Europe which had higher
nutrient ratios, the momentum of growth and expansion
accelerated. But it was the improvements in cummunication
through the use of moveable type and inventions in navigation
that allowed the growth to proceed in a much more highly
decentralized fashion in comparison to a command system. For
example, business entrepreneurs developed the invention of
moveable type to print books and make knowledge far more readily
available to much larger numbers of people. These improvements
favored an attitude which regarded nature as something to be
altered rather than taking nature as it is. This combination
transformed nomadism from the eternal threat to a subservient
factor in development thus, in turn, allowing the developing
market greater scope.
Most critically, for the first time, in the fifteenth
century, the nobility began to flock to the universities. In an
ironic coincidence, knowledge became accessible to a wider
public at the same time as its exploration became an attractive
pasttime for the warrior classes. But the aristocrats came to
university for the very same reason the leisure classes have
attended universities ever since, not because they were
dedicated to the preservation of knowledge, but to have a good
time. In having a good time, as well as absorbing some
knowledge, they discovered a wider field of connections,
especially in the "nations" in which they were housed.
This was the context in which Jean Bodin called for a new
source of stability. At the very beginning of the modern era,
the goal was to find a source of stability in the midst of
generally perceived chaos, a singular reference point that was
not focused on a locale perceived as central to the global
order, that is Rome. But the quest for stability was one thing.
The new state arose at a time when there was a new openness to
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change and the positive value of discovery. It arose when the
costs of armaments and warfare required much larger political
entities than the traditional city-states were able to provide.
What, in effect, had developed was a competition not only
between a wide variety of centres within a relatively small
peninsular land mass with very long sea coasts129, but within each
society there was a competition between: a) military (coercive
power) that required political units of a larger magnitude than
municipalities; b) commerce and industry as sources of material
influence which were based in municipalities but had developed
cosmopolitan linkages; c) formal authority (bureaucracy and
legal systems) at the local level that provided the basis of
security and stability as well as modes for adjudicating
economic disputes.
Those who held the responsibility for the soul and morality
were in the universities and the church. They claimed to
represent universal truths and values which came from
spiritually revealed sources precisely at a time when the world
was on the verge of turning to nature, to the material world,
for a source of authority. And that authority was found in
impersonal laws about nature rather than personally revealed
laws about human conduct. Further, they stood for a closed
system, for a system which insisted fundamental truth had
already been discovered and merely needed elaboration and
preservation. Directly or indirectly they represented the Pope
who had the responsibility for adjudicating international
disputes. A much more fundamental division had now been
developed between the town and the gown, between the commercial
and economic interests and the gown interests geared towards a
higher, ostensibly more authentic source of authority in
knowledge and who justified their parasitical existence by an
appeal to a higher morality.
Machiavelli was one of the first political thinkers to
oppose the idea of a centrally directed religious political
authority in favour of political power being transferred to the
merchant-led city-state, which, unlike the pagan Rome of
antiquity as the alternative to mediaeval Rome, was too large
and cumbersome to manage human political ambitions. (cf.
Sullivan 1996)
Modernity came about by the union of three of these four
classes against the epistemic community who were a fifth column
representing the Pope within and the Pope himself as a source of
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higher authority outside. And it was the universities which
provided one of the means to their own irrelevance, their
"nations' or houses which grouped students of the same language
group together and allowed them to discover a commonality of
purpose. Unlike previous students who depended on the university
for their future livelihood, these aristocrats were free of the
strictures and rewards that success in a university brought.
Further, and ironically, their rambunctiousness temporarily
increased the intensity of conflict between town and gown. The
universities in welcoming the aristocrats and in forming them
into nations had sewn the seeds for the nation as opposed to the
"universal" becoming central, for the aristocrats learned that
the pope was as parochial and self-interested as anyone with
concerns with intrigue and the use of coercive power. As well,
the obsolescence of the university as it then existed was being
undermined outside its confines by the publication of books.
Thus, the situation was ripe for the union of three classes
in a wider political entity than the city-state against a
purportedly "universal" moral and legal authority. "(T)he
primary impetus towards centralization came from international
war. Feudal levies were supplemented by professional soldiers,
costs escalated, and competition forced states to emulate their
neighbours. Mercantile activity came increasingly to depend on
the protection of states. But the states themselves depended on
loans from merchant capitalists to fund their wars, because
their powers to tax were still limited. There was thus a kind of
symbiosis between the monarchies and the merchant capitalism,
and mercantile interests saw state warfare as economically
advantageous." Gledhill (1994) The - coercive orders based in
the elite classes of rural agricultural fiefdoms, who were in
the process of becoming capitalist130, the economic class based
in municipalities, and the local  bureaucrats and legal
authorities versed in mundane torts and contract law began to
develop a common destiny as their mooring lines to a pier of
moral authority frayed. The union was made possible by the
invention of a new conceptual universe to which they all could
belong.
The nation-state arose at the very same time as a
scientific conceptual foundations for reconciling change with
stability in a radically new way was discovered. Such a solution
was found in the Newtonian schema. One could have development
and stability at the same time. Aristotle had defined motion in
terms of rest. The circularity of the seasons and of the
heavenly bodies was perfect motion in itself because one always
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returned to the same starting point. Rest defined motion. Stasis
defined mobility. This was the perfect rationale for a
permanently settled agricultural society.
Stability was inherent, natural, and represented perfection.
But Newton defined rest in terms of motion; a home base is
merely a respite from movement; movement, not stasis, is the
norm. Change is prior in both experience and logic. Stasis is
merely an equilibrium point in a dynamic, changing system. A
state was merely a place of equilibrium in an otherwise chaotic
universe. It provided a stable base for dynamic development.
Thus, in the backwater of a relatively small peninsula of
the largest continuous land mass on earth131, in the arena of
warring tribes and factions of western Europe which was a centre
of barbaraism compared to the Mongul empire in India, the Ming
dynasty in China or the Aztec and Inca empires in the Americas,
the foundations for a radically different system of
international political order emerged. The larger political
authority was needed to finance the high costs of armaments,
even if the base for warrior strength was still to be found in
the countryside. The economic sector gained from the much larger
area in which to produce and trade without hindrance in a secure
home base from which to extend into foreign markets. Further,
the development of moveable type allowed the centres of
knowledge to move outside the universities to develop a
competing sources of authentic authority in science and in the
printed word as distinct from institutional authorities who
correctly recognized the subversive potential of the new science
to undermine the idea of a singular source of moral authority.
The invention of the book facilitated and was correlated with
the ability to unite a large group speaking the same language by
sharing the same books. The foundation for divorcing the nation
from its connection with universality and preservation (not only
of knowledge) and associating it with particularity and the
dynamics of change was now in place. The coalescence of these
factors not only created the possibility of the nation-state. It
was the nation-state. And its basic premise had to be that there
was no higher source of moral authority than it. There simply
was no moral authority in inter-state relations.
Where would authority in the international realm come from.
Certainly not from the Pope who seemed a source of conflict
rather than a key centre for its resolution. Religious wars were
the scourge holding back the new development. Borrowed from
economic contract law, the source of authority the state
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received was said to come from a social contract made among the
members of the state. "(T)he rise of the modern state system
from around the sixteenth century took place in the wider
context of the rise of contractual relationships." (Palan 1994,
48) Between the states, agreements could be made on the
principle of equality and mutuality. A higher authority was not
needed. The states merely had to recognize one another as
equals. Authority would flow horizontally rather than from the
top down. They would give one another recognition for the
exclusive authorities they held in their respective realms.
As is widely agreed, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648
settled the religious wars by recognizing a system of states in
which the authority of each was recognized as exclusive with
respect to domestic affairs and the recognition of that
exclusive authority by the other states. Thus, independent
nation-states were born conceptually by being untied to a fixed
international source of moral authority and adjudication.
The nationalization of coercive power strengthened the
mandarins in the creation of a command polity. At the same time,
it left the economic merchant class freer both of rural control
and military parasitism. The new economies of scale in military
production meant that the military need not hold the merchant
class to ransom. Partnerships of military power, economic
entrepreneurship and formal authority produced a new
equilibrium. But it was one in which stabilty was the basis for
discovery rather than change merely being destined to reproduce
the same stable order. Discoveries were not simply made to
reinforce stability, even though that is how it first appeared.
And nation-states by their very creation had to live on the
frontiers of chaos from which their responsibility was to
establish a modicum of order. Significantly, they not only
lacked moral navigation equipment, but the very history of their
creation meant that they were inherently wary of any attempts to
create a source of higher moral authority than the state.
Morality stopped at the frontiers of the state.
The devil's bargain, they made, was, of course, to ignore
the atrocities committed by any one state's formal authorities
against its own citizens. The sacred principle of non-
intervention was the complementary principle to the sovereignty
of the state. That sovereignty was assumed by the authority of
the nation, an elite of aristocrats speaking the same language.
The centre of this elite was the king who, in one of the two
king's bodies, now claimed not only to receive his divine
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authority directly from God rather than via his messenger, the
Pope, but in his second body to be the embodiment of the people
on whom ultimate sovereignty was to be found. Soveriegnty, and
hence power, for Hobbes, was rooted in the people (and not God),
but transfeered to the King.
But this made the King arrogant and at odds with those who
claimed sovereign power resided in the "nation", the group of
aristicrats with whom the revolution against the central
authority of the Pope had been constructed. Since neither could
appeal to a higher authority, they had to forge new alliances to
wrestle for control of the state. The barons united with one
another against the king and his allies. But when the king and
his allies united with a new economic class based in the cities,
in the revolution of 1688 in Britain, a new system of governing
society was born as the sibling to the nation-state. The union
of a soveriegn authority, initially embodied in the king, and
"the people", the merchant and trading classes in the city,
became a new, creative combination.
That whig state became a formidable power, especially when
the military aristocratic classes were sent overseas to exercise
their martial arts for the sake of advancing what was basically
a commercial empire.132 Coercive power had been wedded to the
pursuit of greed in both practice and theory. But the weakness
of the system as well as its great strength was that there was
no higher source of moral authority than the state. And there
was to be no interventions in the actions of that state within
the territory of its own jurisdiction.
This would be a recipe for powerful growth as well as
disaster. And the critical development to follow in modernity
was how the principle of nonintervention worked in practice,
because, of course, no state could resist meddling in the
internal affairs of its enemies let alone its rivals. The issue
would become the grounds for justifying such intervention as
globalization began under the new system of nations-states and
the rise of the English, Dutch and French trade empires.133 "As
a result, the modern integration of the globe into a single
market-regulated economy was well underway by 1700." (McNeill
1992, 113) The principle was non-intervention, but globalization
could only proceed by a systematic and agreed formula of
intervention based on socially contracted standards. The
behaviour of states had to be regulated to ensure that the
behaviour fell within an acceptable range.
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At the same time, the sovereignty of the state had to be
rooted internally in the sovereignty of a people, initially a
small elite, but gradually the whole people. Therefore, the
identity and boundaries of that people had to be determined
based on historically and culturally inherited patterns of
behaviour and national character traits of a dominant ethnic
group in relation to the difficulties of assimilating minorities
into the dominant culture, and in conflicts and wars with
proximate rivals. Britain had to develop and articulate a
culture that celebrated and lauded the self creation of the
nation - hence the tremendous symbolic stress on the Magna
Carta. At the same time, the minoritites in Cornwall and
elsewhere in the peripheral regions (Wales and Scotland) had to
be assimilated into a single monolithic culture. And the enemy-
other - for Britain, it was France - had to be created as the
external threat to foster that unity, assisted, of course, by
the imperial and economic rivalry of the two centres.
This meant that among the disaffected minorities there
remained the potential to get the other from inside. The
foundations for intervention were forged in the muticultural
heritage of every nation-state. "Nonintervention is taken as the
normal state of affairs in international relations. What must be
analyzed and explained, as with the behavioural approach, is
intervention." (Weber 1995, 20) And in light of the contract for
mutual recognition among the states and the absence of a higher
authority to adjudicate such disputes, there had to be some
cognitive community to which the states could appeal, not to
formally sanction actions taken, but to provide a rationale if
the Westphalian system was to endure.
When intervention practices occur, they are
accompanied by justifications on the part of an
intervening state to a supposed international
community of sovereign states. In offering
justifications for their intervention practices,
diplomats of intervening states simultaneously assume
the existence of norms regulating state practices and
an interpretive community that will judge intervention
practices in accordance with these norms...it is
international practice that constitutes the boundaries
and capacities of both sovereign states and
international interpretive communities. (Weber 1995,
5)
At the same time, the principle of non-intervention and the
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autonomy of each state to act domestically without any fear of
external challenge meant that state authorities could undertake
any action against external dissidents without any concern with
the intervention by outsiders. More significantly, if those
revolutionaries were not repressed but managed to take power and
they were deemed to pose a threat to the peace and security of
other members of the club of nation-states, intervention was
justified. Thus, the Concert of Europe of 1815 was used as an
opportunity by the club to have the revolutionary activities of
internal dissidents repressed. As Australian Chancellor
Meternich stated, "States belonging to the European alliance,
which have undergone in their internal structure an alteration
brought about by revolt, whose consequences may be dangerous to
other states, cease automatically to be members of the alliance.
[If such states] cause neighbouring states to feel an immediate
danger, and if action by the Great powers can be effective and
beneficial, the Great Powers will take steps to bring the
disturbed area back into the European system, first of all by
friendly representations, and secondly by force if force becomes
necessary to this end." (quoted in Weber 1995, 12)134
By the end of the first World War one hundred years later,
the grotian idealists rather than the realists were in charge.
Rather than intervention being justified to put down
revolutionaries, intervention was justified in the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919 to protect the rights of national minorities
within states. This shift from repressing revolutionairies to
protecting minorities was necessary if the nation-state system
was to be globalized, but in a manageble way. Fifty nation-
states were managemable. Even one hundred. Two hundred began to
border on chaos. But 5,000 nation-states would create a system
impossible to manage.
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 may have formalized the
legal criteria for the attainment of sovereign statehood in
terms of land (the existence of a defined territory), people (a
permanent population in that territory), and an effective
government for the state which could demonstrate its capability
in enforcing its authority over the territory and the people,
and it may have endorsed the principle of autonomy and non-
intervention - the power of exclusive control over its own
domestic affairs, with the right to take ultimate decisions and
actions concerning the lives of its citizens within the
territorial boundaries of the state without interference by
other states - but that rule was always subject to the very
important qualifier, that a member of the club had to be willing
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to abide by the rules of the club of states. A state not only
was recognized as being capable of entering into relations and
treaties with other states while preserving its right of self-
defence and retaliation against unprovoked attack, but it
participated in the decision-making procedures on second order
rules which determined international legal practice, in
particular, when intervention was justified. Those second order
rules were determined more by practice than formal agreements.
Thus, in the most recent interventions. "As enforcement
operations always overlook the principle of consent, they are
essentially interventionist forces, where intervention is
defined as an attemptto get involved, or deploy military force,
in a conflict without the approval of all the parties to the
conflict. These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia)
appear to have set important legal precedents." (Makinda 1996,
149) These precedents would appear to be determined as well by
decisions not to intervene - or to intervene slowly,
reluctantly, and inadequately. The protection given to the Kurds
in northern Iraq135 determined that large flows of refugees were
threats to peace and security and justified intervention. This
was also true in Haiti, though the restoration of democracy was
used as the primary rationale. Similarly, when refugees are not
deemed to pose such a threat and massive human rights violations
of the worst order occur on the periphery of the global system
in Rwanda and Burundi, non-intervention carries greater weight
than intervention. In contrast, when a tin pot dictator involved
in the drug trade snubs his nose at the United States, he can be
taken out of Panama by force by the United States and without
sanction. Contrary to the wishful thinking of many grotians and
utopians, there is no indication that "the UN is probably ready
to implement a broader concept of security that, among other
things, includes economic development, societal institutions,
and good governance." (Makinda 1996, 164) The system of states
continues to make the rules for intervention. And massive
violations of human rights let alone justice do not appear to be
among the criteria.
What institutional precedent is created by Rwanda? Rwanda
certainly underlines the fact that western European civilization
(including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand)
is unwilling to fight for the creation of democracy in a
frontier location. The French revolution made military
conscription the price of citizenship and thereby created the
foundation for putting coercive power in the hands of the people
rather than in an aristocratic elite. As western countries now
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reject conscription, when normal, healthy positive-oriented good
citizens believe that they are idealists in their commitment to
being decent and even willing to engage in self-sacrifice if
immediate family and friends are concerned, but are unwilling to
engage in self-sacrifice or even endure conscription if the
fundamental principles of democracy are at stake, the result is
military impotence, virtual power but without the very
substantive moral foundation that makes coercive power
effective.
Rwanda demonstrates that the power of rhetoric has won over
the power of science. The belief in tolerance becomes a mere
word rather than an expression of a commitment. In Rwanda, we
find the victory of paternal capital and the impotence of
exchange capital. In Rwanda, the concert of states is more
cacaphonic than harmonic.
At the frontiers of civilization where the values of that
civilization are worked out, instead of the old frontier thesis
of Jackson Turner of expansiveness and freedom being
demonstrated, or even the revisionist thesis of the struggle
between the extremes of hierarchic coercive authority versus
freedom being acted out136, we find only the proof that might is
right. The realist hypothesis seems to be a self-verifying
principle.
Even the humanitarian response following the genocide can
be interpreted as verifying the realist thesis at the symbolic
level at the very least. What really mobilized the world
community was the fear of an outbreak of cholera at Goma when
well over a million refugees had gathered. Cholera, after all,
was the first human disease to have its code deciphered in 1884
so it could be eliminated. The West might have been willing to
show it was a paper tiger when it came to militant challenges to
its principles of democracy and human rights. But when there was
an event that threatened to challenge the superiority of
instrumental rationality over nature altogether, a formidable
international effort was mounted.
If civilization is a consciously recognized set of
principles, values and norms, if culture is the set of
physically acquired habits and practices rooted in everyday
behaviour of individuals and their unconscious fundamental
dispositions, and if states are the mediators between culture
and civilization as well as between the past and the future,
then the actions of states and the international institutions to
which they belong seem to demonstrate that, when fundamental
underlying principles are encountered, these states, and the
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individual members within it, are wedded to realist practices
and are willing to surrender their ideational precepts when
encountering relatively minor challenges.
The dream of creating a universal legal order with a degree
of coercive power, or, in a more utopian vein, of overthrowing
the existing state and/or market driven economic order would
seem futile.
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Chapter 9
Globalization
Is this pessimistic conclusion warranted? Or has a new set
of values for civilization emerged from the decline of the
Westphalian system of modernity? "(T)oday and for the
foreseeable future, the only international civilization worthy
of the name is the governing economic culture of the world
market. Despite the view of some contemporary observers, the
forces of globalization have successfully resisted partition
into cultural camps." (Rosecrance 1996, 45) Has a global
civilization been produced? Is the Westphalian system itself in
grave risk under the pull of contemporary forces of
globalization and the disintegrating forces at work weakening
the power of the state? Have the liberal realists won the battle
and created a new global order and set of values through the
system of the market? Or has the absence of a fundamental
authoritative ground for morals and values and an international
institution with overriding authority to uphold those values
simply come back to haunt the Westphalian system? Is hope only
to be found if the disintegration of the Westphalian system is
replaced by a new international order based on moral principles
and international institutions?
There are still a number of grotian theorists who want to
overleap the neoliberal realists and believe that the time and
the conditions are ripe for reintroducing a supernational moral
and coercive authority over the weakened state system. What some
now want to do is introduce lofty moral criteria for recognizing
a state. Before the community of states grants recognition to
any state, they propose that a state be asked a number of
questions to ascertain whether that state is worthy of such
recognition. Is the state governed by the rule of law? Are
minorities given protection? Are there massive violations of
human rights? (Bonante 1995, 30; Stern 1995, 218) Some even want
to insist that there should me a minimal standard of
distributive justice.
The reality, however, is that in the present (and, I
daresay, for the forseeable future), recognition of a state does
not require that a state live up to any moral criteria. It must
live up to political criteria. A state cannot provide sanctuary
to revolution and terrorists let alone foster such activities.
How to ostracize Iran or Libya, assuming they are engaged in
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such activities, is another matter. A state cannot and must not
persecute its minorities lest the system of nation-states itself
be threatened by large outflows of refugees. And, if the United
States gets its way in its new unilateral legislation aimed at
Cuba, a state not only will be ostracized if it expropriates
private property without proper compensation, but outside
parties dealing with that state in relationship to those
exprepriated properties will be subjected to ostracism and legal
action.
The majority of states could not pass a test based on moral
criteria such as protecting human rights, let alone fostering
justice. Only a very few years ago, democracies constituted less
than 20% of the membership of the community of states. One state
with 20% of the world's population would not pass such a test.
Thus, even though there are increasing numbers of proposals to
make democracy a test for recognition, for the forseeable future
this is unlikely. And if even the issue of property rights in a
global capitalist system arouses so much opposition to
sanctions, especially the secondary sanctions against firms
trading in allegedly "stolen property", what prospect is there
for such a proposal?
More fundamentally, one of the basic premises of the
Westphalian system is that there would be no such tests. The
only test was to be whether a state's behaviour, or even the
internal conflicts within that state, were deemed by the other
states to threaten the preservation of the state system itself
and the security and peace in the relations between states.
Given the Westphalian system, there is simply no empirical or
logical possibility of introducing such a utopian scheme. It is
no surprise that the Marxist utopians have such disdain for
their "unscientific" utopian siblings and their grotian cousins.
Even if a moral order cannot or is very unlikely to be
imposed on the existing system of states, are there forces
presently at work eroding the system itself? Look at the radical
changes that have taken place in just the last century as
modernistic globalization seems to be on the verge of completing
its task. "Among these developments are to be counted the
dynamics of a world economy which produce instabilities and
difficulties within states and between states which outreach the
control of any single polity; the rapid growth of transnational
links which simulated new forms of collective decision-making
involving states, intergovernmental organizations and
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international pressure groups; the expansion and intensification
of transnational communication systems; the proliferation of
military technologies and arms as a 'stable' feature of the
contemporary political world; and the development of pressing
transnational problems - involving, for instance, environmental
challenges like acid rain, damage to the ozone layer and the
'greenhouse' effect - which do not acknowledge national
boundaries and frontiers." (Held 1995, viii)
From historically settled agricultural societies (as
distinct from slash and burn ones) in which 90% of the people
were needed to produce food and support a small leisure class,
in the present in developed societies there are too few farmers
(in the recent census in Canada, for example), constituting less
than 1% of the population, to be significant as a census
category. We have become nations of large urban metropolises,
multi-ethnic megacities with a corresponding depopulation of
rural areas. Developed states are no longer nation-states led by
cities where the vast majority of the population lived in the
countryside.
At the same time as the rural areas of the developed
countries are being depopulated, the twentieth century has
witnessed the largest increase in the human population on the
globe, expanding from a total population of one billion at the
beginning of the century to a population estimated to be about
six billion at the end of the century. In spite of two world
wars and genocides like Rwanda, the disease and human disasters
that normally create massive die-offs of population have been
more than offset by the use of instrumental reason to preserve
and lengthen human life, and this in spite of the use of that
same instrumental rationality to develop technologies and
reinforce a shift in values to placing a priority on enjoying
this life rather than perpetuating ourselves through successive
generations, with the consequent dramatic drop in birth rates
that accompany these changes.
There are clearly fundamental changes at work which
allegedly create a radical new context for states, and hence,
for those states responding to complex emergencies. These
problems are being faced by states in a context of globalization
of production, communication, transportation and trade that is
accelerating. As globalization proceeds apace, states are
alleged to be less autonomous in controlling their own
destinies. "States themselves are porous and often unable to
satisfy their citizens by relying on their national capacities
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alone. State actors will remain the most important ones on the
world scene, but their centrality and range of autonomous choice
will decline in the face of transgovernmental, transnational,
and nongovernmental actors." (Haas & Haas 1995, 257)
This appears to be true of even the most powerful states. As a
result, "Centralizing globalism seeks to justify itself through
universalizing values...[However,] (a)nother globalizing
tendency is thus towards heightened competition and conflicts."
(Mittelman 1886, 207)
On the one hand, we have a push towards centralized values
and institutions. On the other hand, we have a push towards
regionalism, and localism. "We have entered a time of global
transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and
continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen
cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of
sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are
blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by
decisions of States to yield some sovereign perogatives to
larger, common political associations. At the same time,
however, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty
spring up, and the cohesion of States is threatened by brital
ethnic, religious, social, cultural or lingusitic strife. Social
peace is challenged on the one hand by new assertions of
discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of
terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through
democratic means." (Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 11, 41-2)
Consequently, all states have been subjected to
fragmentation pressures which express themselves in different
forms depending on the historical trajectory of a particular
state. These forces include regional, ethnic and ideological
tensions which result in the importance of identity politics in
the life of a nation. Powerful states have a difficult enough
time dealing with these forces of nationalism, regionalism, and
religion. For weak states setting out on the road to
development, the problems can easily be overwhelming. The
question is then asked whether, "These global changes also call
into question the usefulness of the nation-state itself. The key
autonomous actor in political and international affairs for the
past few centuries appears not just to be losing its control and
integrity, but to be the wrong sort of unit to handle the newer
circumstances." (Kennedy 1993, 131)
Modernity set out to establish a single source of authority
based in the congruity between the legal polity, a territorial
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and an economic unit. Now there is a lack of congruity between
the territorial organization of political authority and the
subterritorial and transterrititorrial mobilization of social
forces. "Globalisation is generating a more complex multi-level
world political system, which implicitly challenges the old
Westphalian assumption that a state is a state is a state.
Structurees of authority comprise not one but at least three
levels: the macro-regional level, the old state (or Westphalian)
level, and the micro-regional level. All three levels are
limited in their possibilities by a global economy which has
means of exerting its pressures without formally authoritative
political structures." (Cox 1993b, 263)
"One of the consequences (of globalisation) is a process
that can be called the internationalisation of the state. If you
think back to the inter-war period and especially the depression
years of the 1930s, the role of states was primarily to protect
national economic space from disturbances coming from the
outside. The Bretton Woods system moved towards a different
balance. It sought to achieve a compromise: states still had a
primary repsonsibility to safegurd domestic welfare and levels
of employment and economic activity; but they were to do this
within rules that precluded economic aggression against others
and aimed at harmonisation of different national economic
policies. Since the mid-1970s, with the demise of Bretton Woods,
a new doctrine has achieved preeminence: states must become the
instruments for adjusting national economic activities to the
exigencies of the global economy - states are becoming
transmission belts from the global into the national economic
spheres. Adjustment to global competitiveness is the new
categorical imperative." (Cox 1993b, 260)137
For the conservative realist who honestly faces these new
threats to the survival and security of the state system, the
threats emerging from the neoliberal push to regionalization and
the openess to population flows must be resisted. Globalization
has produced a life and death struggle between conservative and
liberal realists since, "the idea of neoliberalism centers on
integration in the global economy." (Mittelman 1996, 198) For
the "outward orientation of neoliberal regionalism has meant the
diminution of the ability of both states and interstate
organizations to control aspects of trade and monetary
relations." Further, "(T)he formation of macroregions involves
a vast enlargement in the size of the market, a weakening of
extant political units, and a reduction in the full meaning of
citizenship." (Mittelman 1996, 191)
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Globalization has not only produced rapid urbanization and
the megalopolis, mega cities in which are concentrated enormous
numbers of people from different regions, but urbanization
results in a loss of identity for new arrivals and also a sense
of invisibility and a freedom from traditional norms which
previously boundaried the actions of the individual. Loss of
identity is combined with a weakening of the levers which held
individuals to account and an exhilerating sense of freedom that
anonimity can bring.
Globalization has also produced a global division of labour
with two results. The institutionalization of democracy in civil
society has declined with the weakening of the trade unions in
developed states. Further, the divisions between those who own
capital and professionals crucial to the success of the
capitalist system, and labourers have widened on a global scale.
Suffering from fragmentation on the political, social and
economic front, developed states are still involved in providing
assistance to Third World states, but at declining levels in
terms of both the size of their own economies and the
multiplication of needs elsewhere. Further, increasing
proportions of development aid are shifted to dealing with
complex emergencies.138 Developed states are economically as well
as socially less committed to providing overseas assistance. Yet
multinationals grow in strength and power. 70% of international
trade is intracompany trade and states are less able to tax
global companies since the way they earn their profits are less
and less under the control of states. "Restructuring is
depriving the state of its ability to regulate economic life,
furthering the outflow and internal concentration of wealth."
(Mittleman 1996, 209) Global corporations contribute less and
less to state coffers, and significantly less when measured
against their wealth and power in the economy. The ability of
any single state to tax them in relationship to their real
earnings further weakens under the pressure of international
competition to attract multinationals to different countries and
locales. The combination of political, social and economic
weakness of developed states means that they are less able to
play a role as providers of development aid, especially given
the greater need. The result is a weakening of international law
and the tools for its enforcement in all but the commercial
field, at the same time as those laws themselves and the areas
of international concern are multiplying.
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In such a context, it is not surprising that the idea of a
global consensus for acting in response to complex emergencies
is more myth than reality. The situation is not helped when the
sources of threat to developed states themselves have shifted
from other states to internal dissident and desperate factions
and cults, and externally to emerging real and imagined imported
medical threats, illegal migration, the globalization of crime
and the age-old threat that has always haunted nation-states,
revolutionaries and terrorists who believe they are dedicated
and scarificing their lives for a higher moral purpose. However,
these old and new stresses also compel states to match their
participation in economic globalization with intellectual,
political, and security cooperation in the field of policing.
Thus, new institutional arrangements are also evolving to deal
with the increased anarchy in the international political sphere
arising primarily from small sub-groups rather than states,
though those sub-groups may be financed and supported by pariah
states.
In such a context, are states, or, at least developed
states, evolving into "virtual states". Once the population is
concentrated in a relatively limited number of megacities and
the state is no longer dependent on the control of vast tracts
of territory, do we have an international division between old,
obsolete and increasingly weakened Westphalian states and new
virtual states?
"In economies where capital, labor, and information are mobile
and have risen to predominance, no land fetish remains.
Developed countries would rather plumb the world market than
acquire territory. The virtual state - a state that has
downsized its territorially based production capability - is the
logical consequence of this emancipation from the land."
(Rosecrance 1996, 46)
In this vision, the industrial revolution has been
superseded by another revolution in production, communication
and transportation that has completed the work of globalization
begun with the city-states at the beginning of modernity - the
end of the tyranny of the countryside over the city, the end of
the need to use coercive force to defend a territorial base. If
conservative realism was the appropriate ideology to oversee the
transition from the Aristotelian stable agricultural polity to
the industrial polis, it no longer has any function when the
latter, based in nation-states, has been superceded by regional
economic systems involved in an interdependent global economy.
The nation-state system began by inverting the old equation
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(which defined mobility in relationship to stability) by
defining stability in relationship to change. The virtual state
has discharged stability altogether as unnecessary ballast. "The
virtual state is a country whose economy is reliant on mobile
factors of production." "Free movement of capital and goods,
substantial international and domestic investment, and high
levels of technical education have been the recipe for success
in the industrial world of the late twentieth century." "The
virtual state is an agile entity operating in twin
jurisdictions: abroad and at home." (Rosecrance 1996, 47, 59 and
60) Mobility and flexibility in themselves have become the
virtues. Research, product design, development, marketing, legal
organization and financing as well as highly specialized and
customized manufacturing have become the stock-in-trade of the
virtual state.
In Europe, Switzerland is the leading virtual nation;
as much as 98% of Nestle's production capacity, for
instance, is located abroad....A reflection on how far
these tendencies have gone is the growing portion of
GDP consisting of high-value-added services, such as
concept, design, consulting, and financial services.
Services already constitute 70 percent of American
GDP. Of the total, 63 percent are in the high-value
category. (Rosencrance 1996, 52)
With this vision, the economic realists turn into utopian
idealists. They concede that the state will lose its position as
the main agent of change to the international market place where
"The state will become just one of many players in the
international marketplace and will have to negotiate directly
with foreign factors of production to solve domestic economic
problems." (Rosecrance 1996, 60) But the benefits will be well
worth the loss. For the world of an anarchic state system, with
the inevitable and inherent conflict between states, will
finally and ultimately be eliminated. The era of a peacable
international kingdom will be at hand as the market accomplishes
what states could never do. "The taking of real estate does not
result in the acquisition of knowledge and aggressors cannot
seize the needed capital. Workers may flee from an invader. Wars
of aggression and wars of punishment are losing their impact and
justification... Virtual states, corporate alliances, and
essential trading relationships augur peaceful times."
(Rosecrance 1996, 58)
The virtual state, according to this theory, has made
131
Aristotle's dream of a virtuous state unnecessary.
Unfortunately, there are two fundamental flaws in this
vision. The virtual state will not be in a position to solve
domestic problems and the internal divisions between the haves
and have nots. In fact, such a development exacerbates the
divisions. Secondly, "As a result of these trends, the world may
increasingly become divided into 'head' and 'body' nations, or
nations representing some combination of these functions. While
Canada and Australia stress the headquarters or head functions,
China will be the 21st-century model of a body nation."
(Rosecrance 1996, 53) In other words, class warfare will be
internationalized and divided among states. Can one envision
this split between the head and the body, between capital and
labour, between one group of virtual states and another group of
old-fashioned Westphalian states leading to a peaceful world.
The dream of the economic market place producing a global
peaceful order turns into a nightmarish vision.
But perhaps this is merely an extreme view. If we return
from the cyberspace of the virtual state down to earth and the
role of the state in a globalized economy, is there more promise
that the problems of the Westphalian system will be overcome in
a completely globalized world economy? If we face the reality on
this earth in which the population explosion is a problem in the
Third World but, for some, threatens a migratory flood into the
First World, or that even within states, the differential growth
rates of ethnic and other communities at the bottom of the
increasingly differentiated economic ladder threaten the
security of the well-to-do, how can a globalized economic order,
which finally buries the neo-mercantilist world of nation-
states, deal with such problems? Won't there still be a
competition for scarce resources, especially in an overpopulated
world? Have we not come to the end and the limits of the
agricultural revolution wherein population increases will once
again increase at a faster rate than the ability of the world to
feed itself? As fish stocks are depleted, as forests are cut
down, as fresh water becomes scarce in most countries, won't
these problems produce greater social and political instability
with no governmental institutions in place able to deal with
them?
Isn't the state placed in a contradictory position? "As
economic interests expand and the domestic economy becomes a
derivative of the global economy, the nation-state is placed in
a difficult and contradictory position. It must in neoliberal
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societies...promote the efficiency of global resource
exploitation and at the same time meet an expanding array of
domestic responsibilities." (Mason 1994, 17) The global market
on its own seems merely to exacerbate the problems we apparently
face as no substitute appears able to take over the role of the
state, and the state's ability to control even its own monetary
and fiscal policies is eroded.
But the problem is even more complex. Globalization itself
produces its own destabilizing forces. The mobility of capital
in which cash flows, in excess of the GDP of the vast majority
of countries, are tranferred daily in milliseconds, creates a
radically new source of instability in the international
economic system. Automated trading can lead to automated panics
and a catastrophic collapse of the international monetary system
on which the stability of the globalized market depends. Money,
after all, is still a state produced system of representing
value. States with international debts are particularly
susceptible to these fast shifts in money and the effects of
currency speculation.
"Economic globalisation has placed contraints upon the
autonomy of states. More and more, national debts are foreign
debts so that states have to be attentive to external bond
marketsand to externally-influenced interest rates indetermining
their own economic policies. The level of national economic
activity also depends upon access to foreign markets.
Participation in various international 'regimes' channels the
activities of states in developed capitalist countries into
conformity with global economy processes, tending toward a
stabilisation of the world capitalist economy." (Cox 1993b, 262)
If we add to these trends environmental trends, the
unpredictable effects of global warming and the deterioration of
the ozone layer at the very same time as the population of the
world has more than doubled since the end of World War II while
in the same period 20% of the topsoil has eroded and 20% of our
rain forests have been denuded, then nightmarish scenarios can
easily be constructed. This is especially true when the
biotechnology revolution is introduced into the equation and one
begins to imagine artificially created or mutated organisms
producing catastrophic consequences for a population as ill-
prepared as the Europeans were when the Black Plague arrived in
the fourteenth century in the very first phase of the
globalization of transportation, or, worse yet, when the
diseases of Europe devastated the Aztec and Inca empires and
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wiped out 90% of the population.
What is the answer to these new circumstances? "Sometime in
the early 1970s, the world economy entered what I would regard
as a new capitalist phase, commonly referred to as
globalization." One theory posits the withering away of the
state making sovereignty obsolete in the face of global flows of
commodities, labour, capital and information. In a second
theory, the state transforms itself to meet the new challenge.
"In a context of a globalized world economy, the territoriality
of the state is significant not as the source of quasi-
ontological needs and desires but because the state is the
primary political organizational mechanism of social order and
transformation." (Palan 1994, 46) In this theory, "irrespective
of the fact that the economy is globalizing, political processes
are still very much territorially circumscribed."
The latter answer to globalization harnesses the nation-
state living in a competitive anarchic world to the liberal
economic vision by taking advantage of the system to benefit
your own state as Japan Inc. has done by constructing uniform,
high level educational standards in which children attend school
almost 20% more of the year than their counterparts in America,
quite aside from the 'cramming' and the home coaching they
receive. With a high production of engineers and scientists, a
significantly smaller proportion of expenditure on law
enforcement and lawyers generally, with systematically planned
productivity improvements and targetted production and
marketing, with a far lower expenditure per capita on consumer
goods and huge pools of savings for investment, with very low
percentages of GNP spent on the military, and ignoring Japan's
shortcomings in its obsolescent domestic distribution system,
its inefficient and small agricultural sector, its limitations
in ground-breaking innovations as contrasted with technological
improvements, the general option presented is that the future
will be controlled and directed by states which compete
systematically and effectively within a globalized economic
system. The warfare between and among states will be fought on
the economic rather than the military battlefield.
But this does not answer the question of how such a
solution will answer the problem of the have-nots, and the
dangers of political instability that these have-nots in the
Third World pose to the stability of the First World, or the
threats to the global environment that these problems pose for
us all as each states tries to improve its comparative advantage
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relative to other states. Is there not a need then for a new or
strengthened global political system whcih can tackle these
problems directly without all the handicaps of the anarchic
Westphalian order?
The meaning of power, authority and accountability has
to be sparated from its traditional association with
states and fixed national borders, and that the
conditions of its successful entrenchment depend on an
international framework of political life, given form
and shape by what I call 'cosmopolitan democratic
law'. (Held 1995, 22)
Some thus argue that a new global, legal system with
coercive clout is the only answer.
Viewed from the prespective of vulnerabilities, the
growing density of populations, the expanding
complexity of the organized segments of society, the
globalization of national economies, the constraint of
external debts, the relentless pressure of
technological innovations, the challenge of subgroups
intent upon achieving greater autonomy, and the
endless array of other intractable problems that
comprise the modern political agenda, it seems evident
that world politics has cumulated to a severity of
circumstances that lessens the capacity of states to
be decisive and efficient. Their agendas are
expanding, but they lack the will, competence, and
resources to expand correspondingly. Consequently,
most states are overwhelmed, unable to relieve their
systemic overload to the point where effective
management is possible. And added to these
difficulties is the fact that citizenries, through the
microelectronic revolution, are continuously exposed
to the scenes of suthority crises elsewhere in the
world, scenes that are bound to give rise to doubts
and demands in even the most stable of polities and
thus to foment a greater readiness to question the
legitimacy of government policies. (Rosenau 1992, 30)
The only option for citizens will be strengthening the
given or creating new international political and legal
jurisdictions with the power to do something about these issues.
"(A)s transnational and subnational actors in the multi-centric
world become ncresingly active and effective, as they
demonstrate a capacity to deal with problems that states have
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found intractable or beyond their competence, citizens will
begin to look elsewhere than the national capital for
assistance." (Rosenau 1992, 31)
The problem is that these changes create pressures, but not
compulsory forces. Opportunities are opened up and situations
that demand solutions, but the creation of global legal
institutions with clout are only options. "(W)ith the end of the
geopolitical divisions created in the aftermath of the Second
World War, a new fluidity has been established in international
affairs which heralds the possibility of a new fluidity in
political thought. These circumstances present significant
opportuniies for the establishment of an international order
based upon the principles of constittionality and democracy -
opportunities which need to be grasped if the current revival of
sectarian politics and of the use of force, evidenced in the
resurgence of right-wing politics in Europe, the intensification
of racism and the spread of ethnic and political separatism
throughout the world are to be checked." (Held 1995, viii-ix)
But Rwanda suggests that the opportunities are as likely,
if not more likely, to be passed than taken up, For if the
challenge was not met in such a relatively easy case where the
consequences were so dire, why would anyone expect that the
world will respond more effectively in the future? The main
actors are still states. They are being buffetted by
globalization from above and fragmentation within. Further, the
existing system and efforts to correct it require that those
same state actors act in concert and with purpose. But the
states themselves are not unitary actors as the premises of the
Westphalian realist vision assumed.
The theory of the state as a unified actor is based on a
single sovereign embodied in the king. This premise still had
much to say for it even in parliamentary systems when governemnt
was rather small and foreign policy was determined by a small
elite. This was particularly true in democratic monarchies such
as the United States and, very recently, France, where the
president had virtually exclusive jurisdiction over foreign
policy.
However, the theory of the monolithic state as a singular
actor has taken a severe critical beating as state bureaucracies
have mushroomed and divided responsibilities. The state has
become a hydra-headed monster even in the foreign policy area.
In such situations, policy seems more determined by the
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bureaucratic culture to which a decision maker belongs rather
than through a unified executive approach to a problem. As
Schraeder demonstrated in American policy dealing with Gibouti,
"all four individuals (from the State Department, Defense, CIA
and USAID) were representatives of and assessed US policy
interests according to their respective bureaucratic cultures
and missions." (Schraeder 1994, 19) This is particularly true
when the issue and/ or the state or area is of marginal interest
to any defined self interest of the state. "(T)he Nixon White
House...left the formulation and implementation of the US policy
response to the Africa specialists in the State Department's
Africa Bureau, almost certainly because the massacres in a
region of little strategic concern lacked any hint of communist
involvement." (Schraeder 1994, 29) These multiple sources of
authority and policy on behalf of the state were contrary to
Jean Bodin's (De Republica 1576) requirement that a sovereign
state act as a singular and ultimate temporal authority in the
determination of law and policy. That authority might have
shifted from a monarch to a democratically elected president or
a parliament in both subsequent theory and practice, but it
remained, by definition, singular and ultimate, at least in
theory. In practice, it was anything but.
The very same situation that presents the opening for a new
international legal system with clout to back it up, is the very
situation that weakens the only key actor in a position to
reform the system. "The rapid growth and maturation of the
multicentric world can in good part be traced to the
extraordinary dynamism and expansion of the global economy. And
so can the weakening of the state, which is no longer the
manager of the national economy and has become, instead, an
instrument for adjusting the national economy to the exigencies
of an expanding world economy." (Rosenau 1992, 27) In such a
situation, it is hard to see how the weakened state can forge a
coalition to reform the international global polity.
This is particularly true if the source of that new
international authority is envisioned as the replacement of the
centrality of state by the UN as Rosenau does. The fact is that
the UN is not a global government. What is more important, it
lacks any potential to become one. It is a coordinating body for
states and its current head imitates Machiavelli's vision of a
political leader rather than an elected official responsible to
and for a specific constituency (See Appendix 3) while espousing
the principles of grotian idealism.
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This brings us back to the problem of intervention. For it
is a reformed UN that is seen as the leader in new levels of
such intervention. "(T)his is not to deny a real, powerful
tension in the UN between its constitutional prohibitions
against interference in the domestic affairs of its member
states and the turbulent circumstances that encourage its
interference. It is only to assert that the trendline depicts
the tension being increasingly resolved in the favor of
interference." (Rosenau 1992, 39-40)
But our analysis suggests the reverse. If the
sovereignty/intervention boundary is where we locate the state
today (Weber 1995), we must attend to the justifications for
interventions.
When intervention practices occur, they are
accompanied by justifications on the part of an
intervening state to a supposed international
community of sovereign states. In offering
justifications for their intervention practices,
diplomats of intervening states simultaneously assume
the existence of norms regulating state practices and
an interpretive community that will judge intervention
practices in accordance with these norms...it is
international practice that constitutes the boundaries
and capacities of both sovereign states and
international interpretive communities. (Weber 1995,
5)
It would seem, then, that in addition to the old threats
from revoltionairies, terrorists and self-righteous cults, the
new threats to peace and security are not deemed to come from
massive human rights violations but from large flows of refugees
into neighbouring states. It is the threat to other nations, not
the self-destruction within a nation that seems to justify
intervention. The international legal order as it is being
formed in practice is not the legal order envisioned by the
grotians. It is one where the UN demonstrates it incapacity to
protect civilians.
Perhaps we have to look at more radical, utopian solutions.
Certainly, in their rhetoric, the leaders of the UN did not see
the UN simply as a grotian legal system with coercive clout to
make the inter-state system more effective. Most were utopians,
envisioning the UN imparting and upholding universal moral
values. Javier Pérez de Cuellar in April of 1991 claimed that
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there was a "shift in public attitudes towards the belief that
the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should
prevail over frontiers and legal documents." (UN Press Release,
SG/SM/4560, 24 April 1991) Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued that the
UN's coercive role was intended "to address the deepest causes
of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political
oppression." Boutros-Ghali's key document continued: "It is
possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that
spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding
expression in international laws, many owing to the work of this
Organization." (Agenda for Peace para 15)
In other words, the UN was not simply a legal system but a
moral teacher. International law merely refected that morality.
But unlike the Pope in the sixteenth century, the source of
authentic authority did not come from God, but from a shared set
of values held by the people in the world. The UN was, in fact,
a modernist institution that obtained its claimed quasi-
sovereign authority from the will of the people.
This suggests that the real source of reform is to be found
in the consciousness and value of people themselves and their
assumption of responsibility. "(D)evelopment in international
norms and practice appear to be shifting the focus of
sovereignty from the government to the people of a state, from
the Westphalian precepts to popular sovereignty." (Makinda 1996,
151) The people acting directly through NGOs and new
transnational organizations that bypass governements will bring
about the new world order. But these organizations lack both
economic clout and coercive power. In the global scheme, it
appears as if an army of ants is being sent to do the job of an
elephant. And there is absolutely no evidence for a global
system of values being in place as claimed by the last two
Secretary-Generals of the UN. Again, in Hobbes' phrase, empty
rhetoric has replaced scientific analysis.
Utopian historical materialists agree that a radical
solution is required. And they base their claims not on utopian
rhetoric but on precisely such empirical analysis. They suggest
that the changes in the globalized system has indeed brought
about a radical change in consciousness, that is the way we
experience and understand the world. "(W)e now live in a world
which is characterised by the growing global integration of
production and financial structures, complex communications
grids, the rapid innovation and diffusion of technology and the
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possible emergence of associated forms of consciousness (my
italics), as well as changes in security structures and
strategic alignments." (Gill 1993, 7)
What we need to attend to then is the way globalized media
are changing counsciousness and influencing political decisions.
For just as the invention of the printing press was critical to
the creation of the Westphalian system and the dawning of the
modern age, so developments in media are bound to have profound
influences of the future. This is particularly true if the
process of globalization has breached the radical divide between
domestic and international politics. "Westphalian sovereignty is
currently undergoing a reinterpretation and that the boundary
between domestic and foreign affairs is being eroded." (Makinda
1996, 154)
Perhaps we need "to seek theories that integrate both spheres,
accounting for the areas of entanglement between them."
(Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 261) for "We will never breach the
inside/outside wall as long as theoretical discourse begins with
the premise that global politics is dominated by the interaction
of Westphalian state polities." (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996,
263)
For the contemporary media, there is no wall between the
inside and the outside. It is to the media and the role in
played in Rwanda that we must now turn and the implications on
how knowledge and consciousness impacts on policy.
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Chapter 10
Media, Knowledge, Knowledge Institutions and Mitigating Violence
"I suppose that the first landmark of human ecological
history was the advance of our remotest ancestors to the apex of
the food chain. This was almost certainly the result of the
acquisition of language and of the superior coordination of
human behavior that language allowed." (McNeill 1992, 76) What
was done with language -writing, printing, electronic
transmission - mark key turning points, because they not only
allow greater discrimination, and skills to be transmitted, but
they actually change our consciousness, that is, how we see the
world. If we switch from oral to written culture, we establish
an abstract fixidity of reference separate from land markers and
their recollections in songlines. With moveable type and the
printing press, a dynamic mode of consciousness, of concrete
change which can be represented by these abstract symbols. With
electronic transmission of nformation, time and apace seem to
evaporate or, at the very least, become compressed. When
televison is added to the equation, the difficulty in preserving
information as private becomes very difficult. The premium then
shifts from the data to the quality of analysis of that data or
the emotional projection of the image or icon left as a shadow
of an event rather than the details of the event itself.
In the contemporary period, globalization has proceeded
apace with the decline in relative importance of print media so
critical to the spread of modernization. The printing press is
an industrial mechanical mode of making numerous, completely
identical reproductions of original copies of newspapers and
books by mechanical means. It has correctly been called the
first mass product of industrialization and the modern world.
Just as copying books by hand were critical to the perpetuation
of the ancient Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations,
the printing press, combined with the invention of paper, and,
most critically, the western alphabet, were critical to
modernization. After all, both the Chinese and the Koreans had
independently invented the printing press much earlier, and the
Chinese invented paper to take advantage of it, but did not
develop its potential because their printed language depended
upon thousands of separate characters rather than an alphabet of
26 characters. The efficiency of the independently evolved
western printing presses as an offshoot of the wine press,
enhanced greatly by the invention of a technique for casting
letters to precise dimensions, and the widespread use of the
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invention of paper that had been imported from China, resulted
not simply in the reformations and the revolutions and
developments of industrialization generally and the nation-
state,  but, as I said earlier, of modernization itself.
Currently, the twentieth century has witnessed the
revolution coming full circle, but at a very new level. For
electronic means of reproduction and communication, beginning
with the dots and dashes of the primitive telegraph to the
digital binary codes of our contemporary period, have meant the
development of the telegraph and telephone, radio and, most
importantly, movies and television, as new forms of oral and
visual communication which resurrected ancient modes of
communication in a modern context. Just as the mechanical
printing press enhanced certain modes of lineal and logical
thinking as well as serial narratives as forms into which to
cast our mental processes, the resurrection and transformation
of primitive forms of communication by electronic means also
meant the enhancement of certain forms of thought.
For example, it is no surprise that the radio is associated
with the spread of fear. The 1938 classical radio production of
Orson Welles Mecury Theatre adaptation of H G Wells War of the
Worlds spread panic in many American communities as listeners
believed that the imaginary enemies from Mars were real. Radio
has been intimately tied to the construction of humans groups as
real enemies to faciliate the genocides of the Jews of Europe
and the Tutsis in Rwanda.
It is also no surprise that television is so closely
associated with the politics of sentiment so that when the
American government steadfastly refused to become involved in
the genocidal killing in Rwanda, public pressure in response to
images of a million refugees crossing the border at Goma in
July, forced President Clinton to reverse the decision of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. A decision they made on a Thursday
afternoon was overwhelmed by the public response to television
images so that by Friday morning, Clinton had overruled them. By
Monday morning American airplanes were landing in Kigali
airport. The American government became involved in a massive
relief effort, a significant proportion of it unintentionally
used to reinforce the power of those responsible for the
genocidal killing of the Tutsis.
If radio and television resurrected traditional oral and
visual modes of communication for a mass industrialized age, and
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came to enhance and transform different thought processes, the
same can be said of the computer and electronic modes of
transmission of the materials produced and stored in computers.
The latter has made everyman with a computer the owner not only
of his own printing press, but with very cheap access to the
means of distribution of the results produced on that electronic
'press". Further, the new electronic modes can combine visual
and oral media in multimedia productions.
Simply put, we are undergoing an electronic communications
revolution in which certain modes of processing thoughts will be
enhanced and given great significance. All of these will, in
turn,
enhance the process of globalization and the possible decline of
the nation-state as the ultimate and prime source of power, even
if for the time being it retains that status, however weaker
that role is becoming.
What is most important is that the radical divide between
the private and the public, between the interior life of the
individual which was presumed to be his or her sanctuary, and
the public realm which was the proper business of government,
has begun to dissolve. The private is continually displayed
publicly. And the public realm offers immediate, instant and
relatively easy access to an individual's private economic
transactions, and, thereby, much else that was previously
considered sacrosanct from the probing eyes of Big Bother.
When this is combined with the other major technological
revolution in molecular biology, the traces of ourselves through
DNA clues are constantly being distributed through the public
realm so that the public, in turn, and as required, has
increasing access not simply to tracing one's movements, but to
the genetic code which plays such a large part in one's
capabilities and constitution.
The combination of the media revolution and the molecular
one entails the beginning of the end of the enlightenment
paradigm just when it is reaching its apogee. For the invention
of the private versus the public interest, and the radical
divide between the two, was the greatest invention of the
enlightenment. It gave rise to the very idea of the rights of
the individual.
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Chapter 10
Media, Knowledge and Mitigating Violence
"I suppose that the first landmark of human ecological
history was the advance of our remotest ancestors to the apex of
the food chain. This was almost certainly the result of the
acquisition of language and of the superior coordination of
human behavior that language allowed." (McNeill 1992, 76) What
was done with language -writing, printing, electronic
transmission - mark key turning points, because they not only
allow greater discrimination, and skills to be transmitted, but
they actually change our consciousness, that is, how we see the
world. If we switch from oral to written culture, we establish
an abstract fixidity of reference separate from land markers and
their recollections in songlines. With moveable type and the
printing press, a dynamic mode of consciousness of concrete
change which can be represented by these abstract symbols was
developed.
In the contemporary period, globalization has proceeded
apace with the decline in relative importance of print media so
critical to the spread of modernization. The printing press was
an industrial mechanical mode of making numerous, completely
identical reproductions of original copies of newspapers and
books by mechanical means. It has correctly been called the
first mass product of industrialization and the modern world.
Just as copying books by hand were critical to the perpetuation
of the ancient Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations,
the printing press, combined with the invention of paper, and,
most critically, the western alphabet, were critical to
modernization. After all, both the Chinese and the Koreans had
independently invented the printing press much earlier, and the
Chinese invented paper to take advantage of it, but did not
develop its potential because their printed language depended
upon thousands of separate characters rather than an alphabet of
26 characters. The efficiency of the independently evolved
western printing presses as an offshoot of the wine press,
enhanced greatly by the invention of a technique for casting
letters to precise dimensions, and the widespread use of the
invention of paper that had been imported from China, resulted
not simply in the reformations and the revolutions and
developments of industrialization generally and the nation-
state,  but, as I said earlier, of modernization itself. (Cf.
McLuhan 1962)
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Currently, the twentieth century has witnessed the
revolution coming full circle, but at a very new level. For
electronic means of reproduction and communication, beginning
with the dots and dashes of the primitive telegraph to the
digital binary codes of our contemporary period, have meant the
development of the telegraph and telephone, radio, movies and
television, as new forms of oral and visual communication which
resurrected ancient modes of communication in a modern context.
Just as the mechanical printing press enhanced certain modes of
lineal and logical thinking as well as serial dynamic narratives
as forms into which to cast our mental processes, the
resurrection and transformation of primitive forms of
communication by electronic means also meant the enhancement of
certain forms of thought.
With electronic transmission of information, the response
has depended on the medium used. Where the printing press
monopolized knowledge at the same time as the nation-state
sought to singularly control violence within its jurisdiction,
the use of electronics has fragmented the modes of communication
and the aspcts of consciousness with which each medium deals.
Each medium seems to have a corresponding emotional correlate.
For example, it is no surprise that the radio is associated
with the spread of fear. The 1938 classical radio production of
Orson Welles Mecury Theatre adaptation of H G Wells War of the
Worlds spread panic in many American communities as listeners
believed that the imaginary enemies from Mars were real. Radio
has been intimately tied to the construction of humans groups as
real enemies to faciliate the genocides of the Jews of Europe
and the Tutsis in Rwanda.
Radio is associated with the stimulus of fear because it is
relatively cheap to communicate repetitive messages and radio
leaves much to the imagination. When it was used in advertising
- most particularly in the jingles advertising soaps and
cigarettes, etc. - it used this repetitiveness. But once the
visual imagery of television was avaliable, even at a much
higher cost, it was visual imagery that was used to appeal to
our desires, not radio. Further, radio is regional, not global.
Television and movies are global because the impact depends
primarily on the visual reinforced by sound and words.
It is also no surprise that television is so closely
associated with the politics of sentiment so that when the
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American government steadfastly refused to become involved in
the genocidal killing in Rwanda, public pressure in response to
images of a million refugees crossing the border at Goma in
July, forced President Clinton to reverse the decision of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. A decision they made on a Thursday
afternoon was overwhelmed by the public response to television
images so that by Friday morning, Clinton had overruled them.139
By Monday morning American airplanes were landing in Kigali
airport. The American government became involved in a massive
relief effort, a significant proportion of it unintentionally
used to reinforce the power of those responsible for the
genocidal killing of the Tutsis.
 Television and movie images leave their after-effects. It
is not surprising that we speak of the shadow of Somalia
overhanging Rwanda; that is, a visual metaphor is utilized. The
emotional projection of the image or icon left as a shadow of an
event is far more significant than the details of the event
itself. That is why advertisements appealing to desire rely on
minimalist art and iconography.
Until the twentieth century, international politics did not
have to cope with radio or television. When the Tzarist progroms
against the Jews became international knowledge and aroused a
hue and cry, the number of deaths could be counted in the dozens
or perhaps hundreds. Currently, routine slaughters entail
hundreds; the memorable ones entail hundreds of thousands and
sometimes millions.
If radio and television resurrected traditional oral and
visual modes of communication for a mass industrialized age, and
came to enhance and transform different thought processes,
particularly those associated with fear and insecurity in the
case of radio and sentimental compassion in the case of
television, the same can be said of the computer and electronic
modes of transmission of the materials produced and stored in
computers. The latter has made everyman with a computer the
owner not only of his own printing press, but with very cheap
access to the means of distribution of the results produced on
that electronic 'press". The computer gives everyone access to
libraries of materials stored on relatively cheap silicon chips.
Further, it has made possible for the first time the creation of
a truly global epistemic community dealing with the same
material in real time.
If radio is gut-wrenching, if movies and television are
heart-wrenching, computers and their international linkages are
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mind-boggling. The vastness of information available does
literally boggle the mind. The problem is not quantity but
quality and selectivity. Further, the real issue is analysis.
Fortunately, the internet facilitates not only the transmission
of information; it also facilitates international conversation
using writing. Further, the transmission of both information and
analyses is enormously compressed in space and time.
This entails a fundamental qualitative shift. For books
were best at recording discoveries about what is (science and
nature, and therefore, also what was and will be), and about
what was in the humanities and studies of society. The
electronic internet, technologically and in the form of
communication, relies on codes. Codes - whether of dress or
language - are short-cuts to the future by providing simplistic
summaries of the past. Time and space seem to evaporate or, at
the very least, become compressed. Since, equilibrium in a
complex system is enhanced enormously by the efficient flow of
information among the components of the system140, for the first
time in the history of humanity, technology makes possible the
emergence of a global on-time, on-line epistemic or knowledge
community.
Simply put, we are undergoing an electronic communications
revolution in which certain modes of processing thoughts will be
enhanced and given great significance. All of these, except
radio (with some exceptions in providing an oral form of the
intellectual internet), will, in turn, enhance the process of
globalization and the possible decline of the nation-state as
the ultimate and prime source of power, even if for the time
being it retains that status, however weaker that role is
becoming.
What is most important is that the radical divide between
the private and the public, between the interior life of the
individual, which was presumed to be his or her sanctuary during
modernity, and the public realm which was the proper business of
government, has begun to dissolve. The private is continually
displayed publicly. And the public realm offers immediate,
instant and relatively easy access to an individual's private
economic transactions and even medical records, and, thereby,
much else that was previously considered sacrosanct from the
probing eyes of Big modern technology has rendered territorial
frontiers obsolete, altering the esssential nature of space and
time in global politics.
147
When this is combined with the other major technological
revolution in molecular biology, the traces of ourselves through
DNA clues which are constantly being distributed through the
electronic realm, the public, in turn, and as required, has
increasing access, not simply to tracing a person's movements,
but to the genetic code which plays such a large part in
understanding a person's capabilities and constitution, and,
hence, future possibilities.
The combination of the media revolution and the molecular
one entails the beginning of the end of the enlightenment
paradigm just when it is reaching its apogee. For the invention
of the private versus the public interest, and the radical
divide between the two, was the greatest invention of the
enlightenment. It gave rise to the very idea of the rights of
the individual.
The interiorization of morality in terms of pure
intentions, though ostensibly a way of providing a universal set
of values in terms of pure motives independent of the passions
of fear and desire, was, in fact, a way of privatizing emotional
life and keeping it hidden. Universal codes based on a Kantian
categorical imperative was a chimera, more precisely, a
modernist shadow of the universal moral codes that were the
constant adjuncts of mediaeval empires around the world.141 They
were global, but totally dismebodied, thereby taking abstract
universal moral codes to their logical conclusion and allowing
them to evaporate in ether.
Internalizing a hierachical universal moral code was a
magical act which, in fact, facilitated its disappearance except
as a haunting superego. So when the Secretary-General of the
United Nations says, "Technological advances are altering the
nature and the expectations of life all over the globe. The
revolution in communications has united the world in awareness,
in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice"
(Boutros 1992; 1995, para. 12, 42), we know we are dealing with
rhetoric and hope rather than any description of reality. For
events belie the meaning of these words.
On the other hand, the new electronic communications using
internets and computers makes possible a peer-based rather than
a hierarchical knowledge community. As I indicated in chapter 2,
order emerges best out of disordered systems, not via a central
control or via governing laws, natural or man-made, but through
a system that is quick, responsive and adaptive based on the
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principle of self-organization.
In both the opening chapter and chapter 8, I have stated
that modernity has been characterized, deliberately and
intentionally, as the effort in the international arena to deny
the existence of any hierarchical, overriding moral authority.
This was the quid pro quo of avoiding religious wars, wars over
ideas and beliefs, and instead restricting wars to conflicts
over self-interest and the power to protect and defend that self
interest.
That gap in modernity has clearly been felt with the
failure of one idealist, intellectual scheme after another to
recreate a foundation for a new international and universal
moral order. Usually the proposal has come from intellectuals
and churchmen (not rabbis or imams), though the odd politician
has strayed into the fold. The reason, I believe, is that, as I
indicated, in the creation of modernity, intellectuals and moral
leaders were displaced from their role as moral leaders and
arbiters. They were kicked out of their jobs in the adjudication
of international disputes. Once modernity was launched in the
seventeenth century, the university slipped into a role as an
intellectual backwater and an amateur intellectual centre to
train students in values suited to the nation in which the
university was to be housed. It was not until the beginning of
the nineteenth century - specifically in Berlin - that the
university was reborn as a centre of intellect and a place to
professionally train people who would live up to methodological
standards. Moral training continued to take place, but it took
second place to the professional preparation of historians and
scientists, professors of the national literature and
mathematicians, the one morally neutral science that had always
remained an integral part of the university curriculum.
However, the revival of the university was now based on a
Kantian intellectual model. On the one side were the
mathematical and natural sciences as the expression of pure
reason related to pure intellect. On the other side were the
humanities - literature and history - geared to the expression
of practical reason and the exercise of the will, specifically
the moral training of a "pure" will based on a sense of duty to
an ostensible universal moral law. Anthropology, the study of
man as the initial social science, was to bridge the gap in the
study of judgement and the application of reason in the realms
of art and politics.
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What happened to this modernist revival of a mediaeval
vision? It is no accident that knowledge, particularly in the
humanities and social sciences, so quickly succumbed to serving
nationalist goals.142 Among the disciplines themselves,
anthropology split into a number of social sciences - communal
ones such as political science concerned with the study of
power, economics concerned with the study of the pursuit of
material self-interest, sociology concerned with the structures
within modern society produced by the interaction of power and
interest, and anthropology was relegated to the study of non-
modern societies. Psychology became the discipline concerned
with individuals and the interaction between the rational
pursuit of self-interest and irrational forces within the
individual that subverted that rationality. Not only did
anthropology as the social science dedicated to uniting the
humanities and the natural sciences not accomplish that job of
union, but it iself fragmented into a number of separate social
sciences, and, in turn, each of those social sciences fragmented
into schools. This monograph is, in part, an illustration of the
different schools into which political science143 in one of its
fragmented cognate areas - international studies - has divided
into very different schools attempting to comprehend
international relations.
Instead of universality and coherence, chaos and rivalry
became the order of the day. I use order deliberately. For there
was order in that chaos. In the pluralistic mayhem, brilliant
insights and analyses were forthcoming, and the university
resumed its place in the training of professional elites for
society. As the social sciences became preeminent, the
university moved away, not only from its self vision as a
Sanctuary of Truth dedicated to training the aristocratic
leaders of society in a common set of values, but also from a
Sanctuary of Method dedicated to inculcating within each
profession a mastery of a body of materials and a given
methodology to analyze and deal with those materials. The
university became a Social Service Centre in which those elites
were trained, not to serve a professional ethos primarily, but
society in general. The leader of this innovation in the role of
the university was the United States following the American
Civil War. The result of that innovation was that each of the
disciplines began to cross the boundaries set for it and
intervene in the study of material supposedly the body of
knowledge of another discipline. When the university as a
Sanctuary of Method began to break down - this did not happen in
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Canada until the 1960s - the intellectual Westphalian system
also began to break down. Disciplinary boundaries were no longer
sacrosanct. Social problems, not disciplinary boundaries re
materials and methods, began to preoccupy scholars and
researchers.
Historians wrote about economics. Sociologists wrote
history. Philosophers even wrote about refugees. The gap between
social problems in society and the capacities of individuals
trained by the university to tackle and resolve those problems
was significantly narrowed. In turn, societies began to provide
enormous support to the universities and gradually direct half
of their young people to attend such institutions. The
university seemed once again to be in a golden age, training not
just a tiny moral elite, or a larger, but still relatively small
professional elite, but virtually the majority of the citizens
of a state.
In spite of this breakthrough, there remained a gap between
theory and practice in all fields. One of the most significant
gaps, however, remained in the field of international theory.
Alexander George (1993) has documented the character of that gap
very incisively. For within academia, one may find C.P. Snow's
division of the intellectual world into the two cultures of the
humanities and natural sciences, a product in my analysis of the
university relaunching itself on the basis of Kant's misleading
mental geographical guide. But between the university and
society, the largest chasm probably exists between theory as
practiced in the university and foreign policy.
Part of the reason is the standard one applied to any need
to connect theory and practice - the abstraction of one and the
immersion in the concrete of the other, the need for decisions
in practice when there is imperfect information and no time to
gather more. But the foreign policy field has special problems.
First, in the dominant theories, the relations between states
are dominated by the pursuit of rational self-interest and the
preservation and extension of the power of the state to
facilitate such collective pursuits, or, in Wallerstein's world
systems theories, the dialectic between the two as economics is
globalized while the realization of positions of power are
confined largely within state boundaries. In such a context, the
study of power becomes the study of domestic politics, while
foreign policy becomes a sub-study of economics - how to promote
a country's self interest within a global economy. This is
particularly true when the study of the strategic uses of power
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outside the country becomes primarily a study of the best use of
coercive power in the efffort to advance national self-
interest.144 In that case, the military strategists replace the
political scientists per se as the leaders in this area.
One of the results is the relative neglect of whole fields
of study which have least relevance to either economic or
strategies issues. African studies is a case in point.145
Secondly, in the policy area, the Rwanda study demonstrated how
policy was largely dictated, not by knowledge and analysis, but
by ignorance, misleading perceptions carried in the media, and
sentiment. When experience was ostensibly used - such as the
reference to Somalia -it was based on  both a misreading of that
experience and an ill-fitting application to Rwanda. And when
experience was relevant - such as that from Zaire - it was not
utilized.
From the theoretical side, as an example, in the United
States, those with knowledge of Rwanda were largely
anthropologists and historians, not political scientists let
alone foreign policy specialists. There was a simple reason.
Rwanda had not heretofore been a primary foreign policy interest
of the United States. It is difficult to undertake empirical
studies on foreign policy areas where one's own country has
little engagement. And where there were many studies of Zaire
because of the American involvement, they were overwhelmingly
critical - analyses of covert and hegemonic exercises in power
politics to advance American interests and engage in cold war
politics through proxy wars. If intellectuals cannot be the
moral guides of a state, they will inevitably play the role of
its superego. This was but a recurring instance of an endemic
character of universities. As the university developed, again
and again it would create groups of intellectuals concerned with
the moral marginality of the university and its failure to
resurrect its original mediaeval mission to create and set
universal moral standards for society.
There is an additional problem. It is difficult to
generalize from historical studies of the agents and issues in
a particular setting. The gap between politics as history and
politics as social science continues to plague academia so that
theory based on scientific abstractions lacked enough historical
specificity to be relevant, while the historical details of the
events in Rwanda lacked a comparative context or enough
generalization to fit current practices within a larger context.
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 In the Rwanda case, the Adelman/Suhrke report (1996)
pointed to the absence of any detailed diagnosis of what was
occurring at the decision-making levels. There were analyses. In
the United States, the State Department had scenario studies.
The CIA had undertaken strategic studies. As had Pentagon
advisers.146 The UN had a plethora of information and reports
which had not be subjected to systematic analyses. In France,
where the best studies had been done and they had influenced a
shift in French policy from unqualified support for Habyarimana
to support for the peace process, the ambivalence of the shift
suffered from both a time lag and the ambivalence of the policy
in place. More important than all these gaps in substantive
knowledge or the application of substantive knowledge even when
it was available, was the absence of a coherent process for
obtaining the knowledge and utilizing it.
But there are deeper problems. The conflicts between
various inclinations in foreign policy, as I have repreatedly
tried to point out, are but correlates to the disputes between
different theoretical schools. As long as there is such
confusion in conceptualizing the general problem, it is
difficult for policymakers to take scholars seriously, other
than to use them as rationales for their own propensities.
Thus, George (1993), who has over the past decades
demonstrated the greatest concern with the problem of the gap
between theory and practice, and who eschews confining himself
to concerns with instrumental (he calls it technical)
rationality, but is concerned with the broader realm of
normative considerations in what he terms value rationality, is
still a realist. He begins with the assumption that the
essential task of statecraft "is to develop and manage
relationships with other states in ways that will protect and
enhance one's own security and welfare." (xxiv) Thus,
policymakers have to clearly enunciate a state's interests,
prioritize them, and assess costs and risks in pursuing them.
Though George's framework was far broader than most
realists and included America's normative as well as material
interests and the role of knowledge as well as power and
interest in explicating and guiding political actions147, there
remained two problems. The material and power interest were
given priority. Secondly, the key normative interest, the
prevention or mitigation of genocide, arose late in the game.
Prior to that stage, the priority of material and power
interests meant that the intelligence analysis had not been done
or, when undertaken, had not risen to the top of the pile.
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Committed in one direction, in good part propelled by domestic
reactions to the perceptions of the Somalia involvement, it then
became very difficult to reverse course, especially when neither
the government nor the public were well informed on the issue.
Nevertheless, George's stress on the need for far better
conceptualization, especially in relationship to strategic
thinking, much greater generic knowledge based on comparative
case studies, and detailed analysis of actor-specific models
rooted in the detailed knowledge of a specific case is very a
propos. Placed in a larger frame as I have tried to do, I would
identify the problem as follows:
1. the absence of a institutionalized universal intellectual and
moral arbiter of international relations (as distinct from
foreign policy) issues;
2. the presence of a plethora of institutionalized source of
superego critique and analyses;
3. given the predominance of instrumental rationality modes of
analysis, the fundamnetal concern in classical realism with
irrational factors in conflicts in international politics has
been given a low priority;
4. too few theories attempt to be comprehensive to include not
only the analysis of the key component of coercive force and the
pursuit of economic self-interest, but the upholding of
international law as already agreed to, and the instantiation of
such law by application in specific cases and, what is more
difficult, the inclusion of normative criteria on which there is
already widespread agreement.
If these are problems in theory, there are also numerous
problems in practice. First, there is the reality that states
are not unitary actors but, rather, a playing field for
different bureaucracies to compete. Secondly, the problems are
so numerous with so many different players, and, since the
demise of colonialism, an historically deformed division of
labor as its legacy, that accountability and responsibility is
so dispersed that states who might be most suitable in dealing
with an issue are not assigned primary responsibility for
carrying the ball. This leads to the third problem, what is
widely touted as the absence of political will, but is really
the absence of informed intelligence, the absence of a
recognized division of responsibility, and the absence of an
effecive strategy formulated on the foundation of that adequate
intelligence base. Fourthly, and most critically, those who play
the role of universalist moral superegos do so presumptively
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without either a state-sanctioned recognized constituency base
or. where it does exist in the UN, with a totally inadequate
intellectual foundation to undertake that role.
The latter is particularly relevant since new technology
allows for the creation of such a base in real time. The
internet and e-mail allows an intellectually informed community
on an international basis to share information, analyses,
reaction strategies, and evaluate them critically and in terms
of value criteria to formulate strategic responses. More
significantly, it can virtually eliminate the gap between the
scholars and the practitioners for they can be exposed to the
same information. Selected academics can have access to specific
intelligence and information, and policymakers can share the
precedents and scenario analysis with academics. Further,
academics can be exposed to the political constraints and
contending views of all the parties who are involved in the
decision making process.
Of course, all the analyses in the world will not
substitute for the give and take and trade-offs required in
actual negotiations, of the need to respond on the spot to new
situations that arise. But as a senior civil servant avowed to
us in debriefings following a high level meeting, the sharing of
policy making functions with academics provided him with a
comfort and security level he would not have had otherwise. It
did not give him the answers. Academic analysis is no
replacement for diplomatic skill. But it did enhance his
performance considerably.
The experts brought to the table expert background
knowledge and information, general knowledge about the general
effectiveness of different 'sticks' and 'carrots' in different
situations. In one case, academics were not involved in a very
strong stick and carrot game brought to the leaders of a
government engaged in a militant policy against rebels. If the
government pursued the path of peace, large levels of financial
assistance would be forthcoming. If the government pursued its
extremist direction, the leaders would suffer a number of
ostracizing actions. Western governments conveyed that they were
unanimous in this position.
One month later, there was a military coup and the
extremists assumed exclusive power. Why had they  not bought
into the coherent stick and carrot game of the Western
governments? Because it meant surrendering their power,
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gradually at first, but not very long after that, totally. For
they represented only a minority. The sticks and carrots were
not at all comparable to their destiny if those leaders agreed
to compromise. Based on previous studies, the governments should
have been informed that the stick needed to be much bigger, and
the carrot had to include an out with long term security and
protection for the leaders. This entailed normative issues as
well which had to be taken into account. These and other factors
may have made the governments unwilling to use a bigger stick or
offer a basket of carrots instead of just one bunch.
Clearly, this would have led to different possible policy
options, with pros and cons attached to each. But a combined
academic/policymaking integrated approach to the issue could
have brought the best material together to develop the options
so that the choices could be made based on the best analysis of
the options given the actions considered to be feasible by
governments. Such judgements, which include the effects on other
more general policies and priorities, necessarily entail that
most judgements are about taking the least worst option rather
than making the optimally best choices. For all such judgements
are context bound. They are made on earth and not in heaven.
Sharing the process with academics provides the policy maker
with a constituency that can explain and communicate the
rationale for such actions, which bureaucrats have less freedom
to do.
Inevitably, there are risks entailed in such decisions.
Thus, when the NGOs, UNAMIR, and the government of Rwanda
finally agreed to act together to empty the camps for the
internally displaced, with a division of responsibilities in
carrying out the decision, the plan went awry in the final stage
of emptying the camp in Kibeho. (See Adelman and Suhrke 1996)
Part of the reason it went wrong was because there was a need
for a somewhat higher degree of mutual understanding and
cooperation than available at that time. One of the results was
that the micromanagement of the plan came off the rails. The
military went in too early. The weather was not cooperative, and
heavy rains led to chaos, panic, and a large number of deaths.
Given the mistrust each group had of the others, the general
propensity is for each to blame the other party, thereby
undermining the prospects of future cooperation. The presence of
academics involved in assisting in the planning, monitoring, and
evaluating afterwards could have decreased the degree of
remonstrations.
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This issue brings up another one - the need to make value
choices. The general rule is that refugees must be allowed to be
repatriated but may not be forced to repatriate. But when there
is alleged force which, in part, influences them not to
repatriate, and if their failure to repatriate means they will
remain in refugee camps not only for a long period at great cost
to the international community, but in a context that will breed
warrior refugees and the prospects of renewed militant action
against the new government in power, very difficult choices must
be made, not only trading off short and long term gains, but
different normative principles. Academic analysis will not make
the choices, but can significantly clarify the factors that have
to be taken in terms of the limited options available.
There is a timimg problem as well. Existing norms and
inertia feed the process of delaying a decision in the hope that
interim measures or intervening variables will make a hard
decision unnecessary. However, delaying a decision entrenches
the power of the extremists in the camps and the culture of
violence. Academics can remind policymakers that some decisions
cannot be postponed.
There are four criteria of this knowledge base which may
intially appear contradictory, but are, in fact, complementary.
First, the foundation of knowledge must be specialized and area
and temporally very specific. It must be rooted in real people
and a detailed knowledge of their desires and fears and the
reality contributing to appeals to those fears and desires.
"Because of the world's growing reliance on the knowledge of
specialists, networks of experts as learners and transmitters of
knowledge have acquired enormous significance." (Haas & Haas
1995, 257) That signifcance must be translated into an
institutionalized form.
Secondly, such knowledge must be interdisciplinary. No
single source of specialized professional knowledge is adequate
in dealing with these complex problems. Thirdly, the results
must break through the fragmentation in both theory and
conclusions currently pervasive in the intellectual community.
The learning cannot simply be the products of individuals or
even small teams; it must be captured in a system of learning
and communication. "While ad hoc and disjointed responses to
those challenges are likely to occur through most processes of
international relations, robust and resilient responses are
possible in multilateral settings characterized by well-
developed processes of organizational learning." (Haas & Haas
1995, 256)
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Finally, though I have indicated why universal values
imposed ab extra are utopian and irrelevant, and, moreover, in
their most abstract Kantian form provide excuses for the absence
of any external, agreed upon contractual basis for a global wide
basic agreement on moral norms, this did not entail any
opposition to developing such a global wide set of minimal moral
values embodied in legal norms and applied to all human social
and poltical systems. In fact, the analysis suggested that when
the current system developed in order to escape a hierachical
international one, the loss was a system of agreed and enforced
moral vales. But this monograph takes a distinctly
constructivist148 approach to those values. They are not given in
nature. They are not rights inherent in simply being human. They
are the products of experience and agreements. They emerge out
of the experience, convictions, and commitments of human
societies.
That means that the knowledge and case histories on which
the extraction of these values are based must be systematically
formulated and institutionalized. Further, rather than being a
product of academics and moralizers, it must of necessity be a
result of commumication and cooperation between and among
academics with those in the political and economic sphere,
Instead of the gramscian or neo-structuralist apporach which
presumes that because many of those in the most visible economic
sphere cater to the satisfaction of desires in the sales of
their products, and can accumulate wealth in the process, and
that because realist politicians are interested in fears and
security against those fears, that intellectuals should assume
a critical and detached role against the injustices of
capitalism and the anarchic state system, this monograph takes
a very opposite stand. Those in civil society in the economic
sphere, in particular those in corporations concerned with the
accumultion of wealth, and similarly those in the political
sphere, have been reified by theory which either endorses their
isolation from theory and values, or disparages and criticizes
it, instead of enlisting the creativity, concerns and insights
gained from those spheres of activity.
This has a practical byproduct. The use of such knowledge
is made easier. Instead of blaming a lack of political will or
narrow self-interests, intellectuals may do their jobs in
producing sufficiently qualitative analysis and communicating
those results to allow agreements of what is going on and what
might be done about it to emerge. "Learning is a political
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process whereby 'consensual knowledge' is applied by
policymakers to change their policy projects." (Haas & Haas
1995, 259)
But this requires including the policymakers in the process
of analysis and those in the economic sphere at least as users
of the results. For, as has been seen in the policing of the
international sphere, more can often be accomplished with a bad
rating in the economic sphere than human rights monitors have
ever been able to accomplish with bad ratings in their sphere
addressed as superegos to political leaders to reform their
ways. If moral reporting is shown to have poor political and
economic results, the bottom line can also affect the moral
behaviour of states.
There are synergies as well. To avoid the Scylla of
academic individualism (George 1993) or the Charybdis of
bureaucratic conformity in reporting as evidenced in some
American state department analyses of Rwanda, cooperation can
take advantage of the skills of academic critique and the
bureaucratic search for consensus. This means that critical
theory, the ability to engage in self critique as evidenced in
the cooperative work that went into the Rwanda report, can be
institutionalized. Learning should always include a self-
critique of why there was a failure to learn. This is based on
the premises of genetic epistemology and the studies of feedback
systems. There must be accomodation to reality a the same time
as there is adaptation in our conceptual understanding.
This entails institutionalization of the linkages between
academia, government and the economic sector and not just ad hoc
segmental temporary alliances. There must be an "unimpeded flow
of ideas and information 'upward' from universities, think
tanks, national bureaucracies, and advocacy groups. Such groups
serve as an early warning system of potential challenges to the
organization as well as a conduit of new responses." (Haas &
Haas 1995, 263)
The institutionalization of knowledge must entail a
division of responsibilities based on expertise and an
integration of that expertise in a common enterprise. In that
institutionalization, such knowledge is worth money. There is no
reason that the knowledge community cannot be not only self
sustaining, but profitable in the collection, analysis and
communication of that knowledge. Money can be generated for
fostering such an institutionalized form of knowledge through
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capital subscriptions, voluntary contributions and/or user fees.
Further, and most importantly, those societies which are being
analyzed must be an integral part of the analytic proces, both
because the development of such a knowledge or epistemic
community is critical to such a society moving away from
destructive actions, but also because "learning requires an
institutional design that provides for the provision of
nonpartisan scientific information about the state of the
[physical] environment, the regularized feedback of information
regarding activities by governments and firms, and the building
of developing countries' capacity to conduct monitoring research
and to apply it indigenously to their policy process." (Haas &
Haas 1995, 277)
These conclusions summarize the essential principles upon
which a global system of early warning to mitigate violence must
be constructed. Though there is agreement with the United
Nation's efforts to develop an early warning system - "To seek
to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could
produce conflict, and try through diplomacy to remove the
sources of danger before violence results" (Boutros 1992; 1995,
para. 15, 43) - there is not much agreement on its locus or
focus. Recently, the UN declared that the the DPA "is now
organized to follow political developments worldwide, so that it
can provide early warning of impending conflicts and analyse
possibilities for preventive action by the United Nations, as
well as for action to resolve existing conflicts." (Boutros
1995, para. 26, 13) Our analysis (Adelman and Suhrke 1996)
indicated no such thing.
DHA now prvides a distribution of events data on particular
crisis areas such as Rwanda and Burundi. But it includes no
analysis of the crisis. It includes no policy options. It
includes no analysis on the readiness of states to uses and
employ certain strategies. It includes little in the way of
detailed personality profiles of leaders and site specific
contextualized information. It provides absolutely no
application of generic knowledge based on past research to
indicate the likelihood of various response options working.
There is no study of interests and fears as well as readiness to
respond to indicate who might be best equipped to lead the
action. The presumption is always made that the UN will take the
lead.
In recent years the United Nations system has been
developing a valuable network of early warning systems
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concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear
accident, natural disasters, mass movements of
populations, the threaat of famine and the spread of
disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen
arrangements in such a manner that information from
these sources can be synthesized with political
indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists
and to analyse what action might be taken by the
United Nations to alleviate it. (Boutros 1992; 1995,
para. 26, 48-49)
For example, with respect to the absence of what George
(1993) called abstract models of strategies, and if key root
causes are identified as economic weaknesses, social
bifurcations, weakening political leadership and the
availability and demonstrated willingness to use coercive force,
what set of conceptual framework for strategy exists to play
with these elements to facilitate cooperation and a peaceful
resolution of a problem? What generic knowledge re mediation
exists? (cf. (Janice Gross Stein). Thirdly, what actor-specific
behavioural models exist and what are the key situation-specific
variables?
The UN simply lacks the mandate, the organization, the
expertise or the capacity to be anything more than a partner in
a global early warning system. Its presumptions to leadership
reveal precisely why it is ill-equipped to take up such a role.
Thus, there are a number of assumptions which must be made
in developing an institutionalized form of knowledge through an
early warning system designed to mitigate violent conflict.
First, there must be an appreciation of complexity and the
importance of integration of various sources of both knowledge
and action. Secondly, there must be an involvement already so
that there is a prima facie indication of the willingness to
make use of available knowledge; that means that states must be
integral elements of the collection and analysis of that
information to produce that knowledge. Thirdly, structured
authoritative information which has been subjected to
methodological analysis must establish a track record of respect
and value. But it does not entail that, "The first quality a
good manager must have is the ability to detect these signs and
predict events." (Augelli & Murphy 1995, 360) Early warning is
about anticipation and responding to prevent likely events from
occurring; it is not about prediction.
161
If it is indeed about taking control of situations, then
there must be an assumption of responsibility by agents who take
the leadership in directing strategy. This entails states
dividing responsibilities among themselves. States may not be
the wave of the future, but one should not make the mistake of
importing the future into the present. The states still remain
the most formidable and effective actors in dealing with such
situations. But there are far too many crises for each state to
act as an autonomous actor with respect to them all. Such a
spread of energy and resources dilutes the focus and makes the
assumption of leadership impossible. A preestablished division
of responsibilities for leadership in different crisis areas is
a prerequisite.
If some states are quasi-sovereign states in the sense that
they exemplify negative freedom but not positive freedom in
Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction, that is, they are run by
governments deficient in political will, institutional authority
and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-
economic welfare for its citizens (Jackson 1993, 21), then it is
suggested that such states be assigned as de facto (not de jure)
responsibilities of states who have achieved positive freedom.
Though, "independence and nonintervention (can be characterized)
as the distinctive and reciprocal rights and duties of an
international social contract between states" (27), as indicated
earlier, there all also rules of intervention governing
membership in the club of states. These rules of intervention do
not have to be be maximax rules, but minimax rules, minimum
conditions re protecting civilians to be recognized even as a
quasi-sovereign state.149
What interventions are envisaged? One of the research areas
required is the designation of an apprpriate inventory of
responses, most of which will be far short of introducing
military forces into a crisis area. Even if peacekeeping or
peace enforcement actions are undertaken, they must be based on
the intelligence analysis provided by an early warning system.
"Peacekeeping operations cannot be conducted without
intelligence-gathering and early warning capabilities. Although
member states often provide intelligence to the United Nations,
this is not the same thing as having independent inteligence
assets. The United Nations remains, and continues to remain,
handicapped in this regard." Oudraat 1996, 503.
This is not the only UN handicap. "UN efforts to develop
more robust early warning capabilities are hampered by the
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nature of the UN system - a semi-feudal patchwork of
bureaucracies and independent agencies over which the Secretary-
General has limited control. Coordination within the
Secretariat, between UN headquarters and field operations, and
among agencies is undercut by bureaucratic rivalry and
competition." (Oudraat 1996, 503-4)
These are but a few of the reasons why I have suggested that the
UN can be a partner in the system, but not the repository.
There are other reasons. The United Nations was created
based on the power of the nation-states which are its members.
First, the League of Nations was created under a paradigm of the
supremacy of the nation. The United Nations was created on the
foundation of the supremacy of the state. As a federation of
states, one might think that power increase as the number of
members increase. In fact, that power has been diluted as weak
states with particularist agendas have used the UN to attack the
strong and sometimes the vulnerable (Israel is an example). It
is a forum for debate but not for intellectual analysis, moral
leadership, or consensus. And it has itself been severely
weakened by the weakening of states in the face of
globalization.
This process was not helped by overreach after the end of
the Cold War. The Agenda for Peace was far too ambitious for
existing UN economic and administrative capacities, let alone
the longer term trends eroding its foundation. Further, when
states already weakening under the forces globalization are
expected to voluntarily undermine themselves further by
transferring degrees of sovereignty to the United Nations, it is
no surprise that they balk. When that same institution attempts
to serve as the moral arbiter of international behaviour at the
same time as it is itself a demonstration of moral
impoverishment both in the selection of certain leaders - Kurt
Waldheim immediately comes to mind - and in its absolute
inability to serve as the leader in the prevention of crimes
against humanity - genocide being a prime example - then we are
witnessing the evisceration of the central organization
envisioned to be the foundation for a system of global
governance.
The very institution that was to profit most by the end of
the Cold War has been its greatest victim. Why? because the Cold
War has been central to the existence of the UN. Contrary to the
view that the Cold War stunted the possibilities and goals of
the UN, the UN was but a symptom of the Cold War. It is,
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therefore, no surprise that the leader of the institution is
more concerned with defnsiveness than truth, more concerned with
prestige and reputation rather than performance. "(T)here is
continuing damage to the credibility of the Security Council and
of the Operation as a whole when the Council adopts decisions
that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not
forthcoming. The continuing problems with regard to the safe
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the expansion of UNAMIR in
response to genocide in Rwanda are cases in point." (Boutros
1995, para. 99, 36) Or, again, when discussing 'entrusting'
enforcement tasks to groups of member states, instead of an
analysis of the actual pros and cons of such options, the
primary attention is on how "the arrangement can have a negative
impact on the organization's stature and credibility." (Boutros
1995, para. 80, 29)
Nowhere does the leader of the UN assume responsibility for
any of the errors. The faults are always the responsibilities of
the members. The virtues solely accrue to the UN. Instead of
retrospective analysis, we find distortions and displacement of
responsibilities.
But if the UN is not to take the lead, should it be a
hegemonal power. Fortunately, whatever the faults of the United
States, it is blessedly a reluctant hegemon in the global arena.
"In the absence of a dominant state willing to lead, a strong
shared universal vision, or a world government, collective
responses to the global problematique depend on international
institutional mechanisms." (Haas & Haas 1995, 256) That
institutional mechanism must be built through a partnership of
like-minded states willing to assume international
responsibilities of this type.
But what would be expected of such states? They might
partner an early warning system, but, "This study also questions
the view that policy failures are invariably to be explained by
inadequate or faulty intelligence provided to top policymakers
and that the remedy lies in improving the quality of
intelligence...the more fundamental deficiency was the poor
conceptualization of several of the strategies and inadequate
knowledge of the requirements for making effective use of
them...The research needed for this purpose requires a
particular kind of analytic perspective on foreign affairs and
research methods that is more typically possessed by academic
scholars than by intelligence specialists. A partial exception
is with respect to what I have referred to as actor-specific
behavioral models...The challenge here is to find ways of making
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better use of the resources and specialists within the
governemnt and drawing more effectively on specialists outside
the government." (George 1993, 144)
An international early warning system is a necessary
ingredient. It is not sufficient. Further, an early warning
system should not be restricted to analyzing a crisis, but
should attend to the capacities and response strategies for
dealing with the crisis. In addition to understanding the
situation, the analysis should define feasible objectives,
devise strategy options, and propose how the response should be
managed. (Augelli & Murphy 1995, 350-358)
There are many dilemmas, of course, in applying this
formula to complex emergencies. Because they are complex
attending to one element affects all the others. But not
attention to some elements means that the solution will neither
be coherent nor comprehensive. However, the more comprehensive
and complete the analysis is and the proposals to handle them,
the greater the difficulty in implementation. Complex
emergencies entail complex and nuanced responses. These are the
most difficult to execute in contrast to the relative Black and
White of the Gulf War. "Nondecomposable problems are those for
which effective solutions must take account of all linkages.
Partially decomposable problems have solutions that ignore some
of the links and concentrate on others. Full decompasability
facilitates action, but the action is less and less frequently
effective under conditions of complex substantive issue
linkage." (Haas & Haas 1995, 257)
There are other dilemmas as well. One of the most critical
is that, "international motivations are weakest when options are
strongest, and motivations to act are strongest when options are
weakest." (Brown 1996c, 615) There is no direct corrolation
between efficacious action and motivation. We think early
warning dirctly correlates with more effective action. But
vagueness allows states to posture forcefully. Specific analysis
and assignation of roles encourages waffling because a decision
must be made and responsibilities accepted.
Given the wide range of options and the need to distinguish
between conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict
mitigation and conflict prevention as goals and of utilizing
various means including conflict prevention, conflict
management, conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, fact-
finding, mediation, CBMs, peacekeeping, arms embargoes and arms
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transfers, economic sanctions and inducements, judicial
enforcement measures, coercive force, coercive threats, there
are further excuses to always wonder whether another option
might be more effective, especially when there is any reluctance
to act in the first place. Here, the quality of analysis helps
shut escape doors. "The key lies in understanding the problems
different kinds of actions face and the conditions under which
different kinds of actions are most likely to be effective."
(Brown 1996b, 572)
Crises are inevitably complex and multifaceted. They have
deep roots, so those who accept responsibility must be in for
the long haul. Further, there must be a recognition of triage
(Cf. Adelman and Suhrke 1996) based on the significance of the
malevolence, the high probability of success and relatively low
costs of immediate action relative to the long term costs of
non-action, and where other parties are willing to share the
load, particularly those with direct interests in the conflict,
such as neighbouring states.
In the end, one has to be modest. After all, "the promotion
of peace will, in the long run, depend more on what happens in
the classroom than on the peacekeeping field." (Stedman 1996)
Developing an appropriate global epistemic community is, at the
very least, an institute of advanced studies to feed back into
these classrooms.
                    
1. Sweden, like Canada and the other Scandinavian countries,
basis its foreign policy on multilateral internationalism or
structural realism (Goldmann 1991) in contrast to the United
States which has a far greater propensity to base its policy
on classical realism as the inheritor of the leadership mantle
of the West and a country that has based its foreign policy
largely on nuclear deterrence focused on the Soviet Union.
Sweden is a member of the neoliberal institutional school of
practicing international relations. This paper recognizes that
as the premise for the study, but it is not the premise of the
paper. Hence, the paper has to be far more extensive in
exploring presumptions before offering any suggestions for a
program of action. The same, incidentally, would have to be
done if advice was being directed at the United states, but
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there would be a somewhat different emphasis in the analysis.
2. Epistemic communities are defined as "groups of like-minded
professionals, usually self-recruited around some paradigm
linking their lore to some aspect of a problematique." (Haas &
Haas 1995, 260)
3. Cf. an early work, Stephen Toulmin (1971) Human
Understanding, Princeton; Princeton University Press, and a
much more recent one, Cosmopolis......
4. Hilary Putnam (1981) Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
5. Richard Rorty (1991) Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. There are other who believe we can apply the same methods
used domestically to the international sphere. "We focus on
the shared beliefs that inform the practices of institutions,
thus augmenting attention to the formal rules by which an
exogenously determined set of values is authoritatively
determined and applied. We regard a problematique as an
intersubjective phenomenon and look at the social process by
which knowledge informs vision effectively into actual
governance. We develop a model to indicate the process by
which epistemic communities contribute to organizational
learning, and we develop a coding scheme to specify
organizational factors that are likely to facilitate the
conversion of shared visions into broad patterns of action."
(Haas & Haas 1995, 256) My own take is to suggest that this
amounts to prescribing a drug for a disease for which we know
the symptoms but are still ignorant of the aetiology,
physiology or even the precise anatomical location. The
recommended medicine may indeed be helpful in relieving
symptoms, but we are more likely to be successful if we
undersatnd the deeper source of the problem and precisely how
and why an epistemic community is needed and why it is
generally not used.
7. This misues of a single case by practitioners is evidently
standard rather than the exception given "the policymaker's
habit of relying on and often misusing a single historical
precedent." (George 1993, 13)
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8. "Unlike the historian, the student of international society
tends to deal with the general rather than the unique - with,
for example, wars rather than a particular was, revolutions
rather than a particular revolution, sanctions rather than a
particular boycott or embargo, the problems of peace-keeping
rather than any particular example." (Stern 1995, 4)
9. This was not just the conclusion of Adelman and Suhrke
(1996). "(T)he United Nations failed to protect vulnerable
populations and fulfill its humanitarian promises; its leading
members lacked the will to address the root causes of the
conflicts and to use force decisively; they simply treated the
humanitarian symptoms of strife, nd did so in a half-hearted
manner. The UN's credibility consequently suffered. Equally
important, the Security Council's impotence helped to
undermine respect for the principles of humanitarina law. Its
actions in these cases were not just ineffective, they were in
important respects counterproductive."  (Oudraat 1996, 501)
10. Again, this was not just the conclusion of Adelman and
Suhrke (1996). "(I)n the first test case (of PDD-25),
involving the genocide in Rwanda, the administration used its
new guidelines to slow the UN response, arguing that the
operation proposed by the UN Secretary-General did not have a
clear mandate and that forces and financing had not yet been
identified." (Daalder 1996, 484)
11. "The debate (on the universality of values, in particular,
human rights) is central to the development of more effective
humanitarian action by the international community, for at the
heart of it lies the authority of sovereignty....The
trend...has begun to point the way to a more defined legal
framework for humanitarian action even where sovereign
approval is absent." (Griffiths, Levine and Weller 1995, 34)
As one scholar put it, the attempt to keep peace where there
is internal conflict is always associated with intervention
and a breach of sovereignty. "As enforcement operations always
overlook the principle of consent, they are essentially
interventionist forces, where intervention is defined as an
attempt to get involved, or deploy military force, in a
conflict without the approval of all the parties to the
conflict. These interventions (Haiti, northern Iraq, Somalia)
appear to have set important legal precedents." (Makinda 1996,
149)
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12. (Cf. Stedman 1996a, 241-243; Callaghy 1987, 87-116.
Calaghy called such states "lame leviathans".
13. Re critical theory, see Linklater, Andrew (1989) Beyond
Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International
Relations, London: Macmillan.
14. For an attempt to construct a theory in a similar vein to
Dworkin in the field of international relations, cf. Brown
(1992).
15. Our report referred  to this factor as the 'shadow of
Somalia'. This factor was widely recognized as critical in
explaining US behaviour. "In the case of Rwanda, where 800,000
people were slaughtered and millions fled to Zaire and
Tanzania within the space of just three months in 1994, the
U.S. military's perspective coincided with that of other
officials in the Clinton administration and members of
Congress: this was seen as a situation in which the United
States ahd no direct interest and it was therefore best
handled by African countries working through the United
Nations. (In our report, we argued to the contrary that the US
sidetracked the desire of African countries to intervene) The
genocide in Rwanda occurred at a time when interest in and
support for humanitarian intervention among senior U.S.
officials had reached a low point. Still fresh was the debacle
in Somalia, where the mission had gone badly off track in mid-
1993 and thirty Americans had lost their lives with one of the
reigning warlords. To the lessons of Vietnam and Beirut were
added the lessons of Mogadishu, which counselled that military
intervention in an internal conflict for humanitarian purposes
should be left to others." (Daalder 1996, 475)
16. Brown (1996c, 622) recommends doing both in a 2-track
policy - coopting supporters with inducements and, if
necessary, "an aggressive campaign of neutralization: cutting
off arms and logistics from neighboring states; search-and-
capture or search-and-destroy missions. Taking forceful action
against militants and extremists is mainly the reposnibility
of national leaders, but there is much international actors
can do to help if they have the blessing of the local
political establishment."
17. Neither do classical realism or neoliberal international
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institutionalism for that matter. In fact, the conundrum
outlined could be considered a variation of some of the
dilemmas which plague the respective theories. For example,
Goldmann (1994, pp. 164-171) describes what he calls "The
Internationalists' Dilemma" in which there is no basis for
choosing between accomodating a party breaking rules in the
interest of fostering accomodation and compromise (in our
case, the Hutu extremists), and the requirement that
principles be upheld so that violaters of those principles
(the Hutu extremists) are ostracized.
18. The first is a point Edmond J. Keller makes in his
introduction (p. 11) and Donald Rothchild makes in his
conclusion (p. 228) of their edited volume (1996). Ibrahim A.
Gambari makes the latter point in his article in that volume,
"The Role of Regional and Global Organizations in Addressing
Africa's Security Issues." (p. 29)
19. "Even under President Carter -recognized by Africanists as
pursuing one of the most enlightened policies toward the
continent during the post-World War II period - Africa ranked
last in terms of foreign policy attention (see Table 2.1).
Whereas Africa accounted for nearly 11 percent of the Carter
administration's foreign policy behaviour in 1977, the
continent still trailed other regions of the world, and in
fact decreased in importance by nearly 50 percent over the
next three years. Indeed, the personal significance attached
to Africa relative to other regions of the world by Carter is
portrayed in his memoirs, which included only passing
reference to Africa." (Schraeder 1994, 13)
20. Very few international theorists pay attention to what is
generally known as "chaos" theory, even though they are
preoccupied with crises. One exception is Michael Nicholson
(1996) pp. 37-43. "Small changes in the area around the
bifurcation point lead to major changes in the system's
behaviour." p. 39.
21. This is often referred to as the butterfly effect. "If a
butterfly flies from one buttercup to another in June in
England instead of staying put, the minute change in the
climate 'causes' a hurricane in the Caribbean in the following
year." (Nicholson 1996, 43)
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22. For the best introduction to the chaos theory of the
Brussels school, cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers,
Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature, New York:
Bantam, 1984, or Prigogine's earlier more mathematical
version, From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the
Physical Sciences, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company.
For a model on how these systems produce greater order instead
of chaos, cf. the combined work of the Danish scientist, Per
Bak and his Chinese colleague, Kan Chen, and their theory of
'self-organized criticality.' (Cf. their article by that same
name in Scientific American, January 1991, 46-53, or their
earlier short version with Michael Creutz, "Self-Organized
Criticality in the 'Game of Life'" in Nature, 342:6251, 780-2,
December 14, 1989. Whereas environmental realists stress the
mechanical sub-state (Homer-Dixon), inter-state (classical
realists), and larger macro civilizational factors that need
to be kept in equilibrium, and idealists and liberal
internationalists stress the values and institutions that
ought to be put in place to prevent the system from spinning
out of control, this theory essentially argues that the
factors for producing a higher level of order are to be found
within the complex system itself. What is most important is
detecting the critical point at which a system can go from
relative stability to catastrophe. Let me illustrate this with
a simple childhood model. When we as children were fascinated
with building sand castles on the sea shore, we pile the sand
and introduce water to create a packing effect so that the
sand can be carved. But as we pile the sand higher or
introduce water into the moat, the pieces of the wall tend to
collapse into the moat. The key trick is to continue building
larger and larger. We reinforce falls and avalanches as we go,
but not to add too much so that the castle suddenly, and
irretrievably collapses in a catastrophic event that children
actually delight in because it allows them to vent their
furies and totally destory the product of their own
creativity. But the higher stage is reached when we do not
destroy the products of our own creativity, but recognize how
to preserve the castle in a critical state, at least until we
leave the beach to the vagaries of wind and water. Until that
point, we need to keep a wary eye on introducing too much sand
or water. The trick to maintaining relative stability is to
maintain a system at a sub-critical state rather than
producing a supercritical state where a single gain of sand
can destroy everything invested into a situation. As shall
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become clear, I am not a naturalist who is willing to let
nature take its course to see if order emerges out of chaos
spontaneously as it were. Quite the reverse. Humans are imbued
with a spirit, a geist, which allows them to increase order by
countering the downward trend of entropy. In that sense, I
share a kinship with the idealists. But like the realists, I
do not believe in introducing values and institutions ab
extra, but instead see the importance of using elements
already in a situation to use a bifurcation point to create a
higher level order. Humans, like God, are the intervenors in
balancing chance and necessity to create greater order. One
final point. The use of scientific analogies is not intended
to suggest that international relations can be understood in
the same way that the nature of the universe is grasped in the
laws of physics. The use of the language of physics is only
intended to be metaphorical.
23. Though 'chaos" is used here analogically, it also tries to
use the anology accurately in reference to the key elements of
chaos theory. Thus, though on the one hand, language is being
used metaphorically, hoepefully it is not obscurantist and
confusing. For a satire on the misuse of chaos theory to posit
a relativist world in which reflection is merely an exercise
in subjective projection, see the article by Alan D. Sokal
(1996) "Transgressing the Boundaries - Toward a Transformative
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity," Social Text, Spring/Summer,
217-252, and the commentary by Steven Weinberg (1996) "Sokal's
Hoax," New York Review of Books, XLIII:13, August 8, 11-15.
24. (Schraeder 1994, 107) This was even true of the African
pro-active Carter administration. "(D)espite a stated
commitment to human rights and the need to decrease ties with
authoritarian dictatorships, the Carter administration largely
failed to follow through on the promise in 1977 in the case of
Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (see Chapter 3). Rather strong
rhetoric in the first year of the administration gave way to
inaction and acceptance of a consensus within the national
security bureaucracies that Mobutu's fall would yield chaos
and instability." Ibid, p. 7.
25. Cf. Kaplan (1996) who, in  describing the great temple at
Angkor Wat, aptly captures this age-old approach. "(D)warfing
human beings out of all proportion, were seventy sandstone
colossi, about thirty-five demons lining one side of a bridge
leading to the entrance of the medieval city, and thirty-five
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gods on the other side. These turbaned sandstone giants, each
blotched with lichen, were pulling on the elongated body of
the 'cosmic serpent,' or Naga, whch serves as a kind of butter
churn - separating out the solid world and is social
structures from the mythical 'milk of chaos'." p. 424.
26. Cf. Holland, John H. (1995) Hidden Order: How Adaptation
Builds Complexity, Reading: Addison-Wesley.
27. Cf. Taylor (1994) for an analysis of world-systems theory.
28. "If behavioural analysis 'uncovers' or 'discovers'
anything, it is its own prespecified, theoretical meaning of
intervention." (Weber 1995, 18)
29. "(W)e cannot know the reality 'out there' because our
notion of what it contains changes with every twist of the
scientific enterprise. Man-the-knower is the victim of his
methods of acquiring knowledge and is therefore condemned to
settle for successive approximations to reality." (Ernst B.
Haas 1982, 25)
30. "Critical theroists argue that science is a social
phenomenon which grows up under certain social conditions and
reflects the values and power structure of the society in
which it is practiced." (Nicholson 1996, 171)
31. "We live in a disenchanted universe. Rational calculation
remains possible, but rational calculation offers not one
shred of advice about how one should live." (Walker 1993, p.
56)
32. "The Cold War was characterized by uneasy peace, tension,
and limited predictability in an international community
dominated by rival nuclear superpowers and ideological and
economic blocs; it took place from the end of World War II in
1945 until the dramatic political events in eastern Europe of
1989-1990, culminating in the collapse of the Berlin Wall and
the reunification of the two Germanies..The Cold War was also
characterized by political, ideological, and startegic
confrontations between the superpowers and by a fissure
between the East and the West." (Obasanjo 1996, 15)
33. See Clough (1992). In the policy of cynical disengagement,
policymakers are guided by three principles: (1) Do not spend
173
                                                               
much money unless Congree makes you. (2) Do not let African
issues complicate policy toward other, more important parts of
the world. (3) Do not take stands that might create political
controversies in the United States. (Cf. Schraeder 1994, 250.)
As a result, "The proportion of gross domestic product alloted
to development aid by donor countries has also declined, and
the global competition for donor assistance has intensified
because of the colapse of the Soviet Union." (Stedman 1996a,
264) Cf. UNDP (1994) "Africa Recovery, 8:1-2, April-September.
34. "(N)on-African states now have much less interest in
intervening in African conflicts, either to benefit from them
or to calm them. Apeals to outside powers for borrowed power
fall on deaf ears, and this same deafness is found among
African states as well. Who then will help Africa manage its
endemic conflict and insecurity?" (Zartman 1996, 52)
35. "(W)ith the end of the geopolitical divisions created in
the aftermath of the Second World War, a new fluidity has been
established in international affairs which heralds the
possibility of a new fluidity in political thought. These
circumstances present signicicant opportuniies for the
establishment of an international order based upon the
principles of constittionality and democracy -opportunities
which need to be grasped if the current revival of sectarian
politics and of the use of force, evidenced in the resurgence
of right-wing politics in Europe, the intensification of
racism and the spread of ethnic and political separatism
throughout the world are to be checked." (Held 1995, viii-ix)
36. A typical statement follows: "The ending of the Cold War
set in train a series of changes in international relations,
only the outline of which is yet clear. One persistent theme,
however, has been the growing emphasis on universality of
values - most forcefully expresssed within the context of
human rights." (Griffiths, Levine and Weller 1995, 33-34) This
description cetrainly suits the grotian perspective of the
authors, but I would suggest the growing emphasis on human
rights preceeded rather than followed the end of the Cold War.
Secondly, the aftermath of the end of the Cold War witnessed
the most flagrant, horrific and violent abuse of human rights
since World War II in Bosnia and Rwanda.
37. Cf. Lebow and Stein (1994) and Leffler (1996).
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38. Cf. Wohlstetter, Albert (1983) for a critique of the
Catholic Bishop's endorsation of a moderate realist policy re
nuclear deterrence. The Bishops claimed that nuclear
deterrence was morally acceptable, but only if there is no
intention to use the weapons and if you are working for
disarmament. Critics claimed that such a stance undercut the
very foundations of nuclear deterrence, and, hence, increased
the chances of war, thus making the moderate realist position
of the Bishops immoral. Cf. "Bishops, Statesmen and Other
Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," in Charles W.
Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds. (1983) The Nuclear
Reader, New York: St. Martin's Press, 58-76. or in Commentary
(1983) 75:15-35.
39. Jonathan Schell's (The Fate of the Earth, New York: Avon
Books, 1982) includes the apt simile to the rifle with one
barrel turned back on oneself. For an excellent depiction of
the doctrine of mutual kill, cf. Robert Jervis (1989) The
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
40. The dysfunctionality of the use of nuclear weapons is
depicted in Kenneth E. Boulding "What Power Do Nuclear Weapons
Give Their Possessors?" in Kegley and Schwab (1991a) 99-110.
Nuclear weapons, if used, are dysfunctional because they
create nuclear winter. Cf. Sederberg, Peter C. ed., (1986)
Nuclear Winter, Deterrence, and the Prevention of Nuclear War,
New York: Praeger, and the earlier, Peterson, Jeannie and Don
Hinrechson, eds. (1982) Nuclear War: The Aftermath, New York:
Pergamon.
41. "The Soviet Union...continued its build-up of nuclear
weapons far beyond what was required for MAD. Hence, MAD-plus
was adopted by both sides." (Goldmann 1994, 176)
42. Cf. Paul M. Katteneburg in Kegley and Scwab (1991a) "MAD
(Minimum Assured Destruction) Is Still the Moral Position"
111-120.
43. George Kennan created the rationale and formula for the
containment policy of the Soviet Union, which was designed to
confront the USSR with sufficient display of force (I stress
sufficient because he was in favour of moderation, caution,
and prudence rather than overdetermination) wherever and
whenever Soviet ideological or political ambitions threatened
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not just American interests, but the maintenance of a stable
and peaceful world. He also invented the Marshall Plan, the
second punch of the containement strategy, the creation of a
strong, viable, and independent Western Europe. Unlike
contemporary structural realists who wanted to deal with
objective, measurable factors such as the capacity of the
Soviet Union and the potential and actual displayed force by
America, political diplomacy and assessing the enemy persona
and intentions based on the past pattern of behaviour - as he
demonstrated in his "long cable" from his posting in Moscow in
1946 - were the prime keys to policy. As in Thucydides, force
constituted the endnotes, not the preface of international
relations. Reliance on force, Kennan believed, would make
America as arrogant as Athens, and thrust it into the role of
a hegemon for which the United States was unsuited. Further,
like his forbears and contrary to his contemporary realists,
Kennan knew that the real problem was not competing interests
but irrational factors, in particular, understanding the
insecurity of the Soviets who were driven by fear or pride to
undertake foolhardy intitiatives that were in the interest of
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. (cf. George
Kennan 1996)
44. Gramscians, incorrectly I believe, depict Reagan as a
liberal realist, but a real liberal realist and not a neo-one.
"The Thatcher-Reagan model can be treated ideologically as the
anticipation of a hyper-liberal form of state - in the sense
that it seems to envisage a return to nineteenth-century
economic liberalism and a rejection of the neo-liberal attempt
to adapt economic liberalism to the socio-political reactions
that classical liberalism produced. It takes the neo- out of
neo-liberalism." (Cox 1993b, 267) As a counter to this view
cf. see an insider's account: Stockman, David, The Triumph of
Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed, New York: Harper &
Row.
45. Kristol and Kagan dubbed Reagan's policy a doctrine of
"benevolent global hegemony." Cf. William Kristol and Robert
Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs
July/August 1996, 18-32. For them, "a hegemon is nothing more
or less than a leader with a preponderant influence and
authority over all others in its domain" (20, that is, a
hegemon is a moral authority as well as one with a
preponderant control of the instruments of coercive force.
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46. For an analysis of various theories for the end of the
Cold war, see Allan and Goldmann (1992).
47. This argument is very effectively challenged by Lebow and
Stein (1994). "Deterrence is widely credited with preventing
war between the superpowers and teaching Soviet leaders that
aggression would not pay. The central argument of this book is
that this claim is unfounded..We argue that strategies of
deterrence and compellance provoked as much as they
restrained" (p. 4) I have no argument with that thesis. But it
was the arms race behind deterrence and compellence, and not
the strategies themselves, which undermined the Soviet Union
even if the buildup of arms and their use in proxy wars harmed
the relationships between the superpowers.
48. Even Robert M. Gates (1996) acknowledges as much.
49. Many realists tend to forget that their mentor, Thomas
Hobbes, made concern with reputation as important, if not more
important, a motivating factor as self-interest (the desire
for gain) and power (fear of one's competitors). Cf.
Leviathan, 13:para. 6-7. Johnson (1993) has a very interesting
analysis of the role of pride in Hobbes.
50. Tunander, Ola (1989) "The Logic of Deterrence," Journal of
Peace Research 26: 353-365. In fact, I think this formulation
of the paradox is slightly incorrect. For it is not that
deterrence is not credible if these weapons cannot be used,
but deterrence is not credible if it is believed that the
other side is not willing to use them. It does not matter if,
in using them, they are useless.
51. Cf. Fisher (1985), Hardin et al (1985), Nye (1986) and
Paul et al (1986) for a discussion of the ethics of nuclear
deterrence strategy.
52. As shall soon become clear, I agree that we are now part
of a Globalalized World, but my disagreement is that this was
revealed with the end of the Cold War. I have an alternative
revelation thesis. The end of the Cold war did not unveil
previously repressed forces or a new world with which we were
previously unaware. The revelation has been about ourselves,
not the external world. The Cold War helped to produce the
high sense of moral commitment desired by the idealists, but
the unwillingness to back that idealism up with self-sacrifice
177
                                                               
and risk that the realists contend are central to any
political enterprise intent on collective self-preservation.
Hence, our unwillingness to see our states become involved in
overseas 'adventures'. As Goldmann (1994, 33) notes, L.
Freedman, in a paper on, "Control and order in the new
international system," given at a conference organized by
SIDA, the Swedish International Development Agency and the
Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Saltsjöbaden,
Sweden, May 18-20, observed that after the end of the Cold
war, "we are not faced with a revitalized UN but with
reluctance to get involved."
53. E.H. Carr (1946) described realism as focusing on 'what
was and what is' in contrast to the utopian focus on what
could and should be. For an attack on the realist position
dividing the world radically into what is and what ought to
be, Cf. chapter 2, Frost (1996) 41-72.
54. Thus, while agreeing with the distinction between the two
perspectives, unlike Ernst Haas (1983), I see the two
perspectives as complementary rather tahn facing one another
as polar opposites. "Theorists of regimes who identify with
closed systems will incline towards a homeostatic view of the
interactions between man, politics, and nature. They will opt
for a view of the 'system in equilibrium' and will tailor
their notions of regimes so as to restore equilibrium if it is
disturbed. Human adaptation is seen as 'learning to live in
the system'. Those who take the opposing view, however, see in
disequilibrium a warning and an opportunity to do better.
Adaptation to the system, for them, means learning the kinds
of lessons about interdependence among causes that will assure
survival to mankind, to specific states, or to a particular
form of social organization." Haas (1983) 31.
55. Cf. Hobbes' Leviathan, 13: para. 11-12 where civil war is
presented as a society abstracted from government and, hence,
closest to a state of nature. (cf. Johnson 1993, 4)
56. Cf. Johnson 1993 for a defense of Thucydides as not being
a modern or contemporary realist.
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57. Cf. Walker 1993, ch.2 for a defense of Machiavelli as not
being a realist - that is, a modern or contemporary realist.
58. "On all these points, Thucydidean 'methodology' presents a
different, sometimes completely opposite, point of view.
Actors' motivations are not so uniform or predictable. Anarchy
is not equated with constant fear, struggle and danger.
National interest is important, perhaps even depicted as the
preferable route to take for survival, but we have seen...that
Thucydides understands that survival may not be a state's top
priority. Whether this is attributed to hubris (as in the
downfall of Athens) or a sort of moral nobility....The
Thucydidean approach, morover, stresses the important role of
character of nations and leaders, and the role of political
rhetoric. In the Hostory it was the decline of the quality of
both that led to Athen's catastrophe." (Johnson 1993, 70-71)
59. Waltz (1979) claimed that it was an error "to mistake a
theory of international politics for a theory of foreign
policy." International relations provided a theory of
constraints on foreign policy rather than a theory of foreign
policy. (121-2; cf. George 1993, 110) George from a classical
realist perspective criticizes contemporary structural realism
for its failure to live up to its scientific pretensions.
"Although cast in the form of a deductive theory, structural
realism is not a full-fledged deductive theory, because its
key variables and hypotheses have not been 'operationalized'
so that outcomes can be predicted in specific cases. In
consequence, structural realist theory can make only general
probabilistic predictions. But since such predictions lack
grounding in systematic empirical analysis of the observed
relationship between relative capabilities and outcomes in a
large and presumably representative sample of interactions
between states, the theory cannot express probability in
statistical terms and is little more than a statement of
likelihood. Nor does structural realism do much by way of
identifying the conditions under which it expects its
predictions to materialize." (George 1993, 109) The
limitations of structural realism because of its restriction
to high degrees of generality can be summarized as follows:
- no ability to ascertain long term trends
- no help on how to promote peaceful change
- or how to avoid conflict and resolve it via diplomacy
- or how to achieve cooperation among states
- of how to understand and promote foreign policy learning.
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(George 1993, 112-113) There is also a historicist critique of
realism. Neo-realism "has the effect of portraying as natural
and universal a set of social relations which are historically
specific and socially mutable." (Rupert 1993, 83)
60. I am not concerned at this point in arguing that Grotius
would actually have qualified for membership in such a school.
(For example, cf. Forsythe (1992, 27) for a brief summary of
the case against his inclusion.
61. For a portrait of President Carter as a grotian, cf.
Rosati, Jerel A. (1987) The Carter Administration's Quest for
Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behaviour,
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. President
Clinton may also be a grotian, but he could be a utopian
moralist in realist clothing or a realist in moral utopian
clothing or simply confused when he makes humanitarianism a
matter of national interest. Bill Clinton (1995) in A National
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, defined three
levels of national interests: vital, important but non-vital
(that "affect importantly our national well being and the
character of the world in which we live"); and humanitarian.
(Washington: The White House) In giving priority to vital
national interests, he is a conservative realist.
62. "(W)hen one considers how international relations
theorists give accounts of history, concepts, and issues in
their discipline, they seemingly are presented with a choice
between two opposed options. They may provide explanations
from within the tradition of realism which takes individual
sovereign states as its point of departure. Alternatively,
they may give their accounts from within the tradition of
idealism which takes a community of sovereign states as its
point of departure." (Weber 1995, 1)
63. For a succinct summary of the Kantain paradigm, cf.
Hurrell (1990).
64. For an analysis of the concept of hegemony, see Cox's
classical essay, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International
Relations: An Essay in Method," (originally published in
Millenium, 12, 127-155 and reprinted in Gill 1993, 49-66) For
a summary, see Cox's other essay, "Structural Issues in Global
Governance" p. 264 in the same volume.
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65. In contrast, I will argue that technology is not a
determiant, but depends on seredipity. Further, paradign
shifts in mental frameworks and the role of the class
responsible for propagating such frameworks are also critical.
66. "Recent years have seen: Waltzian structural neorealism
forced to share pride of place with Keohaneian
institutionalism and neoliberalism; the emergence of
neoidealism and a revived interest in overtly normative
theory." (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 261)
67. For a very general version of this thesis, see Luttwak
(1996)
- "while the Cold War induced caution, present circumstances
evidently do not. A New season of bellicosity is upon us, and
it is inlikely to long endure without consequences. Because
wars have become less dangerous to fight, the danger that wars
will be fought has increased." (p. 34)
68. Cf. Huntington (1993a) and (1993b). Huntington,
particularly in his response (1993b), stated that he wanted to
"lay out the elements of a Post-Cold War paradigm" which would
replace both the descriptive and explanatory role of the Cold
War in dealing with international conflict. According to
Huntington, civilizations, not states, political regimes or
political ideologies, are the essential unit for understanding
international conflict. That conflict takes place along the
fault lines separating civilizations such as Western,
Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, and Slavic-Orthodox.
Huntington depicts Latin America and even Africa as having
separate civilizations so that the term 'civilization' begins
to lose any meaning other than large geographical divides with
some cultural correlates, though he defines civilizations as
being differentiated by history, language, culture, tradition,
and, most importantly, religion which give the people who
belong to these different civilizations different world views.
The most important fault lines are the ones dividing Islam
respectively from Eastern-Orthodox (in the Balkans), the Hindu
(in India), but particularly Western (in the Middle East)
civilizations. This perspective is not simply a theoretical
one, but a view held by American officials. "A fourth
significant outcome of the end of the Cold War is a growing
perception within the policymaking establishment that Islamic
fundamentalism is a threat to US interests on the African
continent. Many officials privately note that the decline of
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the Soviet Union and communism have created a power vacuum on
the African continent that could easily be filled by 'radical'
forms of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly the 'shia'
variant espoused by Iran." (Schraeder 1994, 253.) This view is
held by both officials at the highest echelons of policymaking
in the United States ("There appears to be a growing
perception at the highest levels of the policymaking
establishment that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to US
interests on the African continent." - p. 30) and at the level
of Foreign Service Officers, though the views of the latter
seem to be more contextually nuanced. ("These same
FSO's...when addressing the nature of conflict in a particular
African country, also tend to balance the traditional impulse
to attach blame to external powers - whether a communist
Soviet Union of the 1980s or a 'radical' Islamic
fundamentalist Iran of the 1990s - with a well-grounded
understanding of the conflict's internal cultural, economic,
historical, and political roots." - p. 17) But it is not only
the views of Americans. It is an obsession of African leaders
and the OAU. "The foremost issue that is challenging the OAU
in this respect is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, which
threatens the stability of the secular state." (Gomes 1996,
43) "At its fifty-sixth ordinary session in 1992, the OAU
Council of Ministers discussed the issue, and views were
expresses to the effect that the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism is the work of dissidents, extremists, and
subversives." (Ibid, pp. 43-44) Further, organizations, not
normally identified with realism, such as Human Rights
Watch/Africa have documented the reality of the threat. (Cf.
Human Rights Watch/Africa 1996, especially the part of chapter
7 pp. 193-219, dealing with freedom of religion for an account
of the discrimination practiced against Christians, forced
Islamicization of abducted Christian children, and other forms
of persecution against Christians and Islamic moderates.) For
other scholars holding this view, cf. Lewis (1993) and the
special issue of Current History, 94 (January), and Gary
Abramson, "Rise of the Crescent," Africa Report 37:2, March-
April 1992, 18-21. For scholars who, on a variety of grounds,
challenge the view that Islam poses a civilizational challenge
to the West, cf. Esposito (1991), Fuller and Lesser (1995),
Hader (1992), Husain (1995), Pipes (1983), Roy (1994), Sisk
(1992), Midlarsky (1995). Based somewhat on this material, but
mainly my own encounters with the fundamentalist branch of
Islam (as distinct from Traditionalists, Modernists or
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Reformists, and Pragmatists or Secularists) in both my survey
of the homeless and encounters with Khomeini Shiites in
Southern Lebanon followng the Israeli invasion in July/August
of 1982, and my own direct encounters with the leaders of the
intifada in the academic back channels exploring the prospects
of peace with the United National Leadership of the Uprising
(UNLU) in which Hamas participated while also remaining apart,
I have been convinced that the contest between Islam and
Western secularism, though real enough, will not be the
central arena of the next global ideological struggle.
69. Cf. Homer-Dixon (1994) for the clearest and most succinct
statement of this perspective. There are three causes of
environmental scarcity: environmental degradation and
depletion, population growth, and unequal resource
distribution. Like the macro-vision of the clash of
civilization doctrine, the conflicts produced are long term
and chronic, persisting through the superficialities of
political conflicts, but unlike the clash of civilization
model, the conflict is diffuse rather than focused, and sub-
national rather than supra-national. Unfortunately,
environmental scarcity produces conflicts that inherently
spill over borders. For example, of the many others who hold
this view, Stanley Hoffman (1990) wrote: "the weakness and
heterogeneity of some of these states and the pressure of
increasing populations, may well lead to violent regional
conflicts, as well as to formidable quarrels over immigration
and refuge to and expulsion from the richer countries. Two of
the problems that have become urgent, drugs and the
environment, could all too easily lead to confrontations
between advanced states eager to protect their health and
their future, and states such as those of South America that
need to cultivate drugs, or to forego struct protection of the
environment, in order to develop." (116-7).
70. Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hedley Bull, and Henry
A. Kissinger are names identified with Cold War realism.
George F. Kennan was a more traditional realist. For the
purpose of this paper, I will ignore the subtle differences
between realism and neo-realism, though generally traditional
realists tended to belittle the importance of democracy and
eulogize a high sense of culture and civilization. For
traditional realists, such as Kennan, that high sense of
culture was thought to be found in the past, whereas neo-
realists invested the contempory political regime with a high
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sense of moral value. In a broader sense of realism, writers
like Lewis and Huntington defined civilizations rather than
states as the operative category (see endnote 39). Traditional
realism was built on an assumption about human nature - namely
that "men [my italics] are ambitious, vindictive and
rapacious." (Cf. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers,
1961, No. 6, p. 54.) Chance counts as much as rational
deliberation. Humans operate within the confines of a short,
ephemeral life and very limited knowledge. The  real dilemma
is to choose that which is least damaging. To protect
themselves and survive, humans clustered into political units,
in the traditional view, states or federations of states. The
game of international politics was to enhance one's own
prosperity and power by seeking spheres of influence and
alliances to forge a balance of power between contending
forces. For realists, idealism, associated with Woodrow Wilson
or the founders of the United Nations, was suspect at the very
least in its ignoring of simple prudence. That idealism, when
identified with a doctrine of American exceptionalism and the
unique mission of the United States to bring the benefits of
liberalism and democracy to the rest of the world, was
regarded as both self-deceiving and downright dangerous. For
realists, the goals of foreign policy were inherently limited.
The postulates of international law and the force of an
international organization were illusory if they led one to
believe in the reality of a universal moral and political
authority or tried to substitute moral claims for state
authority and responsibility based on prudential rather than
principled judgement. The major difference between traditional
and neoliberal realists was that the latter invested the
national interest itself with "moral dignity". The high value
given to current political cultures thus served as the
foundation for a prudential internationalism rather than a
neo-isolationism or a very cautionary approach to
international involvements. But both schools opposed any sense
of obligation on one state to intervene in the violence,
external or internal, that embroiled parties with whom that
state had no abiding interest. Nor did a state have any
charitable obligation to develop the Third World. The
essential responsibility was conservative - to pass on the
world to future generations in at least no worse a state than
the one inherited. (Cf. Kennan (1954), Gellman (1984),
Morgenthau (1951), Niebuhr (1958), Kissinger (1974), and Bull
(1977). Kenneth Waltz (1979)  articulated a neo-realist
position which took into account the effect of international
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structures on states which remained the basic actors concerned
with relative power as the basic means of ensuring security
and, in the end, survival. However, neo-realists in contrast
to structural realists, continue to regard international
cooperation sceptically. For an excellent summary of the
traditional realists in modern dresss, cf. Donnelly (1992).
For a more extensive analysis and evaluation, cf. Smith
(1986).
71. "Realism and pluralism are both decision-centred
approaches to international relations and it is comparatively
easy to interpret them, as many have done, in terms of the
rational choice model. Classical realism takes the state as
the unit and attributes to it a particular utility function:
the maximization of power...The claims of big differences
between the pluralist and realist research programmes, which
go as far as claims that they are incommensurable, are
misconceived. They are rather close from a methodlogical point
of view, both being aspects of the rational choice research
programme." (Nicholson 1996, 151-2)
72. "Some analysts, particularly those who borrow their
imagery from the natural sciences, think of regimes as 'real,'
as factually and conceptually correct ways of describing the
reality that shapes regimes; others, primarily from the social
sciences, think of systems as heuristic simplifications of a
very complex reality." (Haas 1983, 30)
73. "The opposing conceptions of structure also contain
opposed notions of causation. Do human choices (policies)
shape the system or does the system determine the kinds of
policies worked out by the actors? Does structure precede
action or do actions bring about structure? Believers in
closed systems hold that the structure of the system sharply
constrains human choice; men and states do what they must in
order to survive. Causation, then, flows downward from the
system to the actors; the whole shapes the parts. The system
is animated by its structure and the structure consists of
lawlike propositions, derived from the theorist of regimes
from physics, genetics, or economics. If the structure is
'anarchical,' the actors must husband power to assure their
ability to practice self-help; if the structure is
'oligopolistic,' they must mix competition with cooperation to
prosper; if the law is natural selection, the actors must
compete for limited niches." (Haas  1982, 30-31)
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74. "The difference (with neorealism) is substantive, not
methodological: neo-realist theory presumes the essential
features of the international system to be nearly constant,
whereas internationalism presumes that some systemic features
essential for war and peace are variable." (Goldmann 1994, p.
198)
75. "The Grotian tradition that Hopkins and Puchala, and Young
draw upon, offers a counter to structural realism of either
the conventional or the modified form. It rejects the
assumption that the international system is composed of
sovereign states limited only by the balance of power. Rather,
Hopkins and Puchala suggest that elites are the practical
actors in international relations. states are rarified
abstractions. Elites have transnational as well as national
ties. Sovereignty is a behavioral variable, not an analytic
assumption. The ability of states to control movements across
their borders and to maintain dominance over all aspects of
the international system is limited. Security and state
survival are not the only objectives. Force does not occupy a
singularly important place in international politics. Elites
act within a communications net, embodying rules, norms, and
prinicples, which transcend national boundaries." (Krasner
1983, 9) As Puchala and Hopkins (1983) put it themselves, "the
tenets of the international regime come to match the values,
objectives, and decision-making procedures of the pre-eminent
participant or participants." (63)
76. "(R)egime particpants are most often bureaucratic units or
individuals who operate as pars of the 'government' of an
international subystem by creating, enforcing or otherwise
acting in compliance with norms. Individuals and bureaucratic
roles are linked in international networks of activities and
communication. These individuals and rules govern issue-areas
by creating and maintaining regimes." (Puchala and Hopkins
1983, 63)
77. Cf. Gardner (1990), 23-39. Idealists have also argued that
the state as a powerful source of loyalty and identity is
obsolete in the current globalized world so that so-called
'realists' are state ideologues rather than realists in the
ordinary language sense of the term. New supra-state
institutions are replacing and need to replace the state as
the ultimate unit of political authority. Cf. Rosenau (1990)
and (1992). See also Camilleri and Falk (1992).
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78. The failure to commit the economic resources required may
be blamed on a combination of factors in turn - the low
savings rates of wealthy societies such as the USA, inadequate
investments in education, research and productivity in the
obsession with speculative and short-term profits, or
narcissism and anti-state tendencies combined with a lack of
political leadership.
79. Cf. Frost 1996, chapter 4, 104-136 for an analysis of each
of these approaches. Bonante (1995) refers to them as realist,
utilitarian and deontological positions best represented by
the following respective books: F. Oppenheim (1991) The Place
of Morality in Foreign Policy, Lexington; G. Elfstrom (1990),
Ethics for a Shrinking World, London; D. Warner (1991) An
Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations, Boulder.
80. The following bibliography on Zaire can be used for a
fuller account:
Amnesty International (1990) The Republic of Zaire: Outside
the Law - Security Force Repression of Government Opponents,
1989-1990, London.
Gibbs, David N. (1991) The Political Economy of Third World
Intervention: Mines, Money, and US Policy in the Congo Crisis,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gould, David J. (1980) Bureaucratic Corruption and
Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Cse of Zaire,
Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press.
Kalb, Madeleine G. (1982) The Congo Cables: The Cold War in
Africa - From Eisenhower to Kennedy, New York: Macmillan.
Pachter, Elise Forbes (1987) Our Man in Kinshasa: US Relations
With Mobutu, 1970-1983; Patron Client Relations in the
International Sphere, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University,
PhD dissertation.
Schatzberg, Michael G. (1988) The Dialectics of Oppression in
Zair, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988; and (1991)
Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire, 1960-1990,
Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Weissman, Stephen R. (1974) American Foereign Policy in the
Congo, 1960-1964, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Young, Crawford (1985) "The Zairian Crisis and American
Foreign Policy," in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman and
Richard L. Sklar, eds. African Crisis Areas and US Foreign
Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 214-219.
Though I take a very different take on the case, the material
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is largely drawn from Peter J. Schraeder's excellent case
study of Zaire in chapter 3 of his 1994 volume, and Durch
1993b, although supplemented by a few other sources.
81. "In his last annual report to the General Assembly, he
(Hammarskjöld) noted that the purposes and principles set out
in the Charter 'lay down some basic rules of international
ethics by which all member states have committed themselves to
be guided.' Hamarskjöld felt deeply about those rules and
about the Charter in which they were embodied. The Charter was
many things to Hammarskjöld: guide, legitimating source for
all his actions, blueprint for the future, inspiration for the
present. To it and all it stood for he had pledged himself and
his best eggorts in this life." (Jones 1995, 144) Influenced
by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, Hammarskjöld belived
that, "Distrust was the curse of the twentieth century, not
just between states in the international system, but between
people in their daily lives as well." (ibid, 142)
82. Richard M. Nixon, "The Emergence of Africa, Report to
President Eisenhower by Vice President Nixon," Department of
State Bulletin 36, 930, April 22, 1957, 640.
83. "Conventional structural arguments, whether realist or
Marxist, see transnationalization as a direct reflection of
hegemony; high levels of trade and capital flows obtain under
the pax Britannica and the pax Americana. The regimes for
trade and money are largely epiphenomenal adjuncts that may be
invoked to legitimate this outcome, but they have little or no
bearing on it. Conventional liberals, on the other hand, hold
that high levels of trade and capital flows will obtain only
if there is strict adherence to open international economic
regimes, so that these become virtually determinative. Neither
formulation is satisfactory." John Gerard Ruggie,
"International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded
liberalism in the postwar economic order," in Krasener, ed.
(1982) 199.
84. "Great Powers in relative decline instinctively respond by
spending more on 'security,' and thereby divert potential
resources from 'investment' and compound their long-term
dilemma." Kennedy (1987) xxiii.
85. "Traditionally wary of placing its advisers (and therefore
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its credibility) under the command of even a US-dominated
multilateral UN force, the Defense department preferred
dealing directly with the Zairians on a bilateral basis. Most
important, the decision signalled the beginning of a movement
away from the Africanist coalitions ideal of fostering a
moderate and democratic civilian regime in favor of the CIA's
preference for a military strongman capable of ensuring
stability." Schraeber (1994) 66.
86. "US policy was itself a matter of contention between
liberals and conservatives who took very different views of
African nationalism, the role of Communist influence in the
region, and the relative importance of good relations with
Third World countries when that goal clashed with traditional
relations with NATO allies, several of whom retained colonial
empires. These tensions existed within the State department,
within Congress, and among the media's many shapers of public
opinion. They reduced the Kennedy Administration's flexibility
and made it reluctant to endorse the use of force by the UN
until it was eminently c;ear, in late 1962, that force was the
only remaining option." (Durch 1993b, 323)
87. For Kennedy, the "only real question is whether these new
[African] nations will look West or East - to Moscow or
Washington - for sympathy, help, and guidance in their effort
to recapitulate, in a few decades, the entire history of
Europe and America." "The Challenge of Imperialism: Algeria,"
in Theodore C. Sorensen, "Let the Word Go Forth": The Speeches
 Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy. New York:
Delacorte Press, 1988, pp. 331-37. Cf. also his speech in that
same volume, "The New nations of Africa." pp. 365; 368.
proposal for a bold imaginative, development program for
Africa. "We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of
maneuver in the worldwide competition between the communist
bloc and the non-communist world." John F. Kennedy,
Memorandum, "Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Africa,"
Washington: US Department of State, March 1962, p. 1., in
Africa: National security Files 1961-1963, Reel No. 1,
microfiche, University Publications of America. For a
discussion of Kennedy's views, cf. Schraeder (1994), 15, 32-
34, 69, 59-69, 108-109, 200-206.
88. George Ball, The Disciples of Power. Boston: Little Brown,
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1968, p. 240. Cf. Schraeder (1994) p. 15.
89. Schraeder (1994) 15.
90. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, G.
Mennen Wiliams, testified before a closed hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that, "If we pulled out
completely and the Russians could fill this vacuum in the
center of Africa, we would soon lose much, if not all, of
Africa." (ESFRC 13:1, 116; in Durch 1993, 322) The domino
theory had been promulgated before in Africa before the
Americans were even involved in Vietnam.
91. "The Africans within the administration, led by Ambassador
Gullion, skillfully used the threat of a possible communist
victory to convince Kennedy of the need for more forceful
action as favored by the African-Asian bloc. Toward this end.
Kennedy instructed Stevenson to vote for a November 24
Security Council resolution which permitted UN troops, if
necessary, to employ 'a requisite measure of force' to expell
foreign mercenaries and advisers from Shaba. After a bruising
NSC meeeting during the first week of December in which the
Africanist position prevailed, Kennedy also ordered the
defense department to place twenty-one transport planes at the
disposal of the UN command to facilitate a major airlift of
miltary equipment and personnel. However, rather than
achieving a quick victory over Tshombe's forces, the long-
awaited UN offensive quickly bogged down in the face of strong
ground resistance." (Schraeber 1994, 63)
92. "For its first eight months, ONUC found itself in an
impossible situation: reluctant to withdraw, for the sake of
the civilian populace; reluctant to take sides, to preserve a
semblance of impartiality; and unable to take significant
military initiatives, because the mandate was interpreted to
forbid such actions, particularly by Hammarskjöld, who was
strongly averse to violence. ONUC therefore marched in
place..." (Durch 1993b, 327)
93. "The Kennedy White House's decision to move away from the
Africanist coalition's ideal of fostering a moderate coalition
regime in favor of the ahrdliners' preference for a military
strongman capable of maintaining stability constituted an
important aspect of growing US involvement in the paramilitary
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war...The addition of Tshombe to the central government
created a bureaucratic rift within the US policymaking
establishment which further revealed the declining fortunes of
the Africanist coalition in favor of the more hardline views
advanced by the CIA." (Schraeder 1994, 69)
94. A CIA reorted in a statement of supreme irony given
subsequent events that Mobutu "with careful and skillful
exercise of power, plus an unusual amount of luck (translate
that as CIA assistance), has brought the Congo to its present
pacified position." CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "Mobutu
and the Congo," Special Report, Weekly Review, 23 June 1967,
1, University Publications of America, CIA Research reports
(Africa 1946-1976), microfiche, reel 2; cf Schraeder 1994, fn.
84, 281.
95. "(T)he twin goals of the CIA's bureaucratic mission in
Zaire - the permanent disposal of Patrice Lumumba and the
creation of a pro-Western military government capable of
maintaining stability - were initially thwarted by the arrival
of Rajeshwar Dayal, the new Special Representative of UN
Secretary-General Hammerskjold." (Schraeder 1994, 57)
96. Schraeder (1994) 86; see also US Senate, Committee on
Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, curity
Supporting Assistance for Zaire,
Hearings, October 24, 1975, 94th Congress, 1st Session,
Washington: GPO, 1975.
97. Schraeder (1994) 86.
98. "The issue of human rights reforms was a characteristic
starting point for the Carter administration and figured
prominently in State Department instructions to the US Embassy
in Kissasha. Although willing to recognize that human rights
'problems' existed in Zaire, the State Department believed
that it was improper to designate the country as a 'gross and
consistent violater' of those rights. More problematic was
that several Africa specialists within the State Department's
Africa Bureau had serious misgivings about the human rights
approach (which were shared by their counterparts at the CIA
and the Pentagon). According to these officials, especially
those who had served in Zaire, not only was Mobutu an
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'unavoidable evil' who had to be dealt with, there was, in
actuality, 'very little' that Washington could do to make
Mobutu meet the human rights demands of the Carter White
House. In short, for a bureaucracy which perceived its mission
as the maintenance of untroubled relations with African
regimes, the sensitive issue of human rights threatened that
mission." Schraeder (1994) 89-90.
99. "According to this realpolitik-inspired vision of the
international system, power politics, military preparedness,
and a resolve to intervene remained essential components of US
foreign policy in the post-Cold war era. However, the Bush
administration tempered its realpolitik vision with a
pragmatic desire to enhance the role of regional and
international institutions within the international system,
albeit as instruments for the promotion of US security
interests." Schraeder (1994) 35. In other words, Bush was a
liberal realist. This also serves to explain Bush's disastrous
policy for Somalia. "As the death toll continued to mount and
Aideed's opposition to a UN force remained, nongovernmental
organizations in the United states began to press for a
forceful intervention to protect relief operations. Caught
between a desire to address a major humanitarian disaster that
had widespread television coverage and military advisers who
feared protracted involvement in a civil war, U.S. President
George bush put forward a compromise: the United states, under
the mandate of theUnited Nations and in conjunction with other
nations, would intervene in Somalia in order to break the
famine." Stedman 1996a, 255.
100. Schraeder (1994) 102.
101. "A small group of military and civilian associates of
President Mobutu, all from the same ethnic group, control the
city of Kinshasha by virtue of the loyalty of the 5,000-man
Presidential Guard known as the DSP. This same group also
controls the Central Bank which provides both the foreign and
the local currency needed to keep the DSP loyal. While the
ruling group has intelligence information about what is going
on in the rest of Zaire, there is no real government authority
outside the capital city. (Cohen 1993, quoted in Weiss (1995)
157) "(E)lites who become the 'bastions of democracy' and,
therefore, staunch U.S. allies have usually been traditional
dictators who lack popular support, concern themselves
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primarily with personal aggrandizement, and therefore
demonstrate a general disregard for social reform or braodly
shared development policies. The core of the problem is that
these dictators (whether of the right or the left) seek
legitimacy in the form of external economic and military aid
in the international arena rather than attempt to build a
popular basis for support among their own people. When the
United States has been willing to fill the role of patron by
dispensing generous amounts of aid, the dictator's need to
foster popular domestic legitimacy is sorely circumscribed.
Likewise, as dissent against the regime grows, the tendency is
toward greater repression than reform." (Schraeder 1992, 399)
102. "President Clinton's selection of Anthony Lake as
national security Adviser and Warren G. Christopher as
secretary of state suggested a return to the regionalist
policies reminiscent of the Carter administration. As a
result, the administration can be expected to downplay the
foreign dimensions of conflicts in Africa in favor of their
internal roots, and recognize the potent force of African
nationalism as a constraint on intervention by foreign powers,
including the United States." Schraeder (1994) 35.
103. "If one judges the internal functioning of the Zairean
state as it exists in 1994, and indeed has existed for quite a
few years, one must conclude that it has virtually
disappeared. The state's 'responsibility' to seek the welfare
of its citizens has been almost totally neglected. In fact,
little remains of the state's role as a provider of health
care, education, justice, the maintenance of the country's
infrastructure, and so forth." (Weiss 1995, 157) "If some of
the new tests of legitimacy (human rights, internal conditions
that threaten to disturb peace in the region) were to be
applied to Zaire, the legitimacy of the Mobutu regime would be
very much in doubt." (Weiss 1995, 158)
104. "The obstinate refusal of Mobutu to cede power may yet
have the effect of destroying the state. Over time this has
become a more real possibility, because in addition to the
dictatorial methods he has always employed (terror and the use
of state funds to buy support) he has now encouraged
interethnic hatred and conflict to such an extent that the
specter of secession has reappeared." (Weiss 1995, 159)
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105. The preparation of PDD-25 setting very restrictive
conditions for UN involvement in peacekeeping was already
underway. PDD-25 was Presidential Decision Directive 25
released in May 1994, the Clinton Administration's Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Washington: Bureau of
International Organizational Affairs, Department of State; for
a discussion of cf. Daalder (1996) 480-484.
106. For an excellent sceptical critique of the record and
prospects for forceful intervention, see Stedman (1996a).
107. I am referring here to political neutrality. Humanitarian
neutrality is a complementary doctrine usually considered
easier to defend. In contrast to my view, there are many
defenses, and some see the doctrine to be in grave peril. "The
traditional - and underexamined - notion of neutrality of
humanitarian action is severely at risk. It is ironic that at
a time when universality of values, based on a shared view of
human rights, is receiving greater attention than ever before,
the fundamental principle of humanitarian work is in jeopardy,
namely that assistance is given to those who need it without
discrimination except in their favour. This is the doctrine of
humanitarian neutrality." (Griffiths. Levine and Weller 1995,
35. In contrast, there are many criticisms of neutrality
applied to Rwanda in the humanitarian area as well as the
political one: "in the Goma camps in Zaire, international
relief agencies supplied food, water, medicine, and shelter to
rwandan refugees, many of whom were armed and some of whom
dressed in military fatigues. Since humanitarian assistance
was not predicated on the demiltarization of the camps and
because the Zairean armed forces were unwilling to disarm the
Rwandan military and mebers of the government who were
implicated in the genocide of 1994. Not only has humanitarian
assistance protected gross violators of human rights, it has
enabled the Rwandan military to regroup and retrain in order
to prosecute the war anew." (Stedman 1996a, 247)
108. "The singular passions of men may combine to form into
the sedition of a nation; in such an instance, men may adopt
the mistaken notion that they have the whole truth, which
makes them think themselves special when they are not (l, 8,
par. 22). Vainglory, one might say is a drunkenness produced
by one's own conceit. The pride that brings about folly can
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never be deserved. One cannot possibly have good judgement
when under the influence of pride. Thus the natural and common
delusion of pride keeps human beings from seeing their true
interst, from feeling fearful in situations in which rational
fear is justified. Oride stands in the way of the order Hobbes
wished to impose on society, because men will destroy for
vanity what is in their own best interest." (Johnson 1993, 13)
109. I say most deliberately. There are some theories who take
into account the irrationality of leaders. Some argue they
must be taken into account. (George 1993) But most often these
analyses are concerned with cognitive dissonance, with the
inability of a leader to adjust his or her prorities or
perceptions given the reality faced. (Cf. Jervis 1976) Hobbes
is more concerned with a deeper level of irrationality which
is taken into account by some analysts. See, for example, the
analysis of Pol Pot in Findlay 1995.
110. Whether this is a consequence of their concern with the
issue of cheating in international relations, a problem which
the realist model was unable to deal with, I am not sure.
111. Cf. Stedman 1966b for a succinct summary of most of the
critical components of an effective conservative realist
mediator. For a more detailed analysis of cases to argue why
grotians cannot mediate successfully, cf. Toval and Zartman,
eds, 1985.
112. Indirect reciprocity is "the possibility [not necessity]
that not only bilateral agreements but also multilateral norms
risk being undermined by single violations. The idea that
reciprocity makes subjects abide by norms presumes that actors
take into account how a violation on their part might affect
the future behaviour of others. In the case of direct
reciprocity, actors are thought to be deterred by the negative
consequences of increasing the freedom of action of a
particular adversary. In the case of indirect reciprocity,
they are thought to be deterred by the risk of increasing
everybody's freedom of action...This thought would seem to be
essential for a theory of internationalism. It implies: (a)
that whether a norm is obeyed or disobeyed in a particular
instance affects its future effectiveness as well as the
effectiveness of other norms; and (b) that governments find it
more important to keep the freedom of action of others
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constrained than to do what is most advantageous to themselves
in the immediate situation. The latter is Kant's asumption.
The former adds a new element. The reciprocity argument is
that rules are effective because their future effectiveness
would be impaired." (Goldmann 1994, 35)
113. Thus, for example, our report indicated the shift in
Franch policy in 1992 and 1993 from conservative realism to
liberal realism as symbolized and expressed by the change of
ambassadors to Rwanda. In fact, that shift had already been
underway earlier. "After President François Mitterand asssumed
office, France sharply curtailed its tendency to intervene
militarily in African affairs...Since the end of the Cold War,
there has been a significant shift in French policy toward
Africa. France is now less interested in military intervention
than it is in creating an enabling environment for liberalized
economic policies." (Keller 1996, 10) In other words, ten or
perhaps fifteen years earlier, the RPF would not have had a
chance because the extremists would have been right in their
expectations; France would have likely intervened forcibly on
their behalf.
114. As Helen Fein noted, "both (kurt) Jonassohm and (Barbara)
Harff recognize the difficulty of explaining the apparent
irrationality (if viewed solely in terms of material and
political costs and gains) of modern ideological genocides."
(Fein 1992, 5)
115. Thucydides and Hobbes were not the only ones to speak of
the sense of self-esteem as a motivation for genocide. For
example, cf. Sigmund Freud (1951) Group Psychology and the
Analysis of the Ego, New York: Liveright Publishing. See also
H. Kobut (1978) "Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic
Rage," in P.H. Ornstein (ed.), The Search for The Self:
Selected Writings of Heinz Kobut: 1950-1978, New York:
International Universities Press, Vol. 2. For an application
of these psychoanalytic theories of group rage and violence
when the "narcissim, self-esteem, and sense of self seem
threatened," to the Bosnian genocide, cf. C.G. Schoenfeld,
"Psychoanalytic Dimensions of the West's Involvement in the
Third Balkan War," in Stjepan G. Mestrovic, ed. (1996)
Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan War, London:
Routledge.
116. The same motives seem to have characterized the Tutsi
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extremist military leadership in Burundi.
117. "In genocides and mass killings that follow
decolonization, as in Burundi and Biafra, deap-seated
historical conflicts can come to the fore in the context of
profound social-political change. A history of conflict and
antagonism fuels a power struggle that ends in genocide."
(Staub 1989, 86)
118. Cf. Chrétien 1995, 13; Africa Rights 1994, 37; Cf.
Lemarchand 1992 and 1994, 3, for his critique of this thesis
as well as the thesis that the genocide was an eruption of
age-old hatreds.
119. Malkki's book is one of the best documents on the world
views of refugees in camps and the mythico histories which
refugees in camps construct which both explain their position
that determined their fate. That the book was the result of
research on Hutus from Burundi was fortitous. It certainly
corresponds to my own reading on other refugees generally and
on the Palestinian refugees with whose views I am more
familiar. This is also one reason that I have little concern
that the research was undertaken with Hutu refugees from
Burundi rather than Hutus from Rwanda.
120. For Palestinians, it is the first arrival of the Zionist
settlers culminating in the 1948 war in which the Palestinians
were driven into exile. For the Hutus in Burundi it was the
1972 massacres.
121. The institution was known as ubuhake wherein a patron
gave a cow to a client and, in return, the client provided
services in return for protection. There were, in fact, other
agricultural forms of patron-client relations - ubukonde, for
example. Further, the system was made truly oppressive under
the Belgian colonial regime. (Cf. Newbury 1988)
122. At Geneva in June (1996), just prior to the Rwanda
Roundtable, the Canadian delegation led a united delegation of
donors in a meeting with the Burundi authorities offering the
country powerful economic inducements once they unequivocally
moved to restore constitutional government in Burundi along
with the unequivocal assertion that external sources of unds
would be cut off. The Canadians were very optimistic about the
outcome of the meeting. One month later, there was an
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effective army coup in Burundi and the Hutu president fled to
the United States embassy for safety.
123. For two complementary readings of Augustine, but going in
opposite directions, cf. Milbank (1990) and Connolly (1993a).
For a brilliant analysis of both, cf, Heilke (1996).
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